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Supervisor: Wendy Hunter
What effect does partisan ideology have on education outputs (spending) and outcomes
(access and quality) in Latin American democracies? Political left and right are defined
based on divergent beliefs about inequality. Given that education has been touted as being
essential for poverty reduction and equity enhancement, does the left devote greater resources
to this sector? Previous work in the OECD has found that the left outperforms the right
in this way. Do Latin American countries follow the same pattern? Within the education
budget, the left may also be expected to devote greater resources to primary and secondary
education (because these levels are more progressive than tertiary) and to staff expenditures
(because of the left’s historical connection with the teachers’ unions). Is this expectation
borne out in reality? Further, do left and right produce systematically different education
outcomes? Are students more likely to enroll and complete their education and are they
more likely to learn more under either end of the political spectrum? This project attempts
to answer these questions.
I find that contrary to expectations, there are no systematic differences between left and
right on either education outputs or outcomes. I argue that this surprising result is due
to three political factors: policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert advice. These
forces push left and right toward similar education policies, which in turn result in con-
vergence on observed outputs and outcomes. Policy legacies limit the scope of potential
vii
policy reforms through bureaucratic inertia, short-term political and capital costs, and prac-
tical constraints. Powerful vested interests, namely the teachers’ unions, place pressures on
both left (their traditional allies) and right that cannot be ignored. Other organized actors,
including business elites and parents, also have the ability to pressure politicians, but are
secondary actors in this area. Finally, technocratic experts recommend policy strategies that
remain consistent regardless of the ideology of the party in power. An increasing tendency
by both left and right to rely on these experts further contributes to convergence.
I explore this alternative theory of convergence in Chile, tracing education policy since the
return to democracy in 1990. I find that the center-left and left were severely limited by the
policy legacies of the military regime as well as electoral pressures from the teachers’ unions
and students. A willingness to rely on technocratic expertise also encouraged the left to
converge on many education policies with the right. The left was only able to address equity
through small, targeted programs. After 24 years of democracy, policy legacies had weakened
and electoral pressures changed sufficiently that a more strongly left government was able
to ignore expert advice and push through policies in line with ideological preferences. These
new policies have already left legacies of their own that have constrained the governments
of the right.
This project seeks to contribute to an understanding of partisan politics in Latin America
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Education is an inherently and intensely political endeavor, intimately connected to
nation-building, economic development, and human rights. All governments can use the ed-
ucation system to propagate political values and develop citizens in the image of the regime
(Paglayan 2018; Farnen and Meloen 2000) and contribute to nation-building efforts (Bendix
2017). Education is often lauded as the pathway out of poverty for individuals, and a force
for economic development and equity enhancement for nations (Psacharopoulos and Patri-
nos 2004; Hanushek and Wößmann 2007; Woessmann 2016). Finally, education is a basic
human right (UN General Assembly 1948). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set
universal primary education as one of their metrics (World Health Organization et al. 2008)
and their replacement Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) added universal secondary
education to this list (UN 2015). For these reasons, education and the politics that shape
these education systems merit attention by political scientists.
Despite these political connections, the political science discipline largely ignored educa-
tion as a research topic for several decades (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011), an omission
noted at least 30 years ago by Clark (1986). As Gift and Wibbels (2014, p. 292) write,
Political science…is oddly underrepresented among social science disciplines in
the study of education. It is hard to identify a community of political scientists
who are dedicated to the comparative study of education, and the richest body of
work is rather specialized in its focus on the OECD. By contrast, it is common
for economics and sociology departments to have faculty who concentrate on
domestic and international education, and it is easy to identify the relevant
research communities.
Recent work in political science (e.g. Moe and Wiborg 2017b; Ansell 2010; Jakobi,
1
Martens, and Dieter Wolf 2010) has started to address the political connection in a more
systematic way.1 This recent wave of political science literature on education politics con-
siders the subject from a more multi-faceted approach — the politics of education provision.
This study looks to contribute to this new research agenda. It asks, what are the political
factors that drive education outputs (spending) and outcomes (access and quality)? How
does partisan ideology affect investments in human capital development and the learning
outcomes that these investments produce? In short, is the political left or right better for
enhancing education?
I investigate this issue with respect to Latin America. In looking at partisan determinants
of human capital investment, this study extends recent scholarship. Much of this literature
is focused largely on countries in the Organization for Economic Development (OECD).2
This study strengthens the current scholarship by testing the robustness of current findings
and whether the results in the literature are specific to the OECD. It is an open question
whether the findings there also apply to the context of persistently high inequality in Latin
America. This study addresses this limitation and brings the region the focus it deserves.
The existing scholarship has argued that political ideology drives education outputs3 (e.g.
Ansell 2008a; Psacharopoulos and Woodhall 1985). I present evidence that ideology explains
very little in terms of either outputs or outcomes in Latin American education. This result
is surprising — left and right have distinct beliefs about what education systems should look
like, the appropriate relative size of the government, and the government’s role in actively
enhancing equity. Left and right also have divergent relationships with the teachers’ unions
1This is not to downplay the important contributions of scholars looking at the politics of teachers’ unions
(Cook 1996), episodes of education reform (Grindle 2004), or the relationship between political factors and
human capital accumulation (Brown and Hunter 2004). Rather, it is an argument that within the political
science discipline, there has not been a systematic research agenda to look at the relationship between
education and politics.
2A full list of acronyms used in this project can be found in Appendix A.
3Note that throughout I conceptualize education outputs and outcomes as education policy outputs and
outcomes. That is, I focus on the political inputs and the consequences for education via policy. Thus where
others describe spending on education as an input, I view it as a policy output and a result of a political
process.
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and form electoral coalitions consisting of distinct groups. I argue that a combination of
policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and advice from experts produces this convergence on
education policy, which in turn produces convergence of both outputs and outcomes.
1.1 Expected Divergence Between Left and Right
I argue that there exist strong reasons to expect the left to outperform the right on metrics
of both outputs and outcomes, as they have been found to do in the context of advanced
industrial democracies. Left and right are defined by opposing views about inequality, which
is purportedly tied to education. Further, left and right each form electoral coalitions from
different segments of society, creating distinct policy pressures.
Differences in beliefs about the causes of inequality and the role of government in re-
ducing (or not reducing) inequality are largely the defining characteristics of the political
left and right (Ames 1987; Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014; Bobbio 1996; Coppedge 1997;
Castles and Mair 1984; Alcántara Sáez and Rivas 2006; Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg
2001; Levitsky and Roberts 2011a). This serves as the basis of my definition between the
political left and right. The left favors state intervention in reducing inequality of all kinds,
including inequality of outcomes (Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014). The right, on the
other hand, views inequality as naturally occurring and either opposes government efforts
to reduce inequality entirely or, at most, supports state intervention to ensure equality of
opportunity (Freeden et al. 1996; Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2014). Note that “equity” is often
defined as equality of opportunity and “equality” as equality of outcome and that the former
is closely tied to ideas of justice, fairness, and inclusion (Simon, Malgorzata, and Beatriz
2007). For the purposes of this study, “equity enhancement” refers to improvements on both
of these areas.
Other definitions of the differences between left and right are possible, but in the Latin
American context no other cleavage so neatly divides parties into two camps or places them
on compatible grounds with parties from other regions around the world (Coppedge 1997).
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The left’s foundational views on equity form the basis for the expectation that it will
spend more on education and that this spending will decrease as party ideology shifts to
the right. Previous studies support this expectation in the OECD (e.g. Ansell 2010; Garrett
1998; Iversen and Wren 1998). This spending pattern is expected to hold at the primary
and secondary levels because of the left’s focus on equity enhancement and its longstanding
relationship with the teachers’ unions. This relationship also produces the expectation that
the left will devote a greater share of resources to teacher salaries. Further, the left’s concerns
about inequality lead to the expectation that it will produce more equitable outcomes in
education than the right.
In contrast, the right is expected to spend less on primary and secondary education than
the left because of its weaker relationship with teachers’ unions and underlying beliefs about
the state’s lesser role in addressing inequality. The traditional wisdom also holds that the
right’s economic focus and preference for smaller government should result in more efficient
education systems.
Left and right may have opposing foundational views of equity, but if partisanship can
serve as an explanatory variable for policy outputs and outcomes, then there must be a con-
sistent meaningful difference between left and right parties. In the past three decades there
has been a shift toward greater levels of party institutionalization (Luna and Zechmeister
2005), although there remains variation in the degree to which the party systems themselves
are institutionalized (Mainwaring 2018). As a result, partisan ideology is plausible as an
explanatory variable.
1.1.1 The Left and Education
The left in Latin America includes established and institutionalized parties including
Social Democratic, Socialist, and Communist parties. Some examples include the Broad
Front in Uruguay (FA), Socialist Party of Chile (PS), and the Venezuelan Communist Party
(PCV). The Latin American left also includes more newly established leftist parties. Exam-
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ples include the Workers’ Party (PT) in Brazil and the Movement toward Socialism (MAS)
in Bolivia.
There are many reasons to expect that the left will dominate in primary and secondary
education, investing more state resources and producing better outcomes. The left’s deci-
sions about education are driven by two primary components: ideological preferences based
on a fundamental concern about equity and electoral pressures from their base constituen-
cies. Empirical evidence — previous findings from other regions, the left’s “ownership” of
education, and a correlation between the left being in power and improved education metrics
— provides further support for the expectations laid out in this section.
Ideological Motivations
Research has long found a positive connection between education and a reduction in poverty
(Schultz 1961; Mincer 1984; Solmon 1985; Psacharopoulos 1995; Hanushek and Wößmann
2012). Equally, research has also found a positive connection between education and eq-
uity enhancement (Lustig 2015; Birdsall, Lustig, and McLeod 2011; Psacharopoulos 1977;
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004; Hanushek and Wößmann 2007).4 Given that the political
left is often regarded as more successful at reducing poverty and inequality than the right
(Lustig 2009; Huber and Stephens 2012), it is reasonable to expect the left to outperform
the right on a range of education metrics.
Education spending can be measured in either absolute terms — does the left devote
more of the government budget to education than the right — or relative terms — within
the education budget, does the left invest greater resources in a particular level or area
than the right? Previous studies based on the OECD find the left spends more than the
right either overall or on a subset of education levels (Garrett 1998; Iversen and Wren 1998;
Iversen and Stephens 2008; Ansell 2010; Ansell 2008b; Rauh, Kirchner, and Kappe 2011).5
4Note that, to the best of my knowledge, no study exists that establishes the relationship between partisan
ideology and education outputs or outcomes in Latin America for any period prior to 1990. Nor does the
data exist to do such a study now.
5Ansell (2010) makes the claim that these findings hold only if Green and Communist parties are excluded
5
In addition to findings that the left spends more on education in advanced economies,
there is also a substantial literature that finds that democracies tend to spend more on edu-
cation than non-democracies (Brown and Hunter 2004; Brown and Hunter 1999; Stasavage
2005; Rudra 2005; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Wibbels 2006). This finding has been
replicated in a variety of contexts, including Latin America generally (Huber, Mustillo, and
Stephens 2008), in African countries (Stasavage 2005), and subnationally in Mexico (Hecock
2006). Combining these findings with the arguments of power resource theory from Huber
and Stephens (2012)6 that allowing the left to compete in elections results in greater social
spending reinforces the expectation that the left should outperform the right.
These expectations on spending must be tempered slightly by the reality that the left can
be limited in its ability to increase the government budget or the amount of it dedicated to
education for two reasons. First, fiscal realities constrain government spending. Latin Amer-
ican governments have long struggled to raise funds through taxation and thus often rely
on revenue from less flexible sources (Ames 1987; Besley and Persson 2014). Second, while
education presents a pathway toward the left’s goals, it is not the only possible pathway.
More immediate solutions for reducing inequality may appear tempting to politicians con-
cerned with reelection. The long-term nature of equity enhancement through education (The
World Bank 2019) also makes it less appealing to politicians concerned with the immediate
economic situation.
Looking at relative spending levels, if the left is committed to reducing inequality, then
it is reasonable to expect them to devote greater resources to the levels most associated
with equity enhancement. Specifically, the left should favor spending at the secondary
level. Numerous studies show that secondary education provides a pathway to enhancing
equity, particularly now that most countries have achieved universal primary education and
from the analysis. In the Latin American context, Green and Communist parties are frequently absent from
electoral competition, if they exist at all (Coppedge 1997), supporting the expectation that these findings
should replicate in Latin America.
6This research builds on previous work in Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens (1992) and Huber and
Stephens (2001)
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as skill requirements for even entry-level jobs increase around the world (Birdsall, Lustig,
and McLeod 2011; Lustig 2015; Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-Juarez 2013; Psacharopoulos
1977; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004; Hanushek and Wößmann 2007).
Investment in primary education may have a progressive result as well in this context
(ECLAC 2013; Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro 2006). In Latin America, most upper class
families (and increasingly middle-class families) remove their children from the public school
system and put them into private education institutions (Puryear 1997; Narodowski 2008).
Promoting strong primary education thus advances equitable distribution of education by
incorporating the poorest sectors of society, even after universal primary education has been
achieved.
Electoral Motivations
The left’s vocal commitment to education and equity enhancement (through both education
and other policies) has led to the left’s “ownership” of education.7 The left has earned
this reputation, at least partially, through its campaign rhetoric. According to Comparative
Manifestos Project data (Lehmann et al. 2015), the correlation between left–right ideology
(on a −100 to +100 point scale) and the percentage of a party’s manifesto devoted to
education topics is −0.44, indicating a medium correlation between left parties and the
amount of a manifesto devoted to education. The left’s need to take action while in office in
order to maintain this reputation is one reason to expect it will outperform right on primary
and secondary education. This issue ownership is particularly important for two groups in the
left’s traditional electoral coalition: teachers’ unions and students. The left may opt to spend
more on education as a signaling mechanism for these groups that they are serious about
education (Potrafke 2011). Spending can thus serve two purposes: a direct commitment to
education in which a party “puts its money where its mouth is” and an indirect signal to
7Issue “ownership” is the view by voters that one party is better able to “deal with” or “fix” problems in
that policy area (Petrocik 1996). See Petrocik (ibid.) or Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen (2003) for a broader
theory of issue ownership and its effects in the context of US presidential elections.
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supporters that the party is “serious” about education. It is the combination of signal and
follow-through that establishes issue “ownership” (Stubager and Slothuus 2013; Walgrave,
Lefevere, and Nuytemans 2009; Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003).
The left has strong historical ties with the teachers’ unions in most countries in the
region. Consequently, we should expect that these ties would result in greater shares of
resources being spent on teachers, even if overall education expenditures remain constant.
This connection also supports the expectation of greater spending by the left on primary
and secondary education, where the unions are active.
The strength of teachers’ unions varies by country in Latin America, but overall the
unions represent the single strongest stakeholder in education in the region. In addition
to the disruptive capacity created by the unions’ size and ability to overcome collective
action problems (Grindle 2004),8 these organizations exercise high degrees of control over
their members and can thus vote as a largely unified bloc (Murillo et al. 2002; Cook 1996).
Further, the unions can act as a political machine, putting their existing organizational
power and deep and direct connections to local communities through schools to use for
parties (Larreguy, Montiel Olea, and Querubin 2017).
The second important group in the left’s electoral coalition is students. During the second
half of the twentieth century, the intellectual left (Castañeda 1993; Puryear 1994) became
increasingly involved in politics. Despite being outnumbered by centrist and conservative
students uninterested in political participation (Hennessy 1979; Liebman, Walker, and Glazer
1972), radical leftist students played an important role as ambassadors for the overall con-
nection between leftists and intellectuals (Castañeda 1993), a bellweather for public opinion
under suspect electoral outcomes (Hennessy 1979), and as grounds for establishing grassroots
8All labor unions operate from a fairly limited playbook of actions in the event that negotiations between
labor and management fail (Murillo 2001). Chief among these options is the strike. Teachers’ strikes tend
to be highly disruptive because parents must find alternative childcare for the students who are no longer in
class. Equally, there is essentially no option for education authorities to bring in replacement teachers in the
event of a strike. The disruptive nature of strikes, combined with a the perception that these actions harm
students, contributes to the negative feelings toward teachers’ unions.
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organization in support of the party, as the Communist Party in Venezuela did in the 1970s
(Goldfrank 2011, p. 43). Part of the left’s electoral strategy involved promising free tuition
to these students (Levy 1986; Castañeda 1993). While this promise went largely unfulfilled
through the 20th century, it helps to explain the inconsistency between a commitment to
equity enhancement and promises to fund a level of education that tends to be regressive
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004; Ansell 2008b; Rauh, Kirchner, and Kappe 2011; Scott
2002). Subsidies to the university system do not enhance equity given the middle and upper
class backgrounds of most public university students.9
1.1.2 The Right and Education
As Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser (2014) argue, the right in Latin America is unified by its
beliefs on inequality, but differentiated on a number of other dimensions including electoral
strategies. Some right parties engage in programmatic, partisan strategies. Examples include
the National Action Party (PAN) in Mexico, Independent Democratic Union (UDI) in Chile
or Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) in El Salvador. Other right parties engage in
electoral strategies outside a traditional left-right divide. Examples include movements led
by Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Álvaro Uribe in Colombia.
The right maintains its own concerns for education even though the left may be expected
to dominate in the primary and secondary levels. Ideological concern over the economy and
electoral realities generate competing expectations about performance in education. This
leads to contrasting expectations that the right should perform at least as well as the left on
education.
Ideological Motivations
The right is defined by the belief that inequality is a natural phenomenon that either is not
a problem or that the state should only intervene to ensure equality of opportunity (Freeden
9During a massive wave of expansion in Latin American universities in the 1960s and 1970s, enrollment
increased over four-fold, but “in spite of reformists’ efforts to widen the social composition of universities,
they continue to draw their students overwhelmingly from the middle classes” (Hennessy 1979, p. 150).
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et al. 1996; Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2014). Yet education is not only connected with equity
enhancement, it is also important for macroeconomic growth (OECD/ECLAC/CAF 2016;
Hanushek and Wößmann 2007), an important goal of the right, and for upward mobility at
the individual level (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004).10 Supporting education can be an
avenue for supporting growth, especially in places where employers often complain that they
cannot find sufficiently skilled labor (Kosack 2012).
Further, there remains disagreement about some aspects of the connection between par-
tisan ideology and education outputs even in the context of the developed OECD countries.
Several authors find support for the thesis that right parties favor spending on tertiary educa-
tion when that system has restricted enrollment (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004; Ansell
2008b; Ansell and Samuels 2010; Rauh, Kirchner, and Kappe 2011).11 In Latin America,
Huber and Stephens (2012) and Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008) find that partisan
ideology is not a strong predictor of education spending while Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo
(2001) suggest that the left spends less than the right.12 Still others argue that there is little
reason to expect the left to spend more on education — education spending can be regres-
sive — and argue that partisanship plays no role in determining human capital investment
(Jensen 2011).13
Garritzmann and Seng (2016) also argue that partisan ideology suffers as a predictor for
theoretical reasons: party families are not sufficiently homogeneous in regards to education
preferences. Categorizing parties into families (Christian Democrats, “liberal,” or “conser-
10The education budget has long been a source of clientelist funds (Ames 2001; Luna and Kaltwasser
2014), also contributing to the interest of the non-electoral right (Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014).
11However, as access and enrollment in tertiary education expand, the right will begin to oppose spending
at this level and the left will move from favoring a public-private partnership in tertiary education toward a
more publicly funded model (Ansell 2008b).
12Note that Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) measure “popular” governments as opposed to a direct
left/right measurement. I argue the latter is essential for answer the question posed in this study. Equally,
Huber and Stephens (2012) and Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008) combine health and education spending
into a single dependent variable. Given the variation in education spending, especially in relation to other
social services, education should be treated independently.
13Under certain tax regimes, if the wealthy utilize the public education system at a sufficiently higher rate
than the non-wealthy, the redistributive effects of education will flow upwards.
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vative” parties, for example) may provide greater differentiation than a simple left-right
dichotomy, but there may yet be a high degree of variation in policy positions within each
family — a Green party in one country may hold a different position on education than
its counterpart in a neighboring country. Pioneering studies on this question in the OECD
found that partisan variables were good predictors of education spending (e.g. Castles 1982),
with the left spending more than the right. These studies were criticized as suffering from
specification issues or focusing on a period characterized by unique economic conditions
and whose results are thus colored by temporal trends. Reanalyses of these models confirm
temporal trends but fail to find a long-term relationship (Busemeyer 2007; Potrafke 2011).
Concerns about the usefulness of party family as an explanatory variable are well taken
within the OECD and in comparing parties across the world. However, in the Latin American
context we observe parties of the same family staking out similar positions on education
(Gibson 1997; Murillo 2001). Still, the mixed empirical findings temper the expectation that
the left should outperform the right and suggest, instead, a possibility that the right and
left may actually perform on similar levels.
Electoral Motivations
The right’s electoral strategy involves groups connected with tertiary education. However,
their interest is primarily class based. A large proportion of public university students comes
from middle- and upper-class families (Liebman, Walker, and Glazer 1972; Arocena and Sutz
2005), including those with business backgrounds — one of the blocs historically associated
with the right. Support for tertiary education derives both from fear of disruptive protests
by the highly organized students and political reprisal by their parents and in support of
these groups, since many students come from fairly affluent or politically connected families.
The right has no mechanism by which to deliver selective benefits only to students on the
right. Scholarships are uncommon in the region and university admission is sufficiently
meritocratic that free tuition to only a subset of universities would not accomplish this goal
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either. Further, Latin America (along with the rest of the world) has seen an explosion
in universities in recent years. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the exponential increase in total
universities in the region. A large percentage of the new universities in the past decade are
private, often for-profit universities. These new universities are owned by economic elites


















Figure 1.1: Growth of universities in Latin America. Note that the number of private
universities is underestimated here, as unreported types are assumed to be public. Figures
also do not take into account enrollment. Many for-profit universities operate many campuses
and enroll a higher number of students than their public counterparts. Calculations are based
on data from Apfeld (2019).
These same business elites have also expressed concern that a lack of skilled labor has
prevented more robust economic growth (Downie 2007). The deficit of skilled labor exists
at a level such that many businesses have created their own training programs to provide
the education their employees lack (Sanchez Zinny and McBride 2014). But businesses
need workers with skills they cannot provide (entirely) on the job: engineering knowledge,
technological expertise, foreign language abilities, writing skills, and a host of other skills and
abilities needed to perform white-collar sales and other professional work. Economic elites
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in Latin America also express a feeling of entitlement to free, high quality tertiary education
based on the argument that they bear an outsized share of the tax burden (Sanchez-Sibony
2019) but do not use the primary or secondary education systems (Puryear 1997). Thus
supporting education across all levels has potential electoral benefits for the right as well.
Although the teachers’ unions are not generally part of the right’s electoral strategy,
their ability to organize and disrupt means that the right cannot afford to ignore them
(Grindle 2004; Cook 1996). The right, generally, does not seek out support from the teachers’
unions to build an electoral coalition. Once in power, however, the right is constrained by
the knowledge that any educational reforms or budgetary changes that the unions view as
threatening will be met with fierce opposition and potentially disruptive strikes (Moe 2017b).
The right stands to benefit electorally from supporting education in favor of its base and
in avoiding conflicts with the opposition. However, the forces are not likely to be as strong
as those that drive the left toward support for education. Business elites often have diverse
(and potentially opposing) interests and do not organize frequently in relation to education
policy (ibid.). And while unions can prove to be a disruptive force, right parties have shown
(as in the case of Chile (Siavelis 2014)) that they can reduce the teachers’ unions support of
the left without fully embracing their agenda.
1.1.3 Expectations for Left and Right in Education
The expectations laid out in this section must be tempered by the reality that many
decisions in education, particularly with respect to spending by level, are dictated by the
state of development of the education system. In other words, if a country has yet to achieve
universal access at the primary level, then increasing spending at the secondary or tertiary
levels makes little sense and governments essentially must spend higher percentages of their
education budgets on primary education. This concern is addressed in the statistical tests
that follow by controlling for several measures of the state of educational development in a
country. Still, these expectations should be viewed ceteris paribus with respect to education
13
system development.
To summarize, there are competing expectations for left and right based on foundational
differences in beliefs about inequality, different electoral considerations, and previous em-
pirical work. In terms of inequality, the left believes that the state should intervene to
enhance all equality, including equality of outcomes while the right is focused on growth and
favors state intervention to ensure, at most, equality of opportunities. In terms of electoral
strategies, the left has long been aligned with the teachers’ unions, which have an inter-
est in increasing spending on primary and secondary education. The right, in contrast, is
supported by business elites who have called for an increase to skilled labor in the region.
In terms of empirical findings, a number of authors have found that partisan ideology is a
predictor of education spending in the OECD, while others dispute these results.
Outputs
The left’s concern for enhancing equity and its connection with the teachers’ union produce
expectations that it will outspend the right both overall and at the primary and secondary
levels. Although the left has long promised free university education, it should still be
expected to spend less on this level than the right because tertiary tends to be more regressive
until very late in the education development process. Further, the right is drawn to support
tertiary education because of calls from business elites for more skilled labor. In terms of
areas, the left should be expected to devote a greater share of its education budget to staff
expenditures in support of the unions.
• The left will spend more overall than the right because of its commitment to equity
enhancement and previous empirical findings from the OECD.
• The left will invest more of the education budget in primary education than the right,
after controlling for education system development, because of the progressive aspects
of this level (particularly in the Latin American context where many middle- and upper-
class families remove their children from the public system) and the left’s connection
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to the teachers’ unions.
• The left will invest more of the education budget in secondary education than the
right, after controlling for education system development, because of its connection to
the teachers’ unions and the progressive nature of secondary education.
• The left will invest less of the education budget in tertiary education than the right be-
cause tertiary education tends to be regressive compared with lower levels of education,
controlling for education system development.
• The left will invest more of the education budget in staff expenditures than the right
because of its connection to the teachers’ unions.
Outcomes
The left’s belief in the state’s role for enhancing equality of outcomes leads to the expectation
that measures of quality will be higher under the left than the right. Quality outcomes
should also be distributed more equitably under the left than the right. In contrast, the
right’s belief in equality of opportunity leads to the expectation that measures of access will
be higher under the right than the left. Similarly, access outcomes should also be distributed
more equitably under the right than the left. This expectation is driven more by an increased
concern by the right than a decreased concern by the left.
Expectations for outcomes are independent of those for outputs. That is, we know that
spending alone is not sufficient for producing quality education. Government can produce
different outcomes in education through more pathways than changes in the budget. Specif-
ically, differences in prioritization of education can result in differences in outcomes. The
executive can devote greater human capital to bureaucracies (choosing higher quality lead-
ership, for example) or direct the education bureaucracy to shift focus from one goal to
another. These changes can all occur within the context of a fixed budget but may still
produce different outcomes.
The state of development of the education system affects expectations for outcomes, but
15
to a lesser degree than for outputs. Focusing on access or quality of higher levels of education
before lower levels again makes little sense. It is possible, however, to focus simultaneously
on primary quality and secondary access, for example. Equally, it is possible to improve
quality of any level before achieving universal access outcomes, although this is an atypical
approach to education system development. In this sense, outcomes are more independent
of one another than outputs.
• The right will outperform the left in terms of education access because of its focus on
equality of opportunity. Access will also be more equitably distributed under the right
than the left for similar reasons.
• The left will outperform the right in terms of education quality because of its focus
on equality of outcome. Quality will also be more equitably distributed under the left
than the right for similar reasons.
1.2 Explaining Unexpected Convergence
In contrast to both previous work that finds partisan ideology as a predictor of education
outputs and expectations that the left should be dominant in primary and secondary edu-
cation, I find that there are few differences between left and right on metrics of outputs and
outcomes. In terms of outputs, both absolute spending and relative spending across levels
(primary, secondary, and tertiary) and areas (staff, capital, and current expenditures) show
very little variation under left and right administrations. In terms of outcomes, partisan
ideology is not a good predictor of enrollment, completion, transition, dropout or repetition
rates, or test scores. Nor does it explain much variation in gender equity in any of these
outcomes.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide a statistical analysis of these metrics across Latin American
democracies and Chapter 4 provides an alternative explanation for why this convergence
exists. Here I sketch an outline of this explanation with the addition of some non-political
factors that contribute to the wider politics of education in the region. In order to explain
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convergence between left and right, I argue that policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and
expert advice are, in order of importance, three political forces that dominate divergent
partisan preferences. Additionally, a combination of short-term costs with only long-term
benefits and unique aspects of education as a policy area are non-political factors that further
contribute to convergence. My argument resembles that of Heclo (1978), who finds that
bureaucratic and technocratic forces contribute to policy to a greater degree than partisan
politics in the American context.
1.2.1 Political factors driving convergence
Policy legacies
Policy legacies place constraints on governments seeking policy reforms and establish the
guardrails of “normal” policy.14 These constraints are the result of bureaucratic inertia and
political costs associated with change. Bureaucratic inertia stems from a logic of “positive
feedback” loops (Arthur 1994) and path dependence (Pierson 2000). Policies in this context
become locked in and increasingly difficult to overturn with the passage of time. Outside
of critical junctures in which policy can change dramatically, routinization of tasks, institu-
tionalization, and expectations all develop in a complementary and self-reinforcing manner
(Collier 1979).
Many education policies are more susceptible to these forces than other policy areas be-
cause implementation ultimately occurs at diffuse levels by teachers who are not, by training,
bureaucrats and are often resistant to change. The degree of diffusion increases challenges
and time required to make any changes while teachers may perceive only limited benefit to
implementing new policy (Bell 1995; Hess 1999; Payne 2008).
The degree to which inertia may affect a bureaucracy depends partially on the character
of the bureaucrats themselves. Technocrats, those bureaucrats who are technically trained
to seek out ideal solutions to problems (Centeno 1993), offer consistent recommendations
14I use the term “reform” throughout this project to denote any changes to policy, without any assumption
about whether changes are substantively meaningful or if they represent an improvement of any kind.
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regardless of political consequences. A technopol, a subtype of technocrat that also weighs
political ramifications of policy (Bersch 2016), also has the methodological background but
may temper some recommendations for political expedience. In both cases, however, reliance
on these actors increases the likelihood that policy will endure across administrations.
The political costs of policy legacies include the loss of an important source of power
(patronage jobs and funds for non-programmatic distribution) and a fatal combination of
short-term costs with only long-term benefits. Patronage and clientelist systems have long
plagued Latin American democracies (Ames 1987; Stokes et al. 2013). Education in partic-
ular has been a source of patronage jobs in the civil service (Grindle 1977; Gordin 2002).
Equally, education budgets have been used for non-programmatic distribution in the form of
discrete credit-claiming projects like the construction of new schools over more pressing pro-
grammatic changes (Ames 2001; Luna and Mardones 2016). These forces encourage stasis
and status quo in education policy.
Policy legacies also impose practical constraints on policymakers. Education budgets are
created in the larger budgeting process and therefore must compete for funding with all other
policy areas (Wildavsky 1986). Finding sufficient capital for education projects can limit the
scope of possible policy. Limited state capacity creates a similar constraint on policymakers
(Besley and Persson 2014). Finally, policymakers must confront natural human limitations
in cognitive capacity, restricting the scope of policies they may consider and pushing them
toward an inherent preference for the status quo (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).
Stakeholder pressures
Education is a policy area with a very wide range of stakeholders. As a result of the diffusion
of mandatory schooling laws and a concerted effort to extend universal primary education
during the 20th century (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992), nearly every individual spends
at least some time within the walls of a school and education systems encompass a wide
range of actors. At any given moment, large percentages of a country’s population are either
18
enrolled in school or have children who are enrolled. Additionally, teachers, principals,
and other school staff represent significant percentages of the labor force. Schools are also
consumers of textbooks, office supplies, and other resources, making them an important
economic player.15 Some of these groups are more organized than others, but all represent
interests that politicians on left and right cannot ignore entirely without invoking electoral
costs.
Not every actor has an equal stake or equal political power, however. In the Latin
American context, teachers’ unions are the single most important actor and most powerful
stakeholder (Cook 1990). There is variation between countries as to the power that the
union has (or unions have), but in all cases, the teachers represent an interest that cannot
be ignored.
At the university level, the rectors are another crucial stakeholder in education debates
(Bernasconi 2015).16 This well-connected group represents the interests of university profes-
sors. Variations in how these individuals are chosen and whether membership is restricted
to only the oldest universities creates variation in the amount of power this group holds.
The rectors seek to protect an institution — universities — that has both revolutionary and
conservative impulses.17 These divergent drives, as well as the politically divided student
body (with radical students in a vocal minority and centrist and conservative students in a
silent majority (Hennessy 1979)) mean that rectors are not consistently aligned with either
left or right. This role also means that they are frequently replaced by military regimes
immediately following coups, since their loyalty to the state is not assured (Einaudi 1963;
15Given the scope of education, it can be difficult to identify a complete list of stakeholders in education.
One incomplete list may include “teachers, students, parents, industrialists, [and] politicians” (Wolff and
Castro 2000, p. 17). Elsewhere, these authors add to this list private educational institutions, labor unions,
and the private productive sectors (ibid., p. 32).
16In Latin American universities, the rector “combines the attributes of president and dean at most United
States universities” and is usually selected by faculty at the university, but in some cases is appointed by
the government (Einaudi 1963, p. 640).
17Peñalver (1979, p. 195) describes this divided chacter as “revolutionary, as a source of idealism denounc-
ing social hypocrisies and injustice and calling for enlightenment and reform in society; conservative as its
concerns focus on self-administration and providing education to its members.”
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Peñalver 1979). Although they do not owe allegiance purely to any one party, university
rectors do wield political power in their defense of their institutions and politicians must
consider their input when crafting policy that affects higher education.
Students are stakeholders in the education system and outnumber rectors and teachers by
a large margin but as a political actor, students are much weaker. University students are in
a better position to organize as a political force than younger students because of increased
autonomy, mobility, and access to university facilities where they can gather. Only in rare
cases (e.g. the 2006 “Revolución Pingüina” in Chile) do we ever see students in high school
(or even elementary school) attempting to organize and influence social policy (Disi 2018).
Finally, parents are an additional stakeholder in the education system. Like the students,
though, large scale parent organizations are the exception and not the rule. Expectations
regarding direct parental involvement at the school level is often dictated by school princi-
pals and varies to a large degree between institutions (UNESCO 2009). Yet in both cases,
organization and pushes for change occur mostly at school and district levels, not at the
national level.
Expert advice
Technocratic expert advice was once associated primarily with the neoliberal right in Latin
America. In the past few decades, however, the left has increasingly relied on these experts
in shaping their policies (Dargent 2015). Because the advice offered by experts in the field
does not vary to fit the political goals of the current government, the convergence on reliance
on experts also contributes to a convergence in policy. Additionally, equity has become a
central theme of the advice given by experts — the motivating concern of the left (Levitsky
and Roberts 2011a). This pushes right governments toward convergence on the issue that
defines the left.
These experts are both domestic and international, with a high degree of overlap be-
tween the two networks. Some experts operate within education bureaucracies, while others
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exist outside the government with ties to universities and or think tanks and lobbying or-
ganizations. Experts at the World Bank or Inter-American Development Bank are typical
examples for this group. These organizations have deep ties to policy elites and interact with
policymakers on a regular basis. They provide an abundance of advice and frequently, in
the case of large international organizations, modest funding to implement new programs.
The advice from experts draws a distinction (followed here) between access, quality, and
equity (Corrales 1999). Recommendations on access have shifted from a focus on the primary
level to the secondary (Bassi et al. 2012), largely because universal primary education has
been achieved in nearly all countries. In focusing on secondary level access, experts continue
to find conditional cash transfer programs important, if insufficient to achieving universal
secondary enrollment (Busso et al. 2017). Advice on access is generally unified, with little
dissent in the dominant recommendations. In terms of quality, experts are less certain about
the best practices (ibid.). This has not prevented them, however, from offering a wide range
of solutions, many focused on attempting to improve teacher quality.
A consensus on a focus on equity in education is a more recent development. Experts
now view it as an essential component of any successful education program. According to
a report from the OECD, “The evidence is conclusive: equity in education pays off. The
highest performing education systems across OECD countries are those that combine high
quality and equity” (OECD 2012, p. 14). The expert focus on equity pushes the right, which
relies heavily on technocrats to design policy, toward policy more in line with the left’s goals.
1.2.2 Non-political factors driving convergence
In addition to the three political factors (policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert
advice) described above, there are several non-political aspects of education that contribute
to convergence between left and right on both outputs and outcomes. Specifically, education
policy is an area in which short-term costs are coupled exclusively with long-term benefits
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and education is unique compared with other principal-agent relationships:18 there are no
educational “emergencies,” education is a human right, and its provision is necessarily se-
quential and cumulative. Convergence is more likely as a result of these factors because they
place equal constraints on both left and right.
Short term costs with only long term benefits The economic costs (training or hiring teach-
ers, building new schools, or investing in technology) and political costs (backlash from
various groups for reforms that they perceive to be against their interests) of education
policies are nearly all short-term while the returns to education are only long-term (Nelson
1999). According to Kaufman and Nelson (2004, pp. 4–5),
As the title of this volume [“Crucial Needs, Weak Incentives”] suggests, there is
a crucial need for social reforms, but the incentives to put them into effect are
surprisingly weak. Because measures to improve equity, quality, and efficiency
of education and health services are urgent, we might expect them to appeal to
diverse constituencies. Yet despite this potential appeal, organized pressures for
reform are limited, and decision makers have generally not faced strong political
pressures to take action. Indeed,…major social sector reforms in health and
education tend to be secondary to more pressing concerns on the political agenda,
and they have often been set aside when they appear to come into conflict with
these concerns.
Changes to the education system, particularly those that address equity, may come with
concentrated short-term economic and, potentially, political costs (Corrales 1999). Choosing
these policies extracts an opportunity cost as politicians forego other spending options that
may produce more immediate tangible results for voters. Additionally, dramatic changes to
the education system may be opposed by large voting blocs (teachers or parents) and thus
18Economists define a principal-agent relationship as one in which “two individuals…operate in an uncertain
environment and for whom risk sharing is desirable. Suppose that one of the individuals (known as the agent)
is to take an action which the other individual (known as the principal) cannot observe” (Grossman and
Hart 1983, p. 7). Education can be modeled as a principal-agent relationship where the principal is the
student (or more accurately in most cases, parents of students) who contract out the responsibility of formal
education to the agent, the state.
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create short-term electoral costs (Cook 1996; Murillo 1999). At the same time, any poverty-
reducing or equity-enhancing gains from education are long-term benefits, often beyond the
time horizon of most politicians focused on the next round of elections (The World Bank
2019). These benefits are also diffuse, decreasing the potential demand for them (Corrales
1999).
No educational “emergencies” There is no such thing as an “education emergency,” even
if all agree that education is important. As de Moura Castro and Musgrove (1998) enter-
tainingly illustrate, there exists no scenario in which some ignorance is met with calls to an
emergency service and the attention of a team of highly trained education experts focused on
removing that ignorance. The obvious analogy is to health, where emergencies are met with
this kind of response, but the same can be said of other services. If the power or water is cut,
emergency calls are placed and a trained team is sent in to remedy the problem immediately;
if a fire breaks out, then the fire department responds immediately.
This is not to say that there cannot be an education crisis or emergency. Indeed, many in-
dividuals certainly suffer from education deficits and entire education systems are frequently
accused of being in crisis (see, e.g., National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983;
Farber 1991; Berliner and Glass 2014; Hursh 2008, on the “crisis” in American education).
Yet neither case is met with an “emergency” response nor is such a response possible. Identi-
fying the cause of problems can be challenging and solutions take a long time to implement.
Further, solutions are often subject to uncertainty and debate. Unlike in medicine (where
there is an agreed upon response to an emergency wound) or electricity provision (where a
clear fix to downed power lines exists), poor education outcomes are made controversial by
questions of individual efficacy and the impact of factors like family background, socioeco-
nomic status, and race.
23
Education is a human right Education is a basic human right (UN General Assembly 1948).
Unlike many other government services, there is universal acceptance of education as both a
positive public good and a service that the government should provide (DiNitto and Johnson
2012). Other government provided services are often subject to debate about whether they
should be provided by the government or even if they represent a positive good.19 These
expectations carry with them political consequences: politicians must provide basic levels
of this service and its reduction is likely to carry significant electoral consequences. In
other words, politicians can never provide “less” education because citizen demands are
always in the direction of more and better. Governments also face additional pressures from
international organizations to provide this service in increasing quantities and in higher
quality to all citizens.
Education is sequential and cumulative Education is sequential in the sense that users must
advance through its stages in a fixed order and cumulative in that its rewards build based on
how much education one has received (Kosack 2012). Contrast this with healthcare where
neither disease nor treatment builds on itself in the same sense. A sickness may worsen and
demand new types of treatment, but sickness does not necessarily begin with a hang nail
and progress to pneumonia, nor does a cancer patient have to try antibiotics before moving
on to chemotherapy. In education, learning the numbers is a necessary precursor to learning
multiplication and a learner must learn to decode words in sentences before reading a college
level text.
These aspects of education place limits on the types of policies that can be pursued in any
given circumstance. Attempts to improve the instruction of calculus, for example, will matter
little if most students have received insufficient instruction in algebra. Equally, attempts to
improve secondary enrollment in a given area will matter little if students have already
19While these debates are strongest in the United States where the classical liberal tradition frames most
political debates, discourse in other countries can and does cover similar ground.
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dropped out during their primary education. Put otherwise, the level of development of an
education system establishes crucial demands and limits on policies, particularly spending
by level. Increasing spending at the secondary or tertiary level makes no sense (and may not
be possible) if universal primary education has not been achieved, for example.
1.3 Alternative Explanations for Education Performance
There exist several alternative explanations for education performance in Latin America.
Two are political explanations: that it is not domestic politics but international pressures
that have produced meaningful changes and two that ideology matters less than the length of
time a party stays in power. Two are economic explanations: one that macroeconomic factors
drive education metrics and the commodities boom is responsible for performance gains and
two that education is an inefficient vehicle for redistribution. Each of these arguments offers
some insight into the determinants of education outputs and outcomes. However, none is
sufficient on its own.
1.3.1 Political Arguments
One political explanation for education performance is that any expansion in access
and quality of education over the past half-century is the result of increased international
attention and pressure on education in all parts of the world (Nelson 1999; Corrales 2004).
Education has been heralded as the great equalizer with the potential to reduce both poverty
and inequality. International efforts increased the pressure on developing states to invest in
education during the 1980s and 1990s (Nelson 1999). Likewise, the MDGs, adopted in 2000
and their replacement SDGs in 2015 have added urgency to efforts to make these changes
to education. There is no doubt that international pressures have played a role in this
expansion. Above I outlined some of the ways in which technocratic experts exert pressure
on governments. However, international pressure alone cannot explain either the variation in
the degree of expansion among countries or the unevenness in results, even after controlling
for the starting levels of access and quality.
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A second explanation comes from Huber and Stephens (2012), who argue that the length
of time a party spends in power, particularly the length of time the left spends in power,
will affect policy outcomes. Length of left control alone cannot be a sufficient explanation,
however. Education showed positive trends starting in the 1990s, before the left wave swept
through Latin America (The World Bank 1995; Puryear 1997). Nevertheless, the argument
that length of time in power allows for a greater possibility of implementation deserves
attention. To account for this factor, I control for length of time in power in the empirical
analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3. By itself, however, this variable is insufficient to
explain education performance in Latin America.
1.3.2 Economic Arguments
Some explanations for education performance ignore political factors entirely. The first is
the correlation between partisan control and economic conditions across Latin America. The
left in Latin America has received a lot of attention in the literature over the past decade
(e.g. Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010; Cameron 2009; Levitsky and Roberts 2011b). This
attention is justified — a wave of left governments being elected across the region starting
with the election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998 represent a major shift in the political
balance. The left wave was an opportunity for Latin American countries to try policies the
left had long desired but never been able to implement. Over this same period of time the
overall trend in education outcomes (as shown in Chapter 3) was positive. The argument
would be that any divergence is simply a matter of divergent economic conditions under
left and right. However, the correlation between leftist control, the commodity boom, and
improved education metrics is not sufficient to prove a causal relationship between increased
revenues and outcomes. While this is a plausible story to explain why the left might spend
more in absolute terms than the right, it does nothing to explain differences in the relative
levels of spending within the government budget. Nor does it explain differences in education
outcomes between countries.
26
A second economic argument comes from Jensen (2011), who argues that partisan ide-
ology does not drive differences in education outputs because high income group usage of
education makes it a less redistributive social program. He proposes as an alternative that
deindustrialization and economic structure are better predictors of differences in education
outputs because centrally coordinated economies tend to produce more specialized workers
in need of retraining as the result of shifts in the economy. This explanation, which relates
only to education outputs and not outcomes, has several problems. First, Garritzmann and
Seng (2016) have shown that these findings do not hold when the unit of analysis is changed
from country-year to the more appropriate government term. Second, deindustrialization in
Latin America does not explain either the cross-national or subnational variation in educa-
tion spending. Third, his claim that party ideology does not matter rests on the argument
that education is a poor policy vehicle for advancing redistribution. Yet Ansell (2010) and
others (e.g. Lustig 2015; Holland and Schneider 2017; Bucheli et al. 2013; Levy and Schady
2013) demonstrate that while education is not necessarily redistributive, there are broad
conditions under which it can be.
1.4 Additional Considerations
1.4.1 Scope of this Project
This project focuses on Latin American democracies. Policy legacies matter in authori-
tarian settings, but non-democratic leaders have greater leeway to ignore these aspects and
impose unilateral changes. Importantly, stakeholder pressures matter much less in non-
democratic settings.20 It is also only under the free competition of political parties does
partisan ideology make sense as a potential explanatory variable for policy outcomes (Gibson
1997). Additionally, the finding of convergence between left and right on education outputs
and outcomes is only interesting in this competitive environment. Education under author-
itarian regimes is an important question (see Croke et al. (e.g. 2016), Paglayan (2017), and
20Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig (See 2017) for a discussion of the role that elections play in authoritarian
settings.
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Dahlum and Knutsen (2017) on questions related to education and non-democratic regimes),
but it is outside the scope of this project.
Further, this project focuses mostly on primary and secondary education. Tertiary ed-
ucation enters the discussion at times because these levels do not operate in isolation —
education budgets are divided across all levels and access and quality at lower levels af-
fect higher levels. The project ignores pre-primary education as well as post-secondary
non-tertiary education (e.g. technical training programs). These areas are important in the
development of a complete education system but they represent only a small fraction of the
education budget in all cases. Further, pre-primary education remains limited across Latin
America and data on it even more so, making any quantitative analysis impossible.21
1.4.2 Why Latin America?
With few exceptions, the existing literature focuses on OECD countries. I argue that the
developing world, particularly Latin America, deserves greater attention and its own set of
studies for at least four reasons. First, Latin America is a region that has long been defined
by extraordinarily high levels of inequality (Huber et al. 2006). Encouragingly these numbers
have fallen since the year 2000, but Latin America still holds the ignominious title for being
the region with the highest levels of inequality (Cornia 2014) and the downward trend shows
signs of slowing or even reversing itself in many countries (Gasparini, Cruces, and Tornarolli
2016). These high levels of inequality present a starting point and future challenges distinct
from the more equitable societies of the OECD. Given the role that education can play in
reducing inequality, it is all the more essential to answer the question of which political
factors determine education outputs and outcomes.22
21As more data becomes available, this will be an important area to explore because of the connection
between early childhood education and equity enhancement in adulthood (Heckman 2011).
22There is little doubt that increased schooling (and the increase in cognitive skills it provides) can result
in higher wages and upward mobility at the micro level (Hanushek and Wößmann 2007; Psacharopoulos
and Patrinos 2004). Recent research has also found that the “skills premium” — the amount that skilled
labor earns above its unskilled counterpart — has decreased in recent years (Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-
Juarez 2013; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004). It should be noted that this does not imply that education
does not contribute to reducing inequality, only that as average levels of education rise, its effect is reduced
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Second, studies that focus on Europe and the OECD also tend to focus on tertiary
education spending. Researchers logically focus there because there is so little variation in
the investment at the primary and secondary levels (Busemeyer 2007; Castles 1982). This
is not true of Latin America, where the spending on primary and secondary education still
varies to a high degree. Panel a in Figure 1.2 shows that relative to the size of their economies,
Latin American governments spend, on average, a greater share of their budgets than do
OECD governments and have greater variance in that proportion. Similarly, panels b, c, and
d in Figure 1.2 show that relative to the size of their education budgets, Latin American







































































Region Both LAC and OECD Latin America OECD
Figure 1.2: Higher variation in education spending in Latin America than in the OECD.
Subplot a shows overall spending plotted against logged GDP per capita. Subplots b-d show
spending on primary, secondary, and tertiary, respectively, plotted against the log of the
overall education budget in constant USD.
Significant proportions of budgets are fixed and much education spending goes to fixed
costs, yet there is still meaningful variation in how much is allocated to each part of the
education budget. The regional variation in overall spending is over 16% and the mean
30
within-country variation in overall spending is 8.4%. This compares to just 6.4% variation
overall and 0.6% mean within-country variation in the OECD. These differences underscore
the importance of studying Latin America separately.
Third, a plethora of model specifications and alternative explanations leaves the literature
without a clear consensus on the effect of partisanship on education spending in the studies
on OECD countries. A few points have been clarified (that the right favors higher tertiary
spending in systems with restricted enrollment, for example, (Ansell 2010)), but there remain
many unanswered questions. Given these inconsistencies, the more sparse studies in Latin
America and the rest of the developing world merit further investigation. In order to provide
a comparison between Latin America and the OECD and link this study with previous work
in the area, Appendix B presents a parallel analysis using the OECD as a sample.
Fourth, as Figure 1.2 demonstrates, many Latin American countries are spending at
similar or even greater levels than their OECD counterparts. Yet education performance is
much lower than would be expected given this spending. The highest performing country,
as measured by PISA test scores is Chile, where average scores are half a standard deviation
below the global mean (Bos et al. 2016).23 Where comparable data exists, Latin American
countries lag behind peer nations at similar levels of economic development, in contrast to
outcomes in health, where the region tends to perform higher than would be expected given
its level of development. Despite starting at similar levels of development fifty years ago,
Latin American countries now lag significantly behind those of East Asia (Hanushek and
Wößmann 2012).
1.4.3 The “missing” center
The presentation of the political spectrum in this project is stylized to a left/right dis-
tinction. This is motivated, partially, by a limited number of true centrist parties in the
23The absolute highest Latin American scores come from Argentina, but are based solely on schools in
Buenos Aires and are thus not a fair comparison with the other countries where the test is administered
across a complete sample of schools.
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region. Figure 1.3 shows that centrist parties are relatively rare compared with those clearly











Figure 1.3: Prevalence of parties by ideological position. Observations are party-years.
Although I present parties in a left-right dichotomy, the analytical models in Chapters 2
and 3 use a continuous scale. They imply a linear relationship in which an increase along the
ideological scale has a positive, linear relationship with the outcome variable. Alternative
specification models in which parties are modeled as distinct categories are included in
Appendix D makes no difference to the results presented in the quantitative chapters.
1.4.4 Outline of the work
This project proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents a statistical analysis showing that
there are very few differences in education spending patterns between left and right. Like
previous work on this topic, this project starts by looking at overall levels of education
spending. This is an important first question to answer, but it is equally useful to look at
disaggregated spending and consider patterns of spending by level (primary, secondary, or
tertiary) and type (capital investment, staff expenditures, or other current spending). My
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study does precisely that. Moving from outputs to outcomes, I devote Chapter 3 to an
analysis of the differences in enrollment, dropout, completion, and test scores between left
and right in education. Here again, I show strong evidence that very few differences exist.
In Chapter 4, I propose an alternative explanation for what drives a convergence in
education spending and education outcomes between left and right governments. I argue that
policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert advice produce the observed convergence.
Legacies limit lawmakers, while stakeholder pressures drive left and right toward similar
positions. Equally, an increased reliance on outside experts to guide policy contributes to
the convergence, as these experts tailor their advice to fit the educational situation, not the
political climate.
I explore these findings in greater detail in Chapter 5 using the case of Chile. Chile is
an extreme case — the left and right have highly divergent views for the education system
and education has long been a salient topic in politics. If left and right ideology matters
anywhere, it should matter there. The case study chapter shows that even at the extreme,
this ideological divide does not do a good job of explaining either outputs or outcomes in
education. I process trace the evolution of education in Chile, showing that policy legacies,
stakeholder pressures, and expert advice dominate divergent policy preferences by left and
right and lead to convergence in outputs and outcomes.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes. In addition to summarizing the arguments and evidence put
forth in the previous chapters, the conclusion also explores some of the implications of this
study. In breaking from past literature, this study suggests that one of the political factors
most frequently thought of to affect education does not, in fact, matter. These findings
enhance the extant literature on the politics of education and parties in Latin America.
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Chapter 2
Partisan Ideology and Convergence on Education
Outputs in Latin America
Creating a government budget is an intensely political activity, with left and right parties
expressing divergent interests in both the total size of the budget and in its ultimate division
between competing programs based on their fundamental beliefs about inequality and its
relationship to the state. Budget-making is a zero-sum game in which an increase in one
area must be offset by a decrease in another (Wildavsky 1986). Given this political nature
and the distinct ideological beliefs about inequality (Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014) and
corresponding spending preferences (Levitsky and Roberts 2011a), there are strong reasons
to expect that the left and right will devote different percentages of the government budget
to education. Further, ideological preferences about inequality should be expected to drive
differences in how that money is spent. Specifically, we should anticipate that the left
spends more than the right overall and devotes greater percentages of its education budget
to primary and secondary levels and staff expenditures while the right should be expected to
outspend the left in tertiary education, controlling for the size of the school-aged population.
Understanding differences in how education budgets are allocated is important because how
the funds are spent is at least as important as how much is spent when looking at education
outcomes (World Bank 2004). Previous work has found that the left in Latin America is more
likely to spend more on social services and in areas where programs are expected to enhance
equity (Huber and Stephens 2012) and education has been tied to this outcome (Hanushek
and Wößmann 2007). Are these expectations met? Does partisan ideology predict education
spending?
This chapter looks at education spending across Latin America. It shows that education
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budgets as a percentage of overall government spending have remained fairly stable over
time, as have the distribution of those funds by level and area. It also shows that where
variation does exist, partisan ideology has little effect on these distributions. Before looking
at the trends, I define here key terms related to education levels and areas.
Some readers may wonder whether standard statistical tests are appropriate in this case.
Specifically, these tests rely on a null hypothesis (H0) that there is no relationship between
the variables. The concern is that this does not match the expectation that there will be a
relationship and that the tests are biased toward my conclusion that there is no relationship.
I argue that these tests are, nonetheless, appropriate in this case for three reasons. First,
there is no statistical alternative in which the null is formulated to expect a relationship.1
Second, using these tests is necessary in order to produce a result that can be compared
to existing studies. Third, although it is true that the null can only be disproved (not
proved itself), the robustness of these models to alternative specifications forms a body of
evidence that can only be interpreted as supporting my conclusion that ideology is not a
good predictor of education outputs.
2.1 Spending Definitions
Levels Education levels in this study are defined according to the International Standard
Classification of Education (ISCED) provided by the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2012). In this
classification, education is divided into nine levels labeled 0–8. Each level is defined based
on a combination of instructional content and style, age and duration, and compulsory
status. This section provides a brief overview of the differences between levels, but complete
definitions are available in Appendix C.
For the purposes of this project, “primary” education corresponds to ISCED level 1,
the first level of mandatory schooling that lasts an average of six years (typically starting
1While it is possible to specify a null that a relationship will be either positive or negative, this is rarely
done in practice and it remains impossible to specify that there will be some relationship.
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no earlier than age five and ending no later than age twelve) and is typically taught in
classrooms with one primary teacher. In the United States, this would correspond to the
popular classifications of “elementary” or “grade school.”
“Secondary” education corresponds to levels 2 and 3 (lower and upper secondary). Lower
secondary follows primary and represents a transition to more subject-based instruction.
Upper secondary builds on lower secondary as the final years of general or vocational training.
These two levels correspond to the “middle school” and “high school” levels in U.S. education.
Globally, lower secondary is often the last compulsory level of schooling.
“Tertiary” education corresponds to levels 5 and 6 — short-cycle tertiary and bachelor’s or
equivalent. These non-compulsory levels have restricted entry requirements. Unlike previous
levels, the two ISCED levels of tertiary education are not sequential. Any statistics at the
tertiary level thus aggregate students in short-cycle and bachelor’s programs, which may
exist concurrently within a country. Note that my definition of tertiary education excludes
ISCED level 4, which corresponds to post-secondary non-tertiary education. This level
includes technical training and other programs aimed at improving employable skills. While
this type of education is important, it falls outside the definition of true tertiary education
and the scope of this project.
Although the specific requirements for any given level of education (including age re-
strictions) vary between countries, the definitions laid out by UNESCO provide sufficient
common ground for comparisons. All statistics provided by UNESCO are constructed to ac-
count for variation in educational requirements. Thus, while students in primary education
may be of different ages, they are all at an equivalent stage of their education.
Any references to “overall” education in this study refer to spending on any level of public
education. This includes ISCED levels outside of those that comprise primary, secondary, and
tertiary. These three levels account for an average of 88.6% of government education budgets
in the sample. Pre-primary and post-secondary non-tertiary education are important in the
formation of a complete education system, but are outside the scope of this project because
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they represent a small fraction of education spending and have limited data availability in
Latin America, where state funded pre-primary education has become more common only
in the past few years.
Areas I consider expenditures in “staff,” “capital,” and “current” areas of the education
budget, again defined according to UNESCO standards. Staff expenditures generally cover
salaries and benefits for both teaching and non-teaching employees at schools. Capital expen-
ditures are payments for any education-related materials (including buildings and physical
plants) that are expected to last for more than one academic year. Current expenses, on
the other hand, are those that relate to things consumed within a single year. Appendix C
provides complete and official definitions of these categories.
2.2 Education Spending Trends
The World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and other international techno-
cratic bodies have called for Latin American countries to increase dramatically the resources
they devote to education (UNESCO 2009), even after increased investments brought them to
levels comparable to OECD countries, relative to the size of their economies (Puryear 1997).
This section presents an overview of the spending trends across the region in response to these
calls. In all of the graphs presented below, I group countries into four (mostly) geographic
categories for ease of presentation. I label the categories “Southern Cone +,” “Caribbean,”
“Central America,” and “Bolivarian +.”2 The only divergences from the geographic groups
implied by the names are the inclusion of Mexico in the Southern Cone group and Paraguay
with the Bolivarian countries. This was done because these two countries fit the trends of
these groups better than their respective geographic groups. The Southern Cone is not a ho-
mogeneous block, but Mexico’s geographic size, economic performance, and federal structure
2Specifically, the categories contain the following countries: “Southern Cone +”: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Mexico, and Uruguay; “Caribbean”: Bahamas, Barbados, British Guiana, Dominican Republic, Jamaica,
and Trinidad and Tobago; “Central America”: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Panama; and “Bolivarian +”: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.
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make it a better fit with those countries than with Central America. Similarly, Paraguay’s
smaller size, economic performance, and landlocked status make it a better match with the
Bolivarian countries than with the Southern Cone (or with Mercosur (the Southern Common
Market), e.g., as an alternative grouping).
Figures 2.1 to 2.4 show the spending trends by region. The first plot shows overall
spending as a percentage of the total government budget, while the remaining three show






































































































































Figure 2.1: Overall Spending on Education by Geographic Cluster and Country
Figure 2.1 shows that within each of the four clustering of countries there is general
convergence on overall spending but that there is also some variation between the regions.
The Southern Cone and Bolivarian countries both show signs of converging between 10%
and 20%, having experienced greater variation in the past. Central American countries, on
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the other hand, showed greater convergence in the early 2000s with slightly greater variation
in recent years. As a percentage of the government budget these countries are also higher,































































































































Figure 2.2: Primary Spending on Education by Geographic Cluster and Country
There is a downward trend in primary education spending as a percentage of the edu-
cation budget across all four groupings, as shown in figure 2.2, with the most pronounced
decrease in Central America. Southern Cone countries tend to spend the least of these four
groups and Central American the most. This is unsurprising given their relative levels of
development.
Figure 2.3 is largely a complement to the previous figure in that all four regions show
a general climbing trend in secondary education spending as a percentage of the education
budget. The differences between the four regions are less pronounced, however, with most




































































































































Figure 2.3: Secondary Spending on Education by Geographic Cluster and Country
are the clear exceptions to this trend, with each still spending around 12% of the education
budgets on secondary education.
Breaking from the previous trends, figure 2.4 illustrates a high degree of variability both
between countries within the four groupings and across the groupings themselves. The South-
ern Cone countries all spend at similar levels (approximately 20% to 25% of the education
budget), but in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Bolivarian countries, percentages
range from less than 5% to over 40%. Further, some countries appear to have upward trends
in tertiary spending, some are fairly constant, and a few show precipitous decreases.
Spending patterns by area are a second way to consider trends in how governments
allocate their education budgets. Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 look at this. All present spending
in their respective area as a percentage of the total education budget.
































































































































Figure 2.4: Tertiary Spending on Education by Geographic Cluster and Country
least half of the education budget, but the percentage varies greatly by country (Argentina
consistently spends over 80% on staff while El Salvador dipped toward the 50% mark at one
point). Further, many countries vary greatly over time, with some making dramatic changes
in the direction of their respective trajectories multiple times in the observed period.
In contrast to staff expenditures Figure 2.6 shows there is greater consistency in capital
expenditures in all regions. The Bolivarian countries appear to be trending upwards in this
area of spending and are toward the top of the scale for this category. In all cases, however,
capital expenditures are far less than staff expenditures.
Finally, Figure 2.7 shows current expenditures over time for Latin American countries.
Current expenditures are largely the inverse of staff spending. They represent a significant
portion of the budget (less than staff, but more than capital). They also show less variabil-





























































































































Figure 2.5: Staff Spending by Geographic Cluster and Country
25% or less of their education budgets to current expenditures (Peru and Barbados are the
exceptions), though this was much more common prior to 2010.
What factors are responsible for producing these trends? How much of the variation is
systematically linked to a left-right partisan ideological divide? I attempt to answer these
questions in a statistical analysis in the following section.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
I evaluate the expectations presented above through a series of statistical tests. I look
first at aggregate spending: which parties are most likely to devote the greatest share of
government resources to education? Then I break spending down by level and area and
consider the differences at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels and in staff, capital,




































































































































Figure 2.6: Capital Expenditures by Geographic Cluster and Country
predictor of overall spending or expenditures by level or area.
How governments spend their education budgets is just as important as how much they
spend (Busso et al. 2017). Looking at spending by level and area starts to address this
concern, but still paints an incomplete picture. Whether tertiary spending goes towards
scholarships for the highest performing students or into affirmative action programs, for
example, will have dramatically different consequences for outcomes at that level. Such an
analysis is outside the scope of this project, but future research would do well to examine
this question.
Note also that not all education spending is determined at the national level. In some
countries, states (or provinces) and municipalities may also play a role in setting education
spending levels. The analyses presented here are all focused at the national level. Incon-










































































































































Figure 2.7: Current Expenditures by Geographic Cluster and Country
insufficient data coverage prevent a similar analysis of the subnatinal level. Whether any
such spending occurs is captured in the models below in the country fixed-effects. An alter-
native specification using a federalism dummy variable yields substantively similar results.
2.3.1 Data
Data for the statistical analysis comes from existing secondary sources. All education
related data is provided by UNESCO and accessed through the World Bank’s Education
Statistics Database. Other covariates are provided by various sources, as explained below.
Latin American Sample
The sample for this study is drawn from the following countries from Latin America and the
Caribbean: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, British Guiana, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
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Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. There is no standard definition of “Latin America.” This list represents the most
comprehensive list of independent countries in the Western Hemisphere, barring Canada and
the United States, that have at least partial data available during the time period studied.
Not all countries have the same level of coverage on all education or economic statistics, so
not all are included in every model and panels are unbalanced.
Education statistics prior to 1997 are not available in nearly all cases. UNESCO changed
their definitions of levels of education and other fundamental concepts in that year, cre-
ating an irreconcilable break in the data. The numbers available prior to 1997 are simply
incompatible with those that come after.3 This is a serious drawback of education statistics.
However, this also restricts the sample to an extended period of democratic rule in nearly
all countries in the sample. Venezuela is an exception, as it moved away from democracy
under Hugo Chávez. While other countries have shown some non-democratic (or, rather,
anti-democratic) tendencies during this period as well, all remain classified as democratic by
standard measures.
Dependent Variables
Government spending on education is the dependent variable of interest in this chapter.
Overall education spending is measured as all government spending on education as a per-
centage of the government budget. All remaining models look at spending on a level or an
area as a percentage of the education budget.4 This operationalization allows comparison
across countries because the absolute size of government budgets varies dramatically depend-
ing on a range of political, economic, and demographic factors. Additionally, measuring the
3Although these numbers can be found in printed volumes, they also contain inconsistency between years
and countries. As a result, running two analyses, one for data prior to 1997 and one after, or using a dummy
variable to mark the point of divergence is not a viable alternative option.
4As noted above, these three levels account for an average of 88.6% of the education in the sample.
An alternative specification of these dependent variables as a percentage of the three level total yields
substantively similar results to the ones shown below. This results should be unsurprising because the
correlation between the three levels measured in the two forms are 0.92, 0.94, and 0.98, respectively.
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spending by level or area as a percentage of the education budget captures the priority
tradeoffs faced by politicians who must allocate finite resources between many competing
demands — holding the size of the education budget constant, any dollar spent on primary
education staff is a dollar than cannot be spent on secondary education capital expenses, for
example. Expenditures by area are also calculated as a percentage of the total education
budget for a given year.
Explanatory Variables
The explanatory variable of theoretical interest in this study is partisan ideology. There
exists a debate on how ideology should be measured. First, there is a divide between those
who prefer categorical (left, center, and right, for example) or even binary measures and those
who prefer a continuous measure. Second, there is a divide in the literature between those
who measure ideology based on platforms, manifestos, or other statements, those who use
expert surveys, and those who do so using policy enacted under the party. Each approach
has inherent advantages and disadvantages. For the purposes of this project, I opt for a
continuous measure based on expert opinion.
Specifically, I use the party ideology measure developed by Baker and Greene (2011).
This variable measures ideology on a continuous scale from 1 to 20, with 1 marking the
extreme left and 20 the extreme right. Parties are coded primarily using data from a survey
of experts from Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009), where experts were asked to rate parties
based on policy poitions in a number of dimensions. Expert surveys offer several advantages
for measurement including a high degree of accuracy and reliability (Benoit and Laver 2007)
and their ability to aggregate a large amount of data from individuals with deep knowledge
of specific cases. They have been challenged because of uncertainty about the exact criteria
by which experts judge parties and whether these can be translated into a common policy
space (Budge 2000). Baker and Greene’s measure has withstood scrutiny, however, and its
coverage for the sample of countries employed is unmatched.
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I conduct robustness checks with two other measures of party ideology in Latin Amer-
ica. The first is provided by Rosas (2005) and the second comes from Coppedge (1997) as
extended by Huber and Stephens (2012) (referred to herein as the CHS coding and data).
Appendix D discusses these alternative measures and their results in greater detail, all of
which are substantively similar to those presented here. I use the Baker and Greene measure
as my benchmark because it aligns well with the definition of left and right that I employ.
While Coppedge’s measure is used elsewhere, its main strength comes from an attempt to
avoid post-hoc classification of parties. In this study, this is not a primary concern, since I
am interested in the policy behavior of left and right. Coppedge’s measure differs from the
others in that it employs a categorical classification of parties. That the results using this
measure are so similar to those of the continuous measures should be viewed as evidence that
the null finding is not driven by convergence of center-left and center-right, but by parties
across the entire political spectrum.
In addition to partisan ideology, I include several political, economic, and demographic
covariates, following the bulk of the literature in these modeling decisions. Previous research
has found a positive relationship between democracy and education spending (Brown and
Hunter 2004; Stasavage 2005; Rudra 2005; Wibbels 2006). I control for level of democracy
using the polyarchy measure from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge
et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2015). V-Dem’s polyarchy measure is highly correlated with other
popular measures of democracy, including the polity2 measure (Marshall 2003). Substituting
other measures makes no difference in the results presented below.
Although the executive is by far the most powerful branch in Latin American presidential
systems, legislatures play an increasingly important role (Smith 2012). Further, even in cases
where they are still subordinate, split governments can, nonetheless, create roadblocks for
executive agendas (Aleman 2006). Thus, I control for the percentage of the lower house
controlled by the same party as the executive. This data comes from the CHS dataset. Note
that this variable does not control for the ideology of the legislature, but instead attempts
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to capture the degree to which the legislature can act as a veto point in the executive’s
policy agenda. While this control is important, focusing on the executive remains a valid
approach because most legislation in the region is introduced by the executive. In this way
the executive branch dominates the legislative agenda.
The models include a measure of GDP per capita, as measured in constant 2010 dollars
by the World Bank as a control for the size of the economy. This is important because,
ceteris paribus, a larger economy increases the government’s budget and, by extension, the
amount of discretionary funds available. Instead of using GDP data directly from the World
Bank, I use an estimated series from Fariss et al. (2017). The authors generate this estimate
using a latent traits model that incorporates additional sources of information about GDP
and thus produces both better estimates and a complete time series.
Previous research shows that economic variables play a crucial role in the provision of
education. Thus, I include three additional economic covariates. The first is GDP growth,
a standard control in similar studies, provided by V-Dem. The second is total government
spending on education in constant US dollars.5 I include total government spending because
education systems require sizable fixed costs and the absolute value of resources can affect
distributive decisions. In the overall model in the Latin American sample I also control
for external debt service. This control is included only in the overall model because while
external debt may affect the allocation of funds for education, there is no theoretical reason
to expect it to affect the distribution of those funds across levels or areas. Finally, models
with level or area of education as the dependent variable also include controls for overall
education budget size.
Most countries in Latin America have experienced periods of non-democratic rule under
military or other authoritarian regimes during the second half of the 20th century. Previous
research has shown that authoritarian regimes tend to limit education spending to a greater
degree than democratic ones during economic recessions (Brown and Hunter 1999). As a
5This control is omitted in overall spending model since it is the dependent variable in that regression.
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result, it is possible that the economic situation at the time countries transitioned to democ-
racy could set a precedent in education spending that is perpetuated through time. There
are, however, several reasons to believe that this should not affect the models presented here.
First, democratic governments have had ample time to adjust their budgetary preferences
since the transition. Second, all experienced the international push for greater education
spending during the 1990s. Third, while an ideal model would control for education spend-
ing at the time of transition to democracy, country-fixed effects will capture any residual
effect in the absence of appropriate data for this control.
The models include several demographic covariates to account for population differences
that have been shown to have an effect on education in various contexts. First, I control
for the level of urbanization, as spending requirements in education vary drastically between
urban and rural settings (Guthrie 1979). Second, I control for the average overall level of
education, as higher levels among adults are likely to produce higher spending preferences
(Arends-Kuenning and Duryea 2006; Azam and Bhatt 2015). This variable also captures one
view of the state of education development in a country. Higher levels of average education
in the adult population are indicative of more developed and longer established education
systems. Third, I control for the size of the school-aged population. As populations grow and
the number of school-aged children increases there will be increased demand for education.
Economic development tends to produce, first, an increase in the population and, second,
a decrease. Thus development may also lead to smaller numbers of school-aged individuals
and thus decreased demand for primary and secondary education. For the overall spending
model I control for both the ratio of children under the age of 15 to the working population
and total population. The ratio of youth to working adults has an effect on the relative
balance of different social spending demands, and the government’s ability to provide them
and total population will drive education demand. For all models that look at spending at
a particular level, I control for the number of students at that level as a percentage of all
students. I define the population of all students as the sum of the number of students at
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the official age for primary, secondary, or tertiary education. This accounts for differences in
education requirements across countries. The first three demographic variables come from V-
Dem. The total population is also provided by Fariss et al. (2017) and incorporates multiple
sources to produce an estimated time series.
Finally, I include country dummies to control for country-specific trends. This addition
means the results look at within-country variation, an appropriate comparison for this study
because parties only compete against one another within a single country. Importantly,
this also accounts for federalism. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have federal structures in
which provinces (in Argentina) and states (in Brazil and Mexico) have a degree of political
autonomy and non-trivial responsibilities for funding and administering the school system.6
Failing to take this into account would bias estimates of spending on the levels of educa-
tion, because the national government has greater freedom to devote resources to tertiary
education. Including country-fixed effects solves this problem.7
2.3.2 Modeling Time
Unlike the analysis of education outcomes (see Chapter 3), modeling time is relatively
easy in the analysis of education spending. Budgets are made on an annual basis, so educa-
tional allotments are the responsibility of those in power at the time the budget was made.
Since budgets are typically made one year out (as opposed to being made and implemented
within the same year), the government at time t is responsible for the budget at time t+ 1.
For this reason, all models presented below use a one year lead on the dependent variable.
Regional and global economic conditions as well as the tendency for policy prescriptions
to diffuse and change over time suggest that there may be time-related trends in education
spending that must be accounted for. I control for time trends by including time and time
squared variables.
Garritzmann and Seng (2016) argue that most of the models in the literature on party
6These arrangements have changed over time, which is also captured by the country fixed-effects.
7Excluding these countries entirely from the analysis makes no difference for the results.
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ideology and policy spending are misspecified because they look at the country-year as the
unit of analysis. Instead, they posit that the proper unit of analysis is the administration.
Although this varies in duration, they believe it better captures the theoretical assumption
that different administrations will implement different policy priorities and budgetary allot-
ments. In their reanalysis of education spending in the OECD using the administration as
the unit of analysis these authors find no relationship between party and education spending.
This research draws attention to the importance of modeling decisions and the assumptions
that underpin them.
I argue that the country-year is the appropriate unit of analysis for education outputs.
Budgets are created every year, each time forcing politicians to allocate (or reallocate) funds
according to their priorities. Even if neither the overall ideology of the legislature nor the
preferences of any single legislator (or executive) changes in the span of a single non-election
year, it is still reasonable to expect shifts in the distribution of resources through the gov-
ernment’s budget. Externalities and shocks may impose new demands or reduce previous
demands year over year. Economic crises occur; debts come due; unexpected events make
certain policy areas more salient. For these reasons, I follow the bulk of the literature in
using country-year observations, yet like Garritzmann and Seng (ibid.), I also find there to
be little relationship between partisan ideology and education outputs.
2.3.3 Interpolation
Coverage of education statistics in Latin America is far from complete. I deal with this
problem through linear interpolation. Budgets and the relative allocation of resources change
on a yearly basis, but the variables of interest all demonstrate strong linear trends, suggesting
that such a strategy is appropriate in this case. The models presented below fill a maximum
gap of 3 years. No extrapolation is performed on either end of the time series. Interpolation
is only performed on the dependent spending variables and not any of the economic controls.
I also run the same models using data with a 5 year maximum interpolation. Results remain
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robust to this longer gap.
In addition, I rerun the analysis using a “noisy” interpolation in which random noise was
added to each interpolated value. The was drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0
and standard deviation equal to the standard deviation in the yearly change of value within
each country. I bound these interpolated values at 0 on the lower end. I created ten such
datasets and then combined results from separate regressions on each following the standard
procedure used with multiple imputation. The reanalysis using these noisy interpolations
confirms the findings presented below.
Interpolation vs. Imputation
Multiple imputation has become a popular method for dealing with missing data and software
packages such as Amelia II in R make implementation of this approach very easy (Blackwell,
Honaker, and King 2015). Two problems prevent its use with this data. First, the data
do not meet the fundamental assumption of the imputation model: that missing data be
“missing completely at random” (MCAR). In fact, the non-randomness of missing data does
not even meet the weaker version of the assumption — “missing at random” (MAR) (King
et al. 2001). Instead, some countries are much more likely to have missing values than others.
Even if this assumption were ignored completely, the pattern of missingness still creates
a mathematically intractable problem. Some country-year observations have either too little
data or even complete missingness. This results in matrices that are singular or non-invertible
and thus imputation cannot be performed.
Various Bayesian bootstrapping methods may be feasible in this situation, but I argue
that the interpolated points remain a reasonable “best guess” for the missing values. The
strong linear trends exhibited by the time series along with the tendency to use the previous
value as a starting point in the budgetary process (Jones and Baumgartner 2005), suggest
that interpolation is reasonable here.
Figure 2.8 shows a typical variable with interpolated and non-interpolated points. The
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figure shows that there is a strong linear pattern to spending and adds support to the belief
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Figure 2.8: Primary spending as a percentage of government education spending by country.
Red triangular points have been interpolated, blue circular points are observed. Points have
been connected with lines in cases with at least two consecutive years of observed data.
Maximum interpolated gap is 3 years.
2.4 Results & Discussion
Chapter 1 laid out the expectations that the left would outspend the right overall and
would devote greater shares of its education budget to primary and secondary by level and
staff expenditures by area. It also presented the expectation that the right would outspend
the left at the tertiary level. The analysis demonstrates that none of these expectations are
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borne out in the data.
Table 2.1 presents the results from main models for overall education spending and
spending by level.8 The findings suggest that partisan ideology is not a strong explanatory
variable for these outcomes. The F-statistics, however, indicate that the overall models are
significant and the R2 values show they explain a high percentage of the variance.
Overall Primary Secondary Tertiary
Ideology −0.025 −0.016 −0.375∗∗∗ −0.063
(−0.585) (−0.221) (−4.284) (−0.768)
Debt Service −0.017
(−1.442)
Polyarchy −5.107 −2.460 2.593 −7.556
(−1.820) (−0.448) (0.417) (−1.260)
GDP per capita −1.000 −6.657 −4.144 3.628
(−0.298) (−1.375) (−0.751) (0.701)
Urbanization −1.287 −59.529 −128.458∗∗∗ 28.107
(−0.064) (−1.915) (−3.481) (0.817)
Average education 16.610∗∗∗ −1.287 15.665∗ −15.247∗
(4.472) (−0.208) (2.229) (−2.238)
Growth 4.163 7.872 6.030 −10.842∗











Lower house share 0.669 2.889 −8.484∗∗∗ 2.610
(0.564) (1.290) (−3.382) (1.068)
Overall education spending 0.868 −9.665∗∗∗ 9.953∗∗∗
(0.393) (−3.841) (4.107)
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 154 157 155 155
R2 0.88 0.90 0.86 0.78
F Statistic 38.13∗∗∗ 44.12∗∗∗ 31.07∗∗∗ 17.85∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.1: Spending by level in Latin America
The negative and significant coefficient at the secondary level suggests that the left spends
more of its education budget on secondary than the right. Figure 2.9 shows the marginal
effect of ideology on secondary education spending in Latin America.
Although this finding is in keeping with expectations, this plot makes clear that the
substantive magnitude of the effect is quite small. Moving from the extreme left end of
8A presentation of simple bivariate results can be found in Table D.4 in Appendix D. These results
suggest that, in some cases, ideology can predict spending. However, if a statistical model is a simplified
view of the world and a data generation process, then these models are ones in which education spending
is determined absent consideration of number of students, national economic situation, or current state of
education development. I argue that these are models that carry little to no substantive meaning because
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Figure 2.9: Predicted spending levels for secondary education. All covariates are held at
their mean.
the spectrum to the extreme right is estimated to have an effect around -7.5 points (i.e.
spending on secondary as a percentage of the overall education budget would be -7.5 percent
lower). While this difference can be substantively meaningful within the tight constraints
of the budget-making process, swings of ideology that extreme are not observed in the real
world. The average change from one administration to another is -1.49 points overall (on a
20 points scale). Within this, the mean shift to the right is 4.73 and the mean shift to the
left is -4.69. Thus, the expected change in secondary education spending as a percentage
of the total education budget for an average change in administration is 0.56% overall and
1.76% and -1.78% for shifts to the left and right, respectively.
Ideology is not a statistically significant explanatory variable for tertiary education spend-
ing, contrasting previously published findings based on a sample of OECD countries in
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004), Ansell (2008b), Ansell and Samuels (2010), and Rauh,
Kirchner, and Kappe (2011). The Latin American context of lower levels of development
likely contributes to this result. Although I have controlled for economic factors, lower over-
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all development and lower overall education both create greater demands for primary and
secondary education to take precedence over tertiary.
Staff Capital Current
Ideology −0.053 0.430∗∗ −0.264
(−0.187) (3.318) (−0.968)
Debt Service
Polyarchy 9.806 5.716 −8.290
(0.629) (0.798) (−0.549)
GDP per capita 4.653 6.259 2.929
(0.267) (0.856) (0.174)
Urbanization 81.793 41.870 −60.408
(0.496) (0.684) (−0.379)
Average education −66.681∗∗ 23.935∗∗ 37.748
(−3.057) (2.641) (1.789)
Growth 31.064∗ −0.288 −22.195
(2.221) (−0.044) (−1.641)
School-aged population −30.338 −60.764∗ 43.465
(−0.476) (−2.417) (0.705)
Lower house share 10.861 1.171 −4.731
(1.443) (0.371) (−0.650)
Overall education spending −8.211 −6.870 5.667
(−0.937) (−1.723) (0.669)
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 120 119 120
R2 0.64 0.60 0.54
F Statistic 6.82∗∗∗ 5.67∗∗∗ 4.49∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.2: Spending by area in Latin America
Table 2.2 shows that ideology is a significant predictor of capital expenditures, with
the right spending more of their education budget on this area than the left. As with the
finding on secondary spending above, the substantive magnitude of this effect is very small
— an average rightward shift would increase capital spending as a percentage of the total
education budget by only 2.04%. There are no significant differences on staff or current
expenditures, however. These findings also cut against expectations that party ideology
should be a predictor of how education money is spent. Specifically, it is surprising that the
left does not spend more on staff give its longstanding relationship with teachers’ unions.
The lack of significance on nearly any other variables is also a surprising finding, especially
when the models appear to fit the data well overall. Country-fixed effects account for part
of the overall fit, but the R2 and f-statistics remain reasonably high even when these are
removed. I refrain from any attempts to explain the lack of significance on these other
variables because doing so would be a clear post-hoc justification, lacking theoretical support.
These surprising results should be investigated further in future research.
56
The results presented support two conclusions. First, party ideology does not predict
overall levels of education spending in Latin America. There is no evidence that either
the left or the right devotes greater shares of the government budget to education policy.
Second, the only differences between left and right on any level or area of education spending
is very minor in substantive terms. There is statistically significant evidence that the left
spends more on secondary education than the right and that the right spends more on capital
expenses than the left. In real terms, however, the differences are small.
The sum of these trends is that party ideology is a generally poor predictor of educa-
tion spending. Faced with similar challenges and similar budgets with which to confront
these challenges, left and right governments are deciding to spend their money in similar
ways. There remain, however, reasons to expect that even if the left and right spend simi-
lar amounts, they may still produce different outcomes. The following chapter explores the
connection between partisan ideology and education access and quality.
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Chapter 3
Party Ideology and Convergence on Education
Outcomes in Latin America
The previous chapter demonstrated that there are few differences between political left
and right in terms of education spending decisions and where differences exist, they are
substantively small. Even in the absence of greater connections between ideology and edu-
cation spending, there remain strong reasons to believe that the outcomes produced under
left and right administrations will differ. Outcomes are determined both indirectly through
outputs and directly through policy.1 Consider primary enrollment, for example. Strategies
to increase enrollment could include a range of options including punitive measures (hiring
truancy officers), material incentives (conditional cash transfers), or reduction of barriers
(providing free lunches or uniforms). Further, any of these efforts could be focused within
a given geographic region, target the lowest-performing schools, or include means-testing
for participation. All of these policy decisions would directly affect enrollment outcomes.
Funding for these programs would have an effect on measured outcomes as well, but only
indirectly through the policies themselves. Because policy has its own direct effect on out-
comes, it is possible that left and right will differ on them despite spending at nearly identical
levels.
Preferences diverge between the two ends of the political spectrum on important questions
about system management and policy priorities. Indeed, in an analysis of the challenges in
education in Latin America Puryear (1997) argues that the increase in education spending
during the 1990s indicates that funding was not the primary problem, but rather, that among
1Note that additional outside non-policy factors can also affect education outcomes. For example, external
shocks (economic crises or natural disasters, for example) may force students out of school unexpectedly.
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the obstacles to further reform are political factors. Twenty years later, Busso et al. (2017,
p. 5) offer a similarly blunt conclusion: “money is not the only, or main, issue.”
Governments can choose to prioritize different aspects of education in their policy through
the selection of bureaucratic leadership, education system administration, or legislative agen-
das. A new administration could shift the focus at the education ministry from secondary
curriculum to primary attendance rates, for example, without affecting spending on either
level. The shifts can produce changes in outcome. To reiterate the expectations laid out in
Chapter 1, given the left’s commitment to enhancing equity of outcomes, we should expect
the left to outperform the right on measures of quality and that these outcomes will be more
equitably distributed under the left. In contrast, we should expect the right, which favors
equality of opportunity to outperform the left on measures of access and for these outcomes
to be more equitably distributed under the right.
Are these expectations borne out in reality? I consider both access and quality of ed-
ucation along with whether these outcomes are distributed equitably. That is, how much
education are students receiving, is it good education, and are all students achieving or only a
systematic subset? This chapter conducts an empirical analysis into the connection between
left-right partisan ideology and enrollment rates, completion rates, transition rates, dropout
rates, and test scores. Contrary to expectations, I find no compelling evidence that either
left or right produces better education outcomes in terms of quantity or quality, and only
weakly suggestive evidence that the left produces more equitable outcomes. Before looking
at the trends in education outcomes across Latin America, I define here key terms.
3.1 Outcome Definitions
I follow Corrales (1999) and the education development literature in distinguishing be-
tween access and quality. In broad terms access measures how much education students
receive and quality measures how good that education is. Aggregate success on quantities
related to access (enrollment, completion, transition, dropout, and repetition) and outcomes
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(test scores) can be measured in a variety of ways. Some outcomes are straightforward and
uncontroversial. These are generally those related to quantity of education — enrollment or
completion rates, for example. Others are both difficult to measure and highly controversial.
Measures of education quality such as test scores fall into this category.
Measures of Access Enrollment at any given level of education acts as a measure of access
of education — how much education are students receiving and what barriers exist to getting
it? These measures generally exist only for compulsory levels of education and thus provide
a sense of how well the government is able to provide this service to those who are eligible
to take advantage of it.2 Obstacles to enrollment include lack of schools and economic
conditions. To measure enrollment, I use adjusted net enrollment rates, which measure the
number of enrolled students as a percentage of the corresponding population. This takes
into account students who have advanced to higher levels of education prior to the normal
age for doing so.3
Beyond simply knowing whether the appropriate population is enrolled in school, access
measures also track student progress throughout the education system. Four such mea-
sures are available: repetition, dropout, completion, and transition rates. The names of all
four accurately convey what they measure. The repetition rate measures the percentage of
students who must repeat a given grade. Repetition numbers should be interpreted with
caution because of challenges in its accurate measurement including late enrollment of stu-
dents, policies of automatic promotion, and transfer of students between grades. Dropout
is the percentage of students who were enrolled in one year, but not the following year.
Completion rate is a measure of the students enrolled in the final grade of primary, lower
secondary, or upper secondary.4 The transition rate is the percentage of students who move
2Changes to eligibility itself — age or citizenship requirements, e.g. — can affect access to education,
but are outside the scope of this project.
3The adjusted net enrollment rate can exceed 100% due to repetition.
4Although individual countries can generate more precise completion statistics, taking into account those
who dropout in this final year, these numbers are not available at the world level. As a result, the completion
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from one level to the next and can be interpreted as a measure of access at the higher level
of education (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2018).
Measures of Quality Measuring quality of education is a difficult task. There is no univer-
sally accepted definition of the standard by which to judge education. There is even a divide
in the literature as to whether it is better to measure quality using school inputs such as
spending per student or teacher-student ratios (Betts 1996) or outputs such as test scores
(Hanushek and Wößmann 2008). Further, even when such a standard is agreed upon, there
are not always clear ways to measure it.
Standardized test scores have many flaws and their limitations have been lamented for
nearly a century — essentially as long as standardized tests have existed (Buros 1977).
Some have argued that testing has negative psychological effects on students (Paris et al.
1991) and others that standardized tests themselves are a tool by which to enforce a social
hierarchy (Garrison 2009). A long-recognized problem is that when test scores are linked
with incentives or are made highly public or salient, teachers and school administrators
can shift focus and resources toward teaching to the test instead of spending time on the
prescribed material (Haladyna, Nolen, and Haas 1991; Baker et al. 2010).
Equally, despite the appeal for an “objective” measure of student achievement, standard-
ized tests have been shown to include many kinds of bias and do not adequately measure
student abilities (Kohn 2000). Previous studies have suggested that non-instructional factors
like family background explain the vast majority of variation in test scores (Robinson and
Brandon 1994).5
Perhaps the most damaging criticism, from the perspective of this study, is the suggestion
that standardized tests do not actually measure any valid concept (Popham 1999). This may
rate should only be used as an upper bound on the estimated completion rate (UNESCO Institute for
Statistics 2018).
5This is not to say that schools do not matter. Rather, the research suggests that background factors
like family education are critical (Rumberger 1983; Aikens and Barbarin 2008; Baker and LeTendre 2005;
Buchmann 2000; Marteleto and de Souza 2012).
61
be due to problems with the assumptions of the test as well as the validity of the questions
that it is composed of (Neill and Medina 1989).
Defenders of standardized tests exist, although they tend to receive less attention than the
critics. A sizable literature exists suggesting that standardized tests may, in fact, have pos-
itive consequences. These may be either unintentional (Cizek 2005) or intentional (Phelps
2005) and include increasing accountability, achievement, motivation, and giving leaders
information needed to make decisions. Additionally, more recent research has revisited crit-
icisms about the validity of standardized tests and found reasons to be hopeful that they
can be valid (Kuncel and Hezlett 2010).
Proposed alternatives to standardized tests include “performance assessments” and “learn-
ing portfolios” (Kohn 2000). Both are designed to give greater weight to classroom-specific
learning, allow more detailed feedback than a single letter grade, and assess learning in a
more holistic way. The strengths of these alternatives come in their micro-level approach
but these alternatives also suffer from the same shortcomings of standardized tests (Phelps
2017) — moving away from multiple-choice or essay-based assessment is not a “magic bullet”
to overcome bias or concerns about validity.
Beyond test scores, there are other possible output measures of education quality, but
they are also flawed. Since one of the goals of education is instrumental (i.e. for students to
gain remunerative skills), labor force statistics may provide a measure of education quality.
However, both employment levels and wages are determined by more than the supply of
(skilled) labor. Global economic events, the structure of the local economy, mobility, and
external shocks all play an immediate role in these outcomes. Modeling the effect of schooling
on labor outcomes (typically earnings) presents a variety of challenges (Harmon, Oosterbeek,
and Walker 2003). Although the economics literature has made great strides in overcoming
these obstacles, these studies look at the effect that education quality has on earnings instead
of the inverse of using earnings to measure education quality (Hanushek and Wößmann
2007; Hanushek and Wößmann 2008). Further, in many situations the connection between
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education and wages is not direct — the signaling effect of certain types or levels plays an
essential role in earnings (Spence 1973; Layard and Psacharopoulos 1974). Thus, the classic
“Mincerian” models in which the individual is the unit of analysis are not appropriate in
this situation (Mincer 1958; Mincer 1974).
The result of these considerations is that, despite their flaws, standardized tests provide
the only viable option for international comparisons of education quality.
Measures of Equity Equity in education exists only in relation to access and quality — it
is possible to increase either in equitable or inequitable ways, but it is impossible to talk
about equity in and of itself. It is worth considering both equality of opportunity (whether all
students have equal access to educational resources of similar quality) and outcome (whether
all students learn the same amount).6 On the latter question, it is obvious that not all
individuals will learn the same amount, as cognitive skills and motivation vary by student.
The question is whether or not groups learn the same in the aggregate. This study will
only consider gender equity due to data limitations. Geographic location (urban versus
rural), race, and family income are other common groups across which educational equity is
measured.
The gender gap in education is a problem that exists in nearly every education system.
In less economically developed countries in Latin America (and elsewhere), the traditional
gender gap persists in which boys receive more education and tend to perform better than
girls, although more recent studies suggest that this gap is narrowing (Fraile and Gomez 2015;
Nopo 2012; Hausmann 2009).7 This is due partly to young girls leaving the school system
after becoming pregnant (Rumberger 1983; Hindin and Fatusi 2009; Grant and Hallman
6As noted in Chapter 1, “equity” is often defined as equality of opportunity and “equality” as equality of
outcome and that the former is closely tied to ideas of justice, fairness, and inclusion (Simon, Malgorzata,
and Beatriz 2007). For the purposes of this study, “equity enhancement” refers to improvements on both of
these areas.
7In contrast, girls tend to excel while boys struggle in many wealthier countries (Klesment and Van Bavel
2017; DiPrete and Buchmann 2013; Buchmann, DiPrete, and McDaniel 2008).
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2008).8
Equity can be measured as the difference in either access or quality between either male
and female students. The difference in test scores between boys and girls, for example,
provides one measure of gender equity. Reducing these gaps constitutes equity enhancement.
It is important to note the difference between closing the gap by raising the lower performing
group and allowing the higher performing group to decline. Equity of high quality education
is a desirable outcome; equity of low quality education is not.
3.2 Patterns of Progress
Education in Latin America has received substantial attention by the international com-
munity in recent years. Much of this literature has been focused on the challenges that remain
for education to rise to needed levels (Bellei et al. 2013; PREAL Advisory Board 2005; The
World Bank 2018). Yet there is cause to celebrate in the improvements in education over the
past two decades. On measures of access most countries have made significant improvements.
Quality remains a persistent issue, although some countries have made positive strides on
these metrics.
Recent research also suggests that the gender gap has narrowed in many developing
countries, largely due to a focus from the MDGs and programs designed to address this issue
(Grant and Behrman 2010). The trends presented here confirm this, although there remain
significant gaps.
Despite these gains and the positive trends presented here, Latin American countries
continue to lag behind OECD countries as well as other countries at similar levels of de-
velopment. Chile and Mexico, members of the OECD, perform better than other Latin
American countries in the international PISA test but are still the worst performers in the
OECD (Bos et al. 2016). In comparison to East Asian countries, which started at simi-
8Some schools ban pregnant students and new mothers from attending classes, though international
treaties and specific legislation in some countries has sought to address this. The Ley General de Educación
in Chile, for example, provides specific protections for teenage mothers (Art. 11 LGE 2009), but these
protections are not universal (UNESCO 2014).
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lar levels of development fifty years ago, Latin America performs significantly worse on all
education metrics (Hanushek and Wößmann 2012).
As in Chapter 2, the graphs are presented with groups into “Southern Cone +,” “Caribbean,”
























































































































Figure 3.1: Adjusted net enrollment rate — Primary
Enrollment rates Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show changes in the adjusted net enrollment rate
(ANER) of all countries in the sample for primary and secondary education, respectively.
The first clear trend is that primary education has become nearly universal. Southern Cone
countries reached this marker much earlier than others. Central American countries started
at the lowest point and caught up only by 2018, but there are some signs that primary
education enrollment has dropped a little in these countries over the past few years. The

























































































































Figure 3.2: Adjusted net enrollment rate — Secondary
Southern Cone and higher than Central America, but growing more quickly than the latter.
At the secondary level the trends are positive overall. Southern Cone countries perform
best in secondary enrollment today despite starting at levels similar to those in Bolivarian
countries and only a little higher than Central America. Both Central American and Boli-
varian countries have shown enormous growth in secondary enrollment rates over the period
for which we have data, but are still far from achieving universal enrollment. The Caribbean
stands out for the Bahamas, where secondary enrollment has fallen significantly over the
past several decades.9
Completion and transition rates Figures 3.3 and 3.4 look at the completion rates for primary
and lower secondary, respectively, and Figure 3.5 shows the effective transition rate from















































































































Figure 3.3: Primary completion rate
primary to secondary education. Completion and transition rates exhibit a similar geographic
pattern to enrollment rates: the Southern Cone starts higher than the other regions and
ends with very high scores; Central America starts at the lowest level and makes enormous
strides, but still performs below the levels of the Southern Cone countries; the Bolivarian and
Caribbean countries fall somewhere between these two extremes. Similarly, the completion
rates for primary education are much higher than for secondary.10 A similar trend can be
observed with the transition rates between primary and lower secondary education.
Repetition rates Figure 3.6 shows repetition levels across the region. Across all countries in
Latin America there are similar trends in repetition rates. Repetition rates have held fairly
10This is unsurprising given that the opportunity costs of secondary education are greater than primary





























































































































Figure 3.4: Lower secondary completion rate
constant, with only slight downward movement. These findings should not be surprising con-
sidering the nature of repetition. Unlike in the United States where “social promotion” often
advances students who have not reached academic expectations, it is much more acceptable
in Latin America to hold students back if they fail.11 Although social promotion has not
taken hold in the region, the rate of repetition has decreased dramatically from historical
levels. In Chile, for example, at the start of the Eduardo Frei administration (1965-1970),
enrollment in first grade was at 170% of the total first grade-aged population, suggesting
extraordinarily high levels of repetition (Farrell 1986, p. 34).12 These trends exceed the scope
11There are no statistics on the frequency of social promotion (Thompson and Cunningham 2000). The
practice came under great scrutiny in the late 1990s and the start of the 2000s and was one target of the No
Child Left Behind Act (Jimerson et al. 2006). Still, there is little question that the practice persists to some
degree in the United States.



















































































































Figure 3.5: Effective transition rate from primary to secondary levels of education
of this project but demonstrate the progress in education since the mid-twentieth century.
Note also that repetition is most likely at the lowest grades in primary and secondary.
Higher grades (not shown here) follow the same trends presented here with lower percentages
across the board. After being held back for a year students will either do better the following
year and move on to the next grade or will drop out. Students who are held back are much
more likely to drop out (Griffin and Heidorn 1996), explaining the higher repetition rates at
lower grades.
Dropout rates Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the trends in dropout rates in primary and lower
secondary education, respectively. Despite more or less steady rates of repetition and the
greater probability of dropping out if held back than if promoted, Latin American schools






































































































Figure 3.6: Repetition Rates — Primary Grade 1
levels. These rates are much more fickle than other education metrics, however, and tend
to reflect the immediate economic conditions of the country. Economic recession creates
immediate demands on families, particularly poor families, who can no longer accept the
opportunity costs of sending children to school and need, instead, the immediate income
they can earn if they leave school (Olaniyan and Okemakinde 2008; King and Hill 1993).
Test scores Finally, Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the trends in test scores in primary and
secondary education. These graphs show the average test scores for all students in a given
country-year. The data is based on the test score database created by Altinok, Diebolt, and
De Meulemeester (2013). Even with their extended database, coverage is extremely limited.
Most countries have only a single observation at the primary level and at the secondary level






































































































Figure 3.7: Repetition Rates — Secondary Grade 1
available data suggests that test scores are rising in Latin America.
It is also informative to look at these trends at a country level. Most of the series move in
parallel and there is no clear correlation between executive ideology and changes in education
outcomes. Figure 3.12 shows all the outcome series for Costa Rica, a representative case.
Shaded gray bars at the top and bottom of the plot correspond to administrations, with
darker shading indicating more left governments. Dashed vertical lines have been added to
aid in viewing the blocks of years. In some series there is a hint that an inflection point in
the series trajectory occurs a couple of years into an administration, but most of the lines
appear to move independently of changes in executive ideology. This hints at the findings
below in which partisan ideology does not predict education outcomes.
Similarly, we can look at test score patterns by country. Figure 3.13 shows over time


























































































Figure 3.8: Dropout Rates — Primary
of the overall trends (as much as can be determined from this limited data). We observe a
few clear patterns. First, there is a clear positive trend in all countries, with an increasing
percentage of students meeting the basic standards (series starting with “adj1”). There
does not appear to be any clear connection between party ideology and these improvements,
however.
Second, there are two divergent trends in the relative performance by gender and by
location. The first group of countries, of which Mexico is representative, has made strides
to close the gender gap as well as the divide between urban and rural students. The second
group, of which Argentina is representative, has seen these gaps persist or even increase.
The latter trend is worrying, particularly in the case of Argentina. The divide has not only
increased to an alarming level, but it is driven both by increased performance in urban


























































































Figure 3.9: Dropout Rates — Secondary
The Role of CCTs in These Trends CCTs became popular in Latin America after two
large pilots (in Brazil and Mexico) showed positive results. Though there is great variation
in the requirements attached to CCT programs, all follow a similar model: families who
qualify (usually based on income and residence) receive a modest monthly cash stipend as
long as they fulfill pre-determined requirements (usually related to health services and school
attendance). Are these programs responsible, then, for the trends described above?
Since these programs are tied to school attendance, it is unsurprising that they have
shown positive results with increasing access to education (Bonal, Tarabini, and Rambla
2012). However, the evidence is mixed (or even negative) as to whether these programs
actually improve any other metrics related to education (Schwartzman 2005). In fact, CCTs
show no evidence of increased performance in student learning, which is unsurprising since




























































































































Figure 3.10: Mean Test Scores — Primary
summary of the impact that CCTs have on education,
conditional cash transfers are less impressive in terms of their educational im-
pact than they are as direct poverty alleviation transfers. There is evidence of
some positive impact on enrolment, but it is not clear that transfers are efficient,
particularly at the primary school level, because the transfer is given to many
families who would have sent their children to school without the transfer…The
evidence is more favourable regarding attendance at school. Given that oppor-
tunity to learn is influenced by time spent learning, this is a positive result. If
the schools that students go to were such that children could actually receive
quality instruction once they attend, it is clear that the transfers would help
students learn. This is a critical assumption of these programmes…There is no
evidence that students receiving cash transfers perform at different levels in tests
of student achievement than their counterparts not receiving the transfers. This
should be a cause for concern, if the transfers are seen as a strategy to improve

























































































































Figure 3.11: Mean Test Scores — Secondary
Given this assessment, these programs cannot be credited with producing the wide range
of positive improvements to education outcomes. With respect to improved performance on
access, the mixed ideological roots of CCTs point more toward convergence than divergence.
In Mexico, the Progresa (later Oportunidades) program was started under the center-right
PRI government. In contrast, the Bolsa Escola in Brazil was first piloted under the the PT’s
leftist governor in the Distrito Federal (D.F.), then expanded nationally with the Bolsa Escola
Federal under the center-right PSDB government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. That
program mutated (and dramatically expanded) under the subsequent leftist PT governments.
Thus, it is still worth considering whether partisan ideology can account for the trends in
















Figure 3.12: All outcome series. Shaded bars indicate party ideology for the administration
during that period. Darker colors indicate more left-leaning governments.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
This section examines whether the trends noted above have any relationship with partisan
ideology. Despite expectations that differences in beliefs about inequality should lead parties
to different educational strategies, I find little relationship between partisan ideology and
education outputs. To address concerns that the results are due to model specification errors,
I adopt several different modeling approaches. That all of them show similar results should
be interpreted as strong evidence of a lack of a relationship between partisan ideology and
education outcomes. Alternative specification models are presented in Appendix D.
3.3.1 Data
The World Bank provides high-quality data on a wide range of outcomes related to access.




























































Figure 3.13: Test scores over time. “Adj” indicates adjusted scores; 1 or 3 indicates the level
of proficiency; “m,” “f,” “r,” “u,” and “g” indicate male, female, rural, urban, and global,
respectively.
Data on education quality is more limited in its availability. In Latin America, only a
subset of countries participate in the most widely used Program for International Student
Assessment (PISA) test.
Altinok, Diebolt, and De Meulemeester (2013) have worked to overcome this limitation
by linking test scores from different standardized test regimes into a single metric. They have
expanded their coverage and improved the linking mechanism in a recent update (Altinok,
Angrist, and Patrinos 2018). However, they have not yet made these data publicly available.
Until these authors make this data available, I have to fall back on a second strategy to
overcome a lower level of information. I do this through the application of Bayesian statistical
inference. Unlike frequentist models in which inference is drawn based on a set of well-
77
known assumptions and under repeated sampling, Bayesian inference is drawn purely from
the available data. As a result, Bayesian methods can produce unbiased results even in
the presence of very small n (Jackman 2009). See Appendix E for a full discussion on the
Bayesian approach employed here. While this approach allows analytical leverage on this
limited data, the results on test scores should still be viewed only as preliminary given the
very small subset of countries and years used for those tests.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables for this analysis of access — enrollment rates, completion rates,
repetition rates, dropout rates — follow the descriptions provided above. These variables
are measured as percentages of the relevant population. All of them are bounded at 0 on
the lower end. ANER can exceed 100% due to repetition, but both repetition and dropout
rates are bounded at 100 on the upper end.
The dependent variables for education quality are PISA test scores. Scores are reported
in two forms. In the first, national averages are reported for each of three domains: math-
ematics, reading, and science. There is no theoretical maximum or minimum score on the
PISA tests, but the reported scores are scaled to have a mean of 500 and a standard deviation
of 100 for each of the three domains. As a result, approximately 2/3 of students fall between
400 and 600 (OECD 2017). In the second form, the percentage of students in each country
falling at or above different percentiles is reported. I focus on the former presentation in this
analysis, but offer a brief analysis using the latter in Appendix D.3.
Explanatory Variables
As in the analysis for education outputs, this chapter also uses partisan ideology as the
primary explanatory variable. I continue to use the ideology measure developed by Baker
and Greene (2011) as the benchmark and measures from Rosas (2005) as a robustness check.13
13I do not use the CHS data here because its categorical classification of parties does not lend itself to
how I model time in the outcomes analysis. See section 3.3.2 for more details.
78
The outcomes models also include political, economic, and demographic covariates. First,
I include polyarchy, the V-Dem measure of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2018), because pre-
vious work has shown that democracies and authoritarian regimes have different education
preferences (Brown 1999; Brown and Hunter 2004). Recent work demonstrates that author-
itarian regimes also share an interest in increasing supply of education (Paglayan 2018), so
I do not anticipate that the polyarchy variable will be significant in any of the models. I
also control for the percentage of the lower house that is controlled by the same party as the
executive, because having a majority control of the legislature can facilitate passing policy.
As a final political covariate I also include the length of the executive’s term. The longer
a leader is in office, the more opportunities she has to enact policy changes and see results
from them.
Education exhibits a unique characteristic that makes measurement of its outcomes chal-
lenging: results depend not only on the inputs by the state, but also on the active decisions
by the subjects of the policy — the students and their families. Individual decisions about
attending school, for example, depend not only on the supply of school, but also on a family-
level cost-benefit analysis weighing opportunity costs of more education against future ex-
pected earnings (Psacharopoulos 1977). These individual decisions are in turn affected by
macroeconomic conditions (Torche and Ribeiro 2010). I include GDP per capita as a crude
control for the effect of the economy on individual decisions about education. I also control
for economic growth.
A deep literature on family traits demonstrates the crucial role that parental education
plays on pursuing education with a strong bias toward more education by more highly edu-
cation parents (Marteleto and de Souza 2012; Buchmann 2000; Baker and LeTendre 2005).
My models include a control for average levels of education in the population. Additional
demographic covariates include the degree of urbanization in a country because of the effi-
ciencies associated with concentrations of students and the percentage of the population at
the appropriate age for primary or secondary education.
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3.3.2 Modeling Time
Assigning responsibility for changes in performance in education presents methodological
challenges because of issues related to the passage of time. Specifically, a delay in measure-
ment of outcomes and a delay between the passage of a policy and its implementation makes
it more difficult to assign responsibility for a change in outcome to a specific change in policy.
This makes education different from other policy areas in at least two ways.
First, education policies often have a long lag between implementation and effect. Con-
sider a change in curriculum that requires one additional hour of math instruction per week,
a change the is relatively easy to implement: a ministry of education (or other governing
body) need only design and publicize the change. Yet even in this simple example, the delay
between change and outcome will be lengthy. The change must be propagated across all
schools, the teachers and principals must understand the changes, and the teachers must
then adapt their lessons to match the change. As a practical matter, if this change is an-
nounced in year t, it is unlikely to be fully implemented until at least time t + 1. However,
the effects of this change will not be apparent immediately. The earliest point at which it is
possible to detect the effects comes at the first point of evaluation, which will occur either
at or very near to t + 2. Other changes are likely to take even more time. Improvements
to teacher training, for example, will take many years to implement and the effect of such a
change will be distributed over an even longer period.
Second, education is both cumulative and sequential. A student’s ability to perform math
in high school, for example, will depend not only on the quality of instruction in high school,
but also the quality of instruction in elementary school. Thus, evaluations of students also
depend on their educational history.
In true panel data, the same students would be evaluated at different ages and the re-
searcher could overcome these difficulties to assign values to the different stages of education
(i.e. estimate the effectiveness of specific teachers or changes in policy). However, this is
not the case for either the access or quality metrics used here. Standardized tests, for ex-
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ample, evaluate a different group of students each time they are administered. This means
that while they offer a snapshot in time of student learning at the aggregate level, they are
not appropriate for estimating performance of teachers or schools or growth of individual
students.
There is no consensus about the length of this delay, nor is there a methodological
consensus on how to deal with it. Further, there is little in theory to provide a strong prior
belief about the delay. I employ two strategies for modeling time — one for measures of
access and another for measures of quality.14
In order to model time in the access analyses, I measure the change in outcomes be-
tween the start and end of an executive term.15 This follows the recommendations from
Garritzmann and Seng (2016) to use the administration-term as the unit of analysis, which
are appropriate in this situation where there is greater delay in the observed outcomes. The
average administration length in the period of study is 4.6 years. This period is sufficient
for policies that affect these outcomes to take effect and be measured. Additionally, mea-
suring the change in these outcomes incorporates the cumulative and sequential aspects of
education outcomes. Since the unit of analysis is the executive term, the dependent variable
is measured as the difference between the start and end of the term. By measuring the
change, these models assign responsibility to the party in power. This unit of analysis also
means that the explanatory variable of greatest interest takes on only a single value (i.e. I
assume that an executive’s ideology score cannot change over the course of a term). I take
the average value for other economic and demographic covariates.
In order to model time in the quality analyses, I measure variables as moving means
over extended periods of time. This incorporates information from the entire educational
background of students at the time of measurement on the dependent variable. The baseline
14The analysis of equity follows the corresponding strategy for equity of access and equity of quality.
15Note that I define “term” as the period from when an elected leader is first sworn into office until she
leaves office. Thus, if a constitution stipulates a presidential election every four years but a leader is reelected
(and serves the full two periods), the “term” will be eight years.
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window in the moving means is 15 years. Since the PISA test is administered at age 15, a
15 year period covers the entirety of the students’ educational experience. It incorporates
information about the system in years prior to their entrance in kindergarten and captures
the intuition that education policy in the years leading up to enrollment in primary or
pre-primary education will have an effect on the instruction received.16
3.3.3 Interpolation & Sparse Data
As in the analysis of education spending, I interpolate missing values for the explanatory
variables (see section 2.3.3). Doing so increases the available data. Even after interpolating,
however, there remain an issues of data availability for the quality measures. There are simply
too few observations on the dependent variable to perform a traditional frequentist statistical
analysis. As noted above, I address this shortcoming by using a Bayesian approach for the
education quality models. This allows me to draw valid statistical conclusions. Nevertheless,
I present these results as preliminary evidence only because of the small sample of countries
from which they are drawn.
3.4 Results & Discussion
3.4.1 Access
Table 3.1 shows the results using the five measures of educational access at the primary
level as the dependent variables. Recall that the unit of observation is the executive term.
The dependent variables, then, are measures of change in the outcome of interest between
the start and end of the term. In all five models, ideology is not a significant predictor of
the outcome. Additionally, note that both the F-statistics and R2 values suggest that the
models as a whole do not fit the data well. Alternative specifications (both those presented
in Appendix D.3 and others not reported here) result in the same conclusions: ideology
cannot predict outcomes.
16Below I present the results from models that use a 15 year moving mean. However, I also run all the
same models using 5 and 10 year moving means. The results across all three specifications are substantively
similar and are presented in Appendix D.3.
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ANER Completion Transition Dropout Repetition
Ideology 0.177 −0.388 0.417 −0.084 −0.170
(1.267) (−1.337) (1.872) (−0.296) (−1.264)
Polyarchy −18.902 −17.101 −24.180 64.691 15.888
(−0.856) (−0.447) (−0.882) (1.752) (0.905)
GDP per capita −3.056 −0.075 41.713∗∗ −36.199 −2.496
(−0.303) (−0.005) (3.358) (−1.937) (−0.280)
Urbanization −20.204 69.914 190.731 −385.350∗∗ 19.102
(−0.331) (0.634) (2.065) (−3.106) (0.334)
Average education 14.256 −5.957 −51.739∗∗ 14.276 −4.462
(1.516) (−0.343) (−3.283) (0.754) (−0.523)
Growth 9.212 34.261 −19.739 −11.025 5.184
(0.726) (1.474) (−1.234) (−0.407) (0.472)
Lower house share −3.995 23.379∗ −10.770 −1.833 0.714
(−0.826) (2.607) (−1.612) (−0.214) (0.175)
Term length −0.169 −0.161 1.080 −0.332 −0.272
(−0.415) (−0.193) (1.895) (−0.304) (−0.714)
Primary-aged population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.228) (0.510) (0.420) (1.427) (0.236)
Secondary-aged population
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 52 45 42 52 53
R2 0.62 0.65 0.83 0.65 0.45
F Statistic 1.59 1.55 2.89∗ 1.64 0.75
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 3.1: Primary level access outcomes analysis using Baker-Greene measure of ideology.
T-statistics listed in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
Table 3.2 shows the results of the four measures of education access at the secondary
level.17 Again, ideology is not a significant predictor on any of these outcomes. Unlike the
primary level models, however, the F-statistics on the ANER and completion models suggest
that the overall model is doing a decent job of fitting the data and the R2 values show that
it explains a significant proportion of the variation. This is the result of term length acting
as a strong predictor for the outcomes, though any explanation of why term length matters
in these models and not others would be pure speculation.
3.4.2 Quality
As noted above, these results should be treated as only preliminary and at best suggestive
evidence because data is drawn from only the handful of countries that participate in PISA
testing. The models show that the right produces slightly better test outcomes than the
left. Figure 3.14 shows the results from models with math, science, and reading scores,
respectively. These plots present the results as distributions, as is common in Bayesian
analysis. The curves represent draws from the posterior distribution. Shaded blue areas
17The secondary table has only four models because data on transition rate from secondary to tertiary
education is not available.
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ANER Completion Dropout Repetition
Ideology −0.246 −0.185 0.121 −0.116
(−1.066) (−0.411) (0.513) (−1.197)
Polyarchy 12.267 −57.634 −14.748 13.259
(0.319) (−0.778) (−0.333) (0.909)
GDP per capita 8.847 2.518 12.399 −5.556
(0.443) (0.084) (0.805) (−0.867)
Urbanization 51.945 −201.914 −282.770 −4.493
(0.472) (−0.711) (−1.884) (−0.085)
Average education 9.048 7.142 59.411 −1.222
(0.373) (0.136) (1.760) (−0.137)
Growth −61.527∗ −77.598 3.741 9.851
(−2.480) (−1.873) (0.157) (1.121)
Lower house share −11.495 −16.485 4.083 −0.363
(−1.272) (−1.044) (0.420) (−0.105)
Term length 3.524∗∗∗ 4.372∗∗ −1.293 0.122
(4.323) (2.880) (−1.570) (0.407)
Primary-aged population
Secondary-aged population −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000
(−0.601) (−0.922) (1.121) (0.010)
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 40 47 43 51
R2 0.85 0.63 0.51 0.51
F Statistic 3.21∗ 1.31 0.72 0.88
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 3.2: Secondary level access outcomes analysis using Baker-Greene measure of ideology.
T-statistics listed in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
are the 95% credible interval (CI). Variables whose CIs do not cross 0 can be thought of
as “significant” in the standard statistical framework. Note that for the presentation of the
results, distributions for non-significant variables (and those of less theoretical interest) have
been excluded.
In all three models, GDP per capita and previous education are predictors with the
largest coefficients.18 Equally, in no model is polyarchy a significant predictor of test scores.
Both of these findings are in keeping with expectations and previous research.
The magnitude on the coefficients from the three models is relatively small, approximately
5 points. Interpreting the substantive meaning of this is challenging. Recall that an average
change from left to right government results in a shift -1.49 points overall (on a 20 point
scale). Within this, the mean shift to the right is 4.73 and the mean shift to the left is -4.69.
However, because the explanatory variables are measured as moving means, the shift would
have to represent a persistent shift of that magnitude for the previous 15 years. Recall that
the PISA scores are normalized to have a standard deviation of 100 points. This means that
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Figure 3.14: Effect of party ideology on PISA scores.
a change of one standard deviation requires a shift from one extreme end of the ideological
spectrum to the other that persists for 15 years. A persistent shift this extreme is never
observed in democratic Latin America.
3.4.3 Equity
Equity of Access
Table 3.3 looks at the effect of partisan ideology on the gender parity index (GPI) for the
four access outcomes of interest at the primary level. Only in the model that uses completion
rates as the dependent variable is ideology significant. In the case of the completion rates,
a positive GPI indicates that women drop out at a higher rate than men, so a negative
coefficient means that women drop out at a lower rate under rightist administrations than
under leftist. The substantive magnitude of this effect is very small, however.
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ANER Completion Transition Dropout Repetition
Ideology 0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.163 0.050
(1.004) (0.969) (−1.759) (0.990) (1.531)
Polyarchy 0.151 0.246 0.032 −2.467 −2.785
(1.077) (1.561) (0.208) (−0.153) (−0.656)
GDP per capita 0.090 −0.040 0.037 −12.732 1.060
(1.186) (−0.550) (0.498) (−1.222) (0.492)
Urbanization −0.420 0.148 1.177∗ 9.769 4.215
(−1.004) (0.304) (2.087) (0.166) (0.305)
Average education 0.085 0.072 −0.037 −6.440 3.388
(1.363) (0.950) (−0.398) (−0.694) (1.643)
Growth −0.065 0.095 −0.041 5.751 −3.161
(−0.789) (0.952) (−0.434) (0.479) (−1.189)
Lower house share 0.018 0.059 0.037 1.097 −1.133
(0.583) (1.605) (1.012) (0.278) (−1.148)
Term length −0.003 −0.000 −0.001 0.080 0.032
(−1.032) (−0.092) (−0.202) (0.137) (0.344)
Primary-aged population 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(1.049) (0.484) (−1.415) (−0.193) (0.153)
Secondary-aged population
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 50 52 47 48 52
R2 0.64 0.62 0.67 0.53 0.53
F Statistic 1.58 1.68 1.70 1.00 1.10
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 3.3: Primary level GPI access outcomes analysis using Baker-Greene measure of ide-
ology. T-statistics listed in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
Finally, table 3.4 looks at the effect of ideology on the GPI for access outcomes at the
secondary level. Yet again, ideology is not a strong predictor of these outcomes and the
statistics show that the models are poor fits overall. As with the pure access analysis above,
alternative specifications for these models reach the same conclusion.
Equity of Quality
Figure 3.15 shows that in terms of gender equity in test scores, partisan ideology is not a
strong predictor of differences. In all three subject areas, the 95% CI of the posterior overlaps
0 by a large margin.
3.4.4 General Conclusions
Overall the conclusion of this analysis is clear: partisan ideology explains little variation
in measure of educational access, quality, or equity. The only place where there is a clear
statistical finding in favor of an effect is in test scores, where the right appears to outperform
the left. This finding comes with two major caveats, however. First, the number of countries
included in this sample is very small and the findings may not hold much external validity as
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ANER Completion Dropout Repetition
Ideology −0.000 −0.002∗ 0.112 0.082
(−0.220) (−2.118) (0.660) (1.596)
Polyarchy 0.150 0.356 −15.685 −8.792
(0.929) (1.949) (−0.485) (−1.144)
GDP per capita −0.054 0.007 −1.304 5.055
(−0.648) (0.090) (−0.118) (1.466)
Urbanization 0.684 0.736 −50.868 −8.465
(1.488) (1.053) (−0.438) (−0.299)
Average education 0.068 0.007 12.175 2.990
(0.669) (0.056) (0.476) (0.632)
Growth −0.032 0.076 11.810 −9.993∗
(−0.306) (0.747) (0.695) (−2.092)
Lower house share 0.015 0.073 1.854 −1.244
(0.408) (1.886) (0.268) (−0.684)
Term length 0.004 −0.001 −0.111 −0.032
(1.268) (−0.136) (−0.188) (−0.189)
Primary-aged population
Secondary-aged population −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000
(−1.784) (−1.660) (0.549) (−0.191)
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 40 46 41 48
R2 0.76 0.73 0.34 0.55
F Statistic 1.80 2.16∗ 0.34 0.97
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 3.4: Secondary level GPI access outcomes analysis using Baker-Greene measure of
ideology. T-statistics listed in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
a result. Second, the substantive size of the effect is small. All improvements in test scores
should be lauded. The analysis suggests, however, that other variables have more power in
determining these outcomes, particularly GDP per capita.
As in the previous chapter, there are very few control variables that are statistically
significant in these models. And again, I will refrain from post-hoc justifications of why
this may be the case, but recommend that future research investigate the results in greater
depth. I will note, however, that the lack of significance is less surprising with these models
where R2 and f-statistics suggest that the overall fit is much less strong than in the output
models.
In taking the results from this section in combination with the previous chapter, it may
be tempting to reach the conclusion that the right is more efficient in education than the
left. The results in Chapter 2 suggest the right spends slightly less on secondary education
and the results here suggest that students perform slightly better on test scores under right
governments. It is possible this is the case, but these results cannot support this conclusion
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Figure 3.15: Effect of party ideology on GPI in PISA scores.
specifications and a dramatically reduced sample size in the test score results. Future work
should consider the issue of efficiency in education, but it is outside the scope of the present
study.
These findings are surprising both because they contrast similar studies conducted on
OECD countries and because they stand in opposition to the expectations that left and
right should produce different outcomes in education. Differences in underlying ideology
and fundamental beliefs about inequality led to the reasonable expectation that differences
should exist. Having established that these expectations are unmet, the following chapter




Explaining Convergence: Policy Legacies, Stakeholder
Pressures, and Expert Advice
The division between political left and right is defined based on a difference in beliefs
about inequality. These beliefs, in turn, inform policy preferences on a wide range of issues.
Despite expectations that the left’s concern for equality of outcome should result in higher
performance on education quality and the right’s concern for equality of opportunity result in
higher performance on access, Chapter 3 demonstrated that left and right have converged on
both measures of access (enrollment, completion, transition, dropout, and repetition rates)
and quality (test scores). Equally, Chapter 2 showed that the expectation that the left would
spend more on primary and secondary levels and staff expenditures because of its ties to
the teachers’ unions was also unmet. Instead, left and right spend at similar levels both
overall and in terms of levels and areas. What can explain this convergence? I argue that
policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert advice push left and right toward similar
policy positions. Convergence on policy in turn results in observed convergence on outputs
and outcomes. Figure 4.1 illustrates the pathway of this process. The focus on this chapter
is to explain the three factors on the left hand side of the figure and how they produce
convergence in policy.
Have parties, in fact, converged on education policy in Latin America? Figure 4.2 presents
preliminary evidence in favor of this convergence. The points in the graph represent the
mean similarity between education-related manifesto statements for pairs of parties in Latin
America. All comparisons are done between parties competing against one another in a given
election. The line shows mean similarity regressed on ideological difference as measured







Figure 4.1: Explaining convergence. Policy legacies, stakeholder pressure, and expert advice
all contribute to convergence in education policy. In turn, policy convergence produces
convergence on outputs and outcomes, both directly and indirectly through outputs.
would suggest divergence between the parties: as parties grow more ideologically distant,
their statements should become less similar; a significant upward sloping line suggests a
convergence in which more distant parties make more similar statements. The line here
is upward sloping, but not statistically significant, which suggests a type of convergence
in which partisan ideology is not a strong predictor of education policy statements. This
can be interpreted as preliminary evidence of intra-country convergence on education policy.
Please see Appendix F for a thorough discussion of how manifesto statement similarity was
calculated.
To summarize my argument, policy legacies constrain governments for three primary
reasons: bureaucratic inertia tied with path dependency, the (often) high political cost of
reversing policy, and the imposition of practical constraints including budgetary limitations
and restricting policy creativity. Organized stakeholders, namely teachers’ unions, business
elites, and parents and students exert pressures on both left and right. Additionally, edu-
cation policy is an area in which the public never expresses a preference for “less” policy
and attempts to reduce the provision of education will always be met with a strong political
backlash. This constraint is the direct result of an embrace of democratic rule and can be
viewed as the proper functioning of these institutions — elected officials are forced to pay





































Figure 4.2: Convergence of education statements in party manifestos. Each point
represents a pair of parties in an election. The X-axis measures the ideological difference
(RILE) between the parties, as calculated by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP)
(Krause et al. 2019). The Y-axis measures the average similarity between policy statements
for the pair of parties.
in education. Left and right both have mixed histories with reliance on technocratic advice
for designing policy. The neoliberal right (see Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser (2014)) is most
closely associated with this kind of policymaking, but parties on the left are increasingly
relying on expert advice for crafting education policies as well (Dargent 2015). Because
technocrats design policy to fit education challenges and not political goals, the common use
of these experts contributes to convergence.
Ideological preferences remain important for defining ideal policy points for parties. In
the presence of the convergent forces above, partisan ideology is subjugated. Absent them,
however, parties are more likely to fall back on ideological positions and pursue divergent
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policies.
These three factors (policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert advice) are absent
from the models in the preceding empirical chapters for two reasons. First, there are not
clear ways to measure most of the corresponding aspects. It is not clear how to quantify
technocratic advice, for example. In other cases, it is possible to imagine a measure but with
no clear way to aggregate to the unit of analysis used in these models. For example, one
could use length of time a policy has been in place as a proxy for its legacy, but there is no
clear way to decide which policies (or how many) should be measured or whether all policies
carry the same legacy weight. Even if these questions could be answered, data availability
would still prevent its use in this study. Second, the models in the preceding chapters were
designed to match as closely as possible those in existing literature to provide a comparison
with previous studies and create the possibility of expanding knowledge. It is for this reason
that public opinion, for example, is not included in any of the models.
Convergence vs. Conversion Before proceeding it is important to draw a distinction be-
tween convergence and conversion. I define convergence as the observed outcome that policy
under left and right is identical and conversion as a fundamental shift in a party’s underlying
ideal policy position.
Convergence can be either a compromise position between the ideal points of two parties
or a unilateral shift by a party on one side of the political spectrum to the other. In other
words, convergence can occur when the left moves to the right’s position, the right moves
to the left’s position, or the two meet in the middle. Convergence also encompasses both a
passive acceptance and an active embrace of policy. Passive acceptance occurs when a party
accepts the status quo and does nothing to oppose or change policy set by a political rival.
In an active embrace, a party actively passes or implements the convergent policy.
Policy convergence between left and right should not be considered equivalent to con-
version. That is, although left and right tend to move toward similar policy positions on
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education, this does not mean that they have moved their ideological ideal points toward one
another. Instead, the forces described below cause the parties to support nearly identical
policies in many cases, but if these forces were not at work, the two ends of the political
spectrum would still advocate different policies.
Convergence and conversion under these conditions are observationally equivalent. From
the outside, the actions taken by parties will appear identical regardless of whether doing
so is merely politically expeditious (and therefore an act of convergence) or if the party has,
in fact, changed its underlying beliefs (and converted). Even if they appear identical, the
distinction is important because it can help explain cases in which parties do not converge
on education policy. Further, it can help to produce predictions about the kinds of policies




Policy tends to be highly path-dependent and result in bureaucratic inertia (Mahoney and
Thelen 2010). Overturning these precedents is difficult, costly, and time consuming (True,
Jones, and Baumgartner 2007). Many politicians will prefer to expend political capital on
other policy areas. This contributes to a tendency to preserve the status quo, which, in the
presence of alternation between left and right, results in convergence.
Education policy follows a logic of path dependence (Pierson 2000) where dramatic
changes occur only at “critical junctures” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Collier and Collier 2002;
Levi 1997; North 1990). Over time, policies become entrenched as bureaucrats routinize the
procedures associated with them. Eventually, institutional memory of previous policy fades
and the “new” policy becomes universally accepted as the norm. Critical junctures provide
an opportunity to break out of these patterns, but they occur only rarely, requiring a shock
to be triggered (Collier and Collier 2002).
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Path dependence and critical junctures rely on a logic of “positive feedback” loops within
a policy setting (Arthur 1994). As Pierson (2000, p. 259) argues, “Policies, grounded in law
and backed by the coercive power of the state, signal to actors what has to be done and
what cannot be done, and they establish many of the rewards and penalties associated with
particular activities.” Over time, there are four aspects of politics that contribute to a positive
feedback in this environment: “collective action, institutional development, the exercise of
authority, and social interpretation” (ibid., p. 260) The routinization of bureaucratic tasks
contributes to all four aspects by building patterns of behavior that reinforce these structures.
The positive feedback that drives path dependence in policy also has a linear component
in which the longer a specific policy has been in place, the more difficult it is to overturn
(Arthur 1994). Institutions connected with a particular policy become more entrenched —
institutions simply become the way to do things. Thus, convergence is increasingly likely due
simply to the passage of time — if policies and institutions remain in place after alternations
in power between left and right, the observed effect is convergence.
At times bureaucratic structures are designed intentionally to generate inertia and resist
change. Some authors argue that this occurs as a result of electoral competition and un-
certainty (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Moe 1991) while others suggest the scope
conditions are more limited (De Figueiredo 2002). In both cases, the authors agree that
politicians have agency to create bureaucratic structures that are resistant to change. All
bureaucracies contribute to convergence, but those designed in this manner will be even
more likely to encourage it.
Education systems are particularly susceptible to policy lock-in for several reasons.1 First,
implementation of many education policies occurs at a very diffuse level, relying ultimately
on principals and teachers within every school.2 Coordinating these changes is complicated
1The concept of policy “lock in” comes from the economics literature, where researchers observed the
tendency in relation to technological advances (Arthur 1989) and has been applied in political science in the
study of institutional change Mahoney and Thelen (see, e.g., 2010).
2Highly centralized states are more likely to have implemented highly centralized education systems
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by the fact that these actors are not bureaucrats by training and may be opposed to the
changes. In cases where teachers are suspicious of reforms, they are likely to reject implemen-
tation in the classroom and fall back on prior beliefs and actions (Handal and Herrington
2003). Regardless of opposition, teaching practices can become entrenched and changing
them challenging, particularly when they conflict with long-standing expectations about the
role of teachers (Wood 2007).
In addition, a common perception among veteran teachers is that new ideas in pedagogy
are simply repackaged versions of old ideas and many teachers feel they suffer from ped-
agogical policy whiplash, with “new” methods replacing “old” ones on a seemingly annual
basis. As a result, teachers may reject new policies because they do not feel that the effort
necessary to implement them is worthwhile if they will be superseded within a few years
(see, e.g., Payne 2008; Bell 1995; Hess 1999).3
All education bureaucracies are bound by these limitations. Yet bureaucracies vary in
the degree to which they are staffed by technocrats. According to a now classic definition,
technocrats are “individuals with a high level of specialized academic training which serves
as a principal criterion on the basis of which they are selected to occupy key decision-making
or advisory roles in large complex organizations” (Collier 1979, p. 403). Technocrats in
education bureaucracies are important for their ability to tailor recommendations on best
policy to the specific conditions faced in a given country. Their preference for evidence-
based policy leads to greater policy consistency, which in turn allows institutions more time
to develop and for legacies to become more entrenched.
A subtype of technocrat, the “technopol,” also exists in leadership positions in Latin
American education ministries. These individuals are both technocrats and political actors
who hold appointed leadership positions in the bureaucracy (Domínguez 1997). Technopols
(Lopez 2018). Yet these states are still susceptible to this problem, since ultimate implementation still
happens in the classrooms.
3This problem also reflects the dual perceptions that education reforms are both rare and exceedingly
common. The tension in these views is due, at least partly, to the belief that the substance of many “reforms”
is so minimal that no real change has occurred.
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have different interests and approaches than pure technocrats (Bersch 2016). Neverthe-
less, they contribute to bureaucratic inertia. In weighing political considerations for policy
recommendations, technopols limit the scope of possible policy to the politically feasible
(Domínguez 1997). This simultaneously biases toward the status quo and, in the case of
new policies, those which are most likely to endure after a change in administration.
Political costs
Short-term costs, long-term benefits Policy legacies are difficult to overcome because invest-
ments in education incur significant short-term costs but are coupled only with long-term
benefits (The World Bank 2019).4 This is particularly true for policies aimed at improving
education quality. The time to implement such policies and then to see their benefits can
take years or potentially decades. At the same time, the costs are immediate and real. In-
creasing education spending can only happen if government revenue increases (e.g. through
increased taxation or borrowing) or through decreased spending in other areas. Passing
meaningful reforms may take significant political capital and potentially provoke a costly
backlash if teachers are not on board with the reforms (Grindle 2004).
The short term costs of education policy include both monetary and political costs. New
policies require funding and compete against all other policy areas for a slice of the budgetary
pie. Politicians can either change how the pie is sliced (redistribute the existing budget) or
grow the size of the pie (increase government revenues) (Jones, Zalányi, and Érdi 2014). Both
shifting budget priorities and increasing government revenue carry potential political costs
— taking money away from existing programs or increasing taxes may result in electoral
consequences (Geys and Vermeir 2008; Kone and Winters 1993). Finding funding for new
education initiatives is an obstacle that pushes politicians toward accepting the status quo
4Education policy is certainly not unique in this regard — other policy areas also have a deadly combi-
nation of short-term costs and long-term benefits. Yet even economic policy prescriptions that are explicit
about this trade-off (e.g. the neoliberal solutions to economic crises in Latin America in the 1980s) promise
positive results in the medium-term (Weyland 2002).
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over reform. Maintaining the status quo contributes to convergence both because of the
positive feedback of path dependence and because the status quo under an alternation of
party power appears as convergence.
Short-term political costs extend beyond those associated with changes to the budget.
Time is one of the most limited resources allocated to politicians, creating a premium for the
attention they can pay to any policy area (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). The opportunity
costs for attention and political capital imply a necessary trade-off between education policy
and other policy areas. Logically, unless education is a high priority area, the costs of
addressing it are likely to be too high, further encouraging an acceptance of the status quo.
Benefits from education policy accrue only in the long term. Among the ultimate goals
of education are macroeconomic growth, individual upward socioeconomic mobility, and
citizen formation. These outcomes occur only after a student has completed her education.
For both micro and macro economic outcomes, the full effect could be delayed decades after
the completion of education. The policy tools aimed at achieving these outcomes, through
increased access, quality, or equity, necessarily focus on schooling itself and can only produce
these outcomes indirectly. Thus even successful policies cannot be said to have produced
the full range of desired outcomes until long after the politicians responsible have likely
left office. There are exceptions to this, of course. Education spending on new schools,
textbooks, or technology in the classroom will be visible immediately and politicians may
reap a corresponding award. These types of projects may indeed increase access (potentially
enhancing equity of access in the process). But in the crucial area of education quality, the
benefits (if any) of these immediately visible changes, will still be long-term.
To illustrate the dilemma, consider a policy aimed at improving education quality by
increasing the minimum requirements for teachers entering the profession. Assume that this
policy could be easily implemented by simple decree and that from one year to the next, the
students entering the teaching career at universities across the country suddenly had better
credentials. Even with these extreme assumptions, it would take one to two decades before
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the effects could be observed. The new teachers would have to complete their undergraduate
training, enter the workforce, master their craft, and allow more time to pass to become a
plurality in the teaching pool before the results might show up in test scores. For its effect
on the ultimate goals of education to be observed — remunerative skills and democratic
citizenship formation — students have to complete their education and enter the workforce
themselves. By the time any of these ultimate benefits occur, the causal relationship to the
original policy will have been lost and forgotten by the voting public and those who designed
and passed the policy will likely have left office. This example assumes away all costs of the
new policy, which, if considered, reduce the likelihood that any politician would consider the
trade-offs worthwhile.
This calculus of short-term costs coupled with only long-term benefits makes significant
changes unappealing for many legislators, who would prefer to ignore the issue entirely, or
opt for “flashier” reforms surrounding education spending (Tarschys 2003). Additionally,
the use of the education ministry and budget for non-programmatic politics means that any
reforms that would eliminate these benefits create an additional political opportunity cost.
These costs contribute to policy convergence directly by encouraging acceptance of the status
quo.
Politicians tend to be most eager to pursue policies that research suggests are either
not effective for boosting performance, or are much less cost-effective than a variety of
alternatives. Reducing class size, for example, has been shown to increase performance under
certain conditions, but the cost of implementing this policy is much higher than alternatives
(such as programs targeted toward a specific population at risk) that are as or more effective
(Busso et al. 2017). In cases when politicians have implemented new, sometimes radical,
policies, they often do so on a trial or temporary basis (Hess 1999; Payne 2008). The
tendency is to give these experiments less time than is truly necessary to show results. And
in cases where sufficient time is given, new crises or political priorities arise in the interim
so that the programs are never scaled up. One reason that politicians tend to cut successful
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programs short (or decline to give sufficient time to evaluate experiments) stems from their
ability to claim credit for the success.
Many reforms cannot maintain their successes or fail to replicate beyond their original
test sites (Berman and McLaughlin 1975) and many aspects of schooling appear to be highly
resistant to changes (Cuban 1993; Gibboney 1994). As a consequence, education projects
are rarely deemed highly successful (Payne 2008) and the perceived benefits to politicians
are unlikely to outweigh the immediate and clear costs. Even if education policies are
rarely deemed completely successful, they nonetheless generate their own expectations in
the electorate for continued service provision. Any policy viewed as reducing the provision
or quality of education will be rejected by a wide range of voters, adding another political
cost to reforms and encouraging status quo policy.
These problems affect both left and right. That the costs of meaningful education reforms
are so high contributes to the relative rarity of dramatic change in this policy area. Instead,
stasis and slow policy drift are much more common. In a scenario in which political costs
of reforms are high, politicians are likely to rely more heavily on bureaucrats to make and
implement policy (Hood 2010), which in turn leads to policy convergence, as described above.
Patronage and clientelism Patronage in the civil service continues to be a defining feature in
many Latin American countries (Grindle 1977; Gordin 2002; Dargent 2015). This structure
adds another potential political cost to changes in policy. Any change that may result in
a reduction of staff will be considered politically untenable both because of the immediate
costs (backlash in public opinion for laying off workers) and in the long term (losing the
ability to leverage those positions for political gain). The office of minister of education has
long played this role in Latin America, where the average tenure for a minister between 1990
and 2012 was only 23.7 months.5 Many of these appointees have neither a background in
education nor an interest in systemic changes. The use of patronage postings encourages
5Calculation by author based on data from Corrales (2002) and extended through 2012.
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stasis and status quo in education policy.
Equally, clientelist networks across the region continue to view education ministries as
sources of funds to distribute in the form of discrete credit-claiming projects like the construc-
tion of new schools and purchase of technology over more pressing programmatic changes
(Ames 2001; Brunner et al. 1995; Luna and Mardones 2016). Foregoing these funds works
as a political cost for the party in power and parties in the region have resisted ceding this
power (Chambers-Ju and Finger 2017).
Practical constraints
Policy legacies generate three additional constraints on politicians beyond bureaucratic in-
ertia and increasing political costs for policy reform. Changes to policy may require massive
expenditures of time or money or require greater capacity than the state is capable of pro-
viding. Existing policy may also place “blinders” on policymakers, limiting the scope of
solutions (Prahalad 2004).
Education policy, indeed no policy, exists in a vacuum. Rather, every aspect of the
state education system that requires funding competes in the budget with every other ele-
ment of public policy (Wildavsky 1986), both discretionary and non-discretionary. Legacies
associated with non-education related expenditures may create budgetary constraints that
limit the scope of possible education reforms. These legacies are likely to transcend politi-
cal boundaries and thus drive left and right toward convergence. For example, the defense
budget is unconnected with education spending and is set in large part by external factors
and existing spending levels. Education must compete, nevertheless, with defense for a slice
of the budgetary pie.
Education funding may face three practical constraints. First, state capacity is required
to implement many policies in the education sphere. If the state lacks sufficient capacity,
policymakers may be limited in the scope of policies they consider (Besley and Persson
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2014).6 Second, while increasing government revenues may provide a solution to budgetary
trade-offs, doing so may not be an option in a context where government revenue is often
dependent on fluctuating commodity prices that are set by global markets. At the same
time, taxation (and particularly income taxation) is a perennial issue in the region despite
significant reform attempts (Gavin and Perotti 1997; Goñi, López, and Servén 2011; Shome
1999; Tanzi 2000). Third, education systems have many fixed costs (administrative overhead
and physical facility maintenance, for example) that will represent greater percentages of
smaller education budgets. These budgetary constraints create policy constraints that affect
both left and right and contribute to an explanation of why policy legacies drive convergence
in education policy.
Existing policy also contributes to a limitation of creativity in designing new policy be-
cause of human cognitive limitations. As policy generates positive feedback and institutions
become entrenched, the ability of many actors involved in and close to those institutions
become more limited in their ability think about possible alternatives and instead tend to
compare current problems to past problems (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). For example,
if the institutionalized response to truancy at schools is punitive, policymakers may become
blinded to possible alternatives such as cash transfer programs that increase immediate in-
centives for attendance. The longer an institution has been in place the longer it becomes
the way to do that thing. Both left and right suffer from this same problem, contributing
further to the ways in which policy legacies drive convergence on education policy.
4.1.2 Stakeholder Pressures
Education is a policy area in which there is a high number of stakeholders. Arguably,
everybody is a stakeholder in education given the relationship between schooling, state for-
mation, and economic development. But not all stakes are equal, nor is power equally
6Note that little research exists on whether there is a relationship between partisan ideology and state
capacity. However, Geddes (1994) has found that both democratic and authoritarian governments have equal
interests in developing state capacity.
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distributed across stakeholders. The most important stakeholders in education are, in de-
creasing order of power, the teachers’ unions, business elites, and parents and students.
Elected officials and political parties must take these actors into account both in formulat-
ing electoral strategies and in crafting policy. Parties on both left and right are also subject
to general public opinion on education and must respond to voter demands in this area.
Despite employing electoral strategies that pursue votes from different sectors of soci-
ety and maintaining different relationships with stakeholders, left and right are nonetheless
pushed toward convergence on education policy for two reasons. First, organized stakehold-
ers create demands that cannot be ignored even if they are not part of the electoral coalition
of the party in power. Second, electoral pressures are reinforced by the belief that education
is a right, making it impossible to reduce its provision.
Organized stakeholders
There are three organized stakeholders that play a significant role in education politics across
the region: the teachers’ unions, business elites and university rectors. Of these, the unions
are by far the most important. Students and parents represent two other groups that have,
in some cases, organized and created important pressures on politicians. However, they have
less power than the former two groups because their organization is uneven across the region
and inconsistent across time and because their interests are not as narrowly focused as those
of unions and their political connections not as strong as business elites. For this reason
they are secondary actors in this policy space.
Teachers’ unions are capable of opposing systemic changes in a disruptive manner, as
highly organized and politically connected actors. Although the strength and cohesiveness
of unions varies by country, all exist for the sole purpose of advocating for the labor conditions
of their members (Moe and Wiborg 2017a). Union leadership is often pushed toward more
extreme political engagement (e.g. disruptive protests or strikes) in the face of even moderate
changes they perceive as a threat to themselves or their members because they have few tools
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in their political arsenal.
These disruptions can be costly to politicians in at least two ways. First, they can shift
the public discussion and set the agenda, thus taking power away from politicians who seek
to do the same (Berkovich 2011). If lawmakers lose the ability to set the agenda they may
also lose their ability to design their preferred policies, further weakening their political
position. Second, governing parties or politicians seen as failing to address disruptions may
fall in public opinion, thus harming their electoral chances (Murillo 1999).
Teachers’ unions across Latin America have traditionally maintained stronger relation-
ships with the left than the right.7 However, the left has not always honored this relationship
by including the unions in discussions of education reforms and has suffered the consequences
as a result — costly public disruptions by striking teachers and the corresponding political
costs (Grindle 2004).
Unions provide parties with two important electoral advantages. First, they are uniquely
situated within one of the most connected hubs of any community: the schools. The unions
are able to use this advantage to pressure voters to vote along union lines, essentially acting
as brokers within a clientelist network (Larreguy, Montiel Olea, and Querubin 2017). Second,
the unions can provide a bloc of votes — those of its own members.8
Between historical ties with the teachers’ unions and the temptation to gain the electoral
advantages noted above, the left may pursue policies favored by the unions. These include
policies that advance labor conditions for teachers such as higher salaries for teachers, more
class prep time, and tenure. Favored policies may also involve attempting to protect sys-
tems that favor seniority and disfavored policies include any attempts to measure teacher
performance or tying salary or job security to such assessments.
7Although this is the general trend, it is not a universal one. A notable exception is the case of Mexico,
where the unions have successfully used their ties with the political right to win favored policies (Murillo
1999).
8There exists, of course, variation in the degree of control that unions have over the votes of their own
members. But in all cases, the union has at least strong influence over its members’ votes.
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Business owners represent a second important actor in electoral coalitions. With respect
to education policy, business elites have two competing interests. On the one hand, they
recognize the importance of strong public education systems in order to produce a supply of
high-skilled workers capable of competing in a global economy (Moe 2017a). The business
community is diverse and generally does not behave as a single actor (Schneider 2004; Moe
2017b), but when a lack of skilled labor is an obstacle to economic growth, they will act
together, as was the case in Mexico, where “as a result of Mexico’s dismal PISA results,
business leaders in particular became alarmed by how low levels of human capital might affect
Mexico’s economic competitiveness” (Chambers-Ju and Finger 2017, p. 231). In addition,
many business elites will look to send their children to prestigious state universities, which
generally have nominal or no tuition. On the other hand, they also have a general interest
in reducing their tax burdens, particularly when they are less likely to take advantage of the
primary and secondary education provided by the state (Ansell 2010).
The right has long enjoyed a stronger relationship with business elites than the left (Eaton
2014), pushing their education policies toward those preferred by this group. In addition to
direct support at the polls, including business elites in an electoral coalition can come with
the benefit of the financial resources they are able to contribute to campaigns.
University rectors play an important role in education debates in Latin America as a
representative of the interests of professors and universities, writ large (Bernasconi 2015).
This dual representation reflects a split political impulse by the rectors — progressive in its
push for justice and enlightenment and conservative in its desire to preserve the university
institutions (Peñalver 1979). As a result, rectors are not consistently aligned with either left
or right. Nonetheless, they hold real political power and no party can afford to ignore their
interests in political debates about higher education.
Parents and teachers are also stakeholders in education policy. Parents represent a sig-
nificant part of the electorate, but are frequently not well enough organized to be a major
force in education politics. Parents are also less homogeneous as a group than teachers —
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they have diverse and often competing interests. Not all parents will use the public school
system and all have additional interests from their other roles as taxpayers and workers. In
cases where they can overcome their collective action problems, parents can put pressure on
lawmakers through public demonstrations. Similarly, students can also play a similar role,
though their ability to organize is even more limited and their political power usually much
less since they do not vote.9
Students face even steeper hurdles to overcoming collective action problems. Difficulties
with organization and communication are compounded by their young age and still develop-
ing cognitive capacities mean that their understanding of complex policy issues and ability
to comprehend time and consequences related to these policies may be limited. The biggest
challenge to primary and secondary students, however, is that their status as minors means
they do not have the right to vote and politicians, therefore, have little electoral incentive
to engage with them directly.10 When either parents or students are able to overcome these
challenges and create political organizations, their demands are unidirectional: greater access
to higher quality education.
Common electoral pressures
Parties exist in democracies to win elections. They construct strategies to gain votes by po-
sitioning themselves and enacting policies in line with their constituents’ demands (Bartels
1991; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Wlezien 1995). Responsiveness to voter inter-
ests is fundamental to democracy and is visible both in campaign strategies and the policies
pursued by elected politicians. Thus if voters make demands about education, parties should
be expected to respond accordingly.
Opinions of education systems across the region are low. While the regional average for
those who are “satisfied” with their local education system is 58.4% (according to the Latin
9Chilean students are the obvious exception here. Chapter 5 describes some of the ways in which students
in that country have placed a major role in education politics.
10In many Latin American countries the age of majority of 16, but this still excludes about half of students
in secondary education.
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American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP n.d.)), these numbers are notably lower in many
countries, with satisfaction at 24.4% in Argentina, 32.7% in Paraguay, and 38.1% in Peru.
Because of this, politicians on both sides of the aisle may be pushed toward taking action
on this issue. Although the preferred policies of left and right will differ for various aspects
of the education system, public opinion about the most pressing issues within education is
independent of the party in charge. To the extent that the public dictates the discourse on
education policy, political options will be limited to a similar extent for both left and right,
pushing them toward convergence.
Stakeholder pressures and convergence
Stakeholder pressures contribute to convergence in two primary ways. First, education is
considered a right and reducing its provision is (nearly) impossible. Second, interests of the
two key organized groups overlap in some cases and where they do not, both groups are
sufficiently powerful to demand attention regardless of the party in power.
Education is considered a fundamental human right (UN General Assembly 1948). While
it is possible to update or replace specific education programs, they cannot be eliminated
without serious political consequences.11 The general public is unwilling to accept a reduction
in the provision of education (Campbell 2012). The positive feedback that these systems
entail tends to drive them toward ever higher levels of provision (ibid.).12 Even if only one
party is responsible for the increases, an inability to roll back those changes will result in
convergence. In addition, the state has an intense interest in controlling education because
of its intimate connection with citizenship formation and economic development.
At times, the interests of the teachers’ unions and business elites will align, specifically,
when a lack of education quality is seen as a hurdle to further economic growth and proposed
11Others have noted this tendency with the retrenchment of the welfare state (Pierson 1994) and with
policies such as Social Security in the United States (Campbell 2003).
12Note that while the public will never demand (or accept) less education, it may view education spending
as too high. The “thermostatic” model of public opinion (Wlezien 1995; Soroka and Wlezien 2010) suggests
that in this case politicians will respond by reducing education spending.
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changes support the labor conditions of teachers. Outside of these circumstances, both the
unions and business elites are sufficiently powerful that they cannot be ignored entirely
by either party. The actors, as well as the parties themselves, will attempt to present a
strong opposition force whenever their own party is not in power. The checks available
in the legislative process (though more limited in Latin America than other presidential
democracies), allow roadblocks to slow, delay, or derail attempts to change policy. This
pushes policy toward a stalemate — the status quo.
4.1.3 Expert Advice
Politicians on both left and right have moved toward a more technocratic form of poli-
cymaking across the region beginning in the 1980s (Dargent 2015). These bureaucrats, with
expertise in education, economics, or related fields, provide recommendations to politicians
based on evidence and theory and are more interested in finding a solution than maintaining
a party line. At the same time, politicians (and technocrats) receive outside pressure from
international experts in the field. Ideas diffuse through professional networks and push these
actors toward similar policies.
Expert advice pushes left and right toward convergence on policy for two reasons. First,
the problems they address are entrenched and solutions, which remain constant despite
changes in the party in power, will span multiple administrations (Domínguez 1997). Any
politician willing to take the advice of these experts will be moving toward convergence
by definition. Second, although the left is concerned more with equity and the right with
economy, the recommendations for addressing both concerns are often similar if not identical.
Again, in these cases following expert advice will lead to convergence, although politicians
are likely to stress the intended effect the policy will have on their area of focus and address
the other only to the extent it can provide an electoral advantage.
In recent years the neoliberal right no longer has a monopoly on technocratic ministry
management (Dargent 2012). Pushed by domestic and international factors, the left has
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also moved toward more toward technocratic administration. Domestic reformers willing
to set aside partisan commitments for improvements to education systems have appointed
stronger ministers of education. These ministers, in turn, have led a transformation within
the ministries toward a more technocratic system. However, patronage appointments in the
civil service continue to dominate in place of merit-based hiring systems, even though such
systems are mandated by law across the region (Grindle 2010; Schuster 2017). Internation-
ally, organizations like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have
led a dialogue that promotes both technocratic reforms to ministries and specific education
policies. This shift further contributes to the convergence of left and right on education
policy because recommendations from policy experts will remain constant regardless of the
ideology of the party in power.
The experts
Experts generally fall within one of three groups: technocrats working within an education
bureaucracy, academic researchers with university affiliations, and researchers with think
tank or lobbyist affiliations.13 All three offer recommendations to politicians on both left and
right, albeit through slightly different mechanisms and under slightly different circumstances.
The lines between “domestic” and “international” experts are difficult to draw because
actors move fluidly between the two groups. Many “domestic” experts have received training
at institutions in the United States or Western Europe and maintain close professional net-
works with their counterparts in other countries while many “international” organizations
like the World Bank have extensive staff from the countries in which they work. Experts
themselves tend to converge on policy recommendations because of the diffusion of ideas
across international borders under both left and right governments (Verger, Novelli, and
13Educación2020 in Chile and Mexicanos Primeros are two examples of such domestic organizations while
the Inter-American Development Bank and UNESCO are international examples.
108
Altinyelken 2012).14 For these reasons, I do not attempt to strictly distinguish between the
two groups.
Technocrats are also more willing to experiment with new ideas and policies. As Domínguez
(1997, p. 6) argues, “Technocrats offer a methodology to understand social problems that
rests on a belief in the ability to arrive at the optimal answer to any problem. Their key
criteria for action are realism and efficiency.” These qualities of technocrats lead to conver-
gence because they are not tied to any particular ideology. The advice they give may, at
times, align with an ideological position, but it will not be driven by one nor will it always
align with the same ideology.15 Regardless of the political orientation or even type of ad-
ministration (democratic or authoritarian), they will seek out what they believe to be the
best solution for a problem and not allow political concerns to color this solution (Centeno
1993). Technopols, on the other hand, have the technocratic background, but will weigh
political considerations in policy recommendations to a greater degree than the ideal type
technocrats. Policy convergence is thus driven by the degree to which the bureaucracy is
staffed by technocrats and the extent to which those technocrats are technopols. As both left
and right rely more heavily on technocrats, the more likely both are to implement similar
solutions.
As members of the government, technocrats can provide recommendations both directly
to politicians and on demand. They do, however, also conduct research and produce recom-
mendations outside of direct requests from politicians, which can then be saved and provided
to leadership when needed.
Researchers with university affiliations share an important trait with technocrats: a
devotion to following evidence and finding solutions over any political motives.16 University-
14Dale (1999) outlines several other methods in which education policy is taking a global shape (e.g.
harmonization and standardization), but none of these are relevant in the Latin American context.
15Recommendations for advancing equity aligns with the left’s ideology while recommendations to imple-
menting merit pay for teachers aligns with the right’s ideology, for example. Neither is made because of this
alignment.
16This is not to say that university researchers do not have personal political opinions or that these never
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based research is continuously ongoing, like that of technocrats. However, their work differs
in important ways. First, university research often has no deadline, meaning that the pace
of research can be slower and more deliberate. Second, university research can explore a
wider range of questions than that conducted by a government bureaucracy, whose agenda
may be limited by budgetary constraints or policy priorities (Lipsky 1980). These factors
increase the possibility that university researchers will find new or creative solutions to
existing problems or identify new problems that must be addressed. Finally, university
research is made public, but not presented directly to politicians and policymakers unless
it has been specifically requested. As a result, much academic research goes unread by
these policymakers. Research conducted at universities, however, is an important source of
knowledge for technocrats, so the findings may make their way to legislators indirectly.
Researchers at think tanks or lobbying organizations are more likely to have a political
agenda of their own and are more likely to produce research that aligns with a political
ideology than their university researcher counterparts. Additionally, while politicians may
reach out to these groups and request research,17 these groups will also provide their research
to politicians unsolicited. As Weaver and McGann (2000, p. 5) write,
One role performed by many think tanks…is carrying out basic research on policy
problems and policy solutions in a fashion similar to that done by university based
researchers…A second role…is providing advice on immediate policy concerns that
are being considered by government officials.
Technocrats began their role in Latin America primarily in economics and primarily
under non-democratic regimes in the 1980s (Dargent 2015). As these states transitioned
to democracy, the neoliberal political right embraced the technocratic administration of the
outgoing regimes and continued the practice of employing experts to design policy (Luna
influence their research. Rather, as a group, they are trained to focus on arguments and evidence over any
personal prejudices.
17This lowers the cost of information for legislators, who are overwhelmed with the quantity of information
available (Weaver and McGann 2000)
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and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014). During this period, think tanks also took on an increasing
role in policymaking across the region (Truitt 2017). In many cases the left has also started
to embrace experts within their policymaking structures so that now both left and right are
utilizing them as resources (Dargent 2015; Silva 2009; Babb 2005).
The advice
Experts have long drawn a distinction between access and quality in education (Corrales
1999). Further, reports over the past three decades have voiced the concern that efforts to
improve both access and quality be focused on the lowest-performing students (see, e.g., The
World Bank 2018; The World Bank 1995). Since the lowest performing students are most
frequently the poor and those in rural areas, the policies are equivalent to calls to increase
equity in access and quality. At other times the call for equity-focused policies is explicit
(Puryear 1997; Wolff and Castro 2000; Bassi et al. 2012).
Some of the advice also falls outside of an access/quality divide and focuses on systemic
structures. Many of these recommendations could be classified as “finance-driven,” to use
the language of Mundy (2005). These included measures focused on generating greater
efficiency by focusing spending at lower levels, increased privatization, and reducing the
cost per pupil (ibid.). In addition, many reports from the 1990s and 2000s recommend
decentralized education systems that provide local actors greater flexibility in designing and
implementing programs (see, e.g. De Cerreño and Pyle 1996; PREAL Advisory Board 2005).
More recent recommendations are less likely to identify decentralization as an explicit goal,
but there remains support for the idea that local actors should be given flexibility in tailoring
solutions to specific situations (The World Bank 2018).
Access Expanding access to education has long been a priority of policy experts (The
World Bank 1995). Changes to recommendations here have followed the progress of meeting
the MDGs (World Health Organization et al. 2008) and SDGs (UN 2015). While experts
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previously focused on pushing for universal coverage of primary education, the focus now
rests more on secondary education (Bassi et al. 2012) and increasingly pre-primary education
(UNESCO 2009).
The development literature addresses three general problems in access: lack of educa-
tional opportunities, barriers to entry in available programs, and insufficient incentives to
stay enrolled. In the Latin American contexts, advice focused on the first two areas in the
early 1990s and earlier (Wolff, Schiefelbein, and Valenzuela 1994) but has shifted toward
the third area as the region has built up sufficient infrastructure to accommodate student
needs. The argument is that if students and parents do not believe there is a payoff to
education, they will not attend. Thus, in order to increase enrollment and completion rates
(while simultaneously decreasing dropout and repetition rates), the answer is to improve the
quality of education so that the market will reward graduates (The World Bank 1995; Busso
et al. 2017).
A similar approach of incentivizing school attendance is the conditional cash transfer
program (CCT). CCTs continue to be recommended as a way to increase enrollment, partic-
ularly at the secondary level (Bonal, Tarabini, and Rambla 2012; Busso et al. 2017). CCTs
illustrate well the pathways in which expert opinion resulted in policy convergence. After the
first CCTs starting in Mexico in the mid-1990s, at least 21 Latin American and Caribbean
nations had implemented them by 2012 (Hunter 2020). As Sugiyama (2011) illustrates, the
partisan character of the executive under which these programs are implemented is highly
varied. Of the 18 countries that had implemented CCTs between 1997 and 2008, two were
under left presidents, five under the center-left, four under the center, four under the center-
right and four under the right (ibid., p. 258). The driving force behind their spread was the
diffusion of the idea through international networks of technocratic experts (ibid.) furthered
by monetary support from international organizations (Hunter 2020).
Learning and emulation are central to the diffusion process of CCTs across Latin America
(ibid.). The first CCTs to be implemented — Mexicio’s Progresa (later renamed Oportu-
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nidades) program and Brazil’s Bolsa Família — attracted the attention of international
observers, both receiving foreign delegations from a large number of countries (ibid.). Inter-
national organizations supported the spread of information on the programs, documenting
their successes (Sugiyama 2011) and hosting a large number of conferences on the subject
(Osorio Gonnet 2018). Further, international organizations like the World Bank offered loans
to support CCTs (De la O 2015). The idea behind CCTs thus became available to domestic
policymakers who could see its effects in action in neighboring countries, could learn about
it through conferences and positive reports, and could potentially receive funding to imple-
ment it. It is through these pathways that international experts contribute to convergence
on education policies.
Quality Experts recognize the connection between providing increased access and provid-
ing increased access to quality schools. The following quotation is typical of reports from
international experts:
Getting all children through a full basic education cycle is an important goal,
but the ultimate purpose of schooling is to provide children with an education
that equips them with the skills, knowledge and wider perspectives they need
to participate fully in the social, economic and political life of their countries.
Delivery of good-quality education is ultimately contingent on what happens in
the classroom, and teachers are on the front line (UNESCO 2009, p. 7).
In contrast to the “finance-driven” reforms focused on increasing efficiency, many quality
reforms could be categorized as “competitiveness-driven” (Mundy 2005). These systemic
recommendations included the introduction of standards-based reforms, increased school
competition (usually through school choice), and improved teacher and leadership training
(ibid.). Many of these recommendations also broke a long-standing tradition of ignoring
curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation to provide guidance on these areas (Rizvi and Lingard
2010). The logic of standards-based reforms is to establish education goals, then provide
resources to reach those goals, and to measure (using standardized tests) whether students
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have reached them. In advocating for these reforms, international experts established many
global norms for both the expectations of students and the proper curriculum and pedagogy
necessary to have them reach these minima (Rizvi and Lingard 2010).
The prescriptions for how to improve the quality of education are less unified than the
recommendations for increased access, however. Debate continues about the role of technol-
ogy in the classroom, the importance of student-teacher ratios, and increasing competition in
the teacher selection process. For many years, experts focused on issues of “accountability,”
which translates into a combination of student testing and merit pay for teachers (PREAL
Advisory Board 2005). The quality of teachers is a long-running theme in the literature, but
there is no consensus as to how this should be achieved. Some suggestions include efforts
to modify classroom behavior (Wolff, Schiefelbein, and Valenzuela 1994) and increasing the
prestige of the profession (Board 2001; PREAL Advisory Board 2005). These reports also
push the idea that “skills” should feature prominently in the design of education policy so
that students can increase their human capital and compete in a global economy (Rizvi and
Lingard 2010; Mundy 2005).
One of the recommendations for improving education quality is to improve the quality
of instruction. In turn, one suggested method for doing this is to introduce merit pay for
teachers, which has been shown to produce better education results (Woessmann 2011a;
Woessmann 2011b). According to one typical report, “teachers may be one of the most
important school-side variables affecting student leaning…Paying teachers for what they know
and do may improve student leaning outcomes” (Vegas and Petrow 2007, p. 208). This
type of policy fits well with the neoliberal right’s vision for education. Specifically, merit
pay programs evaluate teachers and provide financial rewards to those who perform well.
Differential pay fits clearly into the logic of efficiency and competition that forms the basis
of neoliberal thinking. Although experts recommend this strategy, it has been implemented
in very few places, partially because of strong opposition from teachers’ unions (Goldhaber
et al. 2008).
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In perhaps the most comprehensive and up-to-date study, authors at the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) provide a series of meta-studies on the most effective practices for
improving education quality (Busso et al. 2017). These recommendations include focusing
on pre-primary education as a crucial starting point for students and identifying the worst
performing schools and targeting resources to them. However, they offer the sobering con-
clusion that “there is limited rigorous evidence on what works to improve student learning
in secondary school” (ibid., p. 188). At the primary level, the authors reveal further uncer-
tainty about best practices, noting that “countries need to invest in producing high-quality
evaluations to determine the effects and costs of alternative interventions” (ibid., p. 149).
Left, right and expertise
Politicians accept the advice of experts for several reasons. In some cases politicians accept
this advice because they must. Although international organizations have refrained from
imposing rules about education on Latin American countries in recent years, the 1980s and
1990s saw many programs with conditionalities that affected education by reducing public
budgets (and in many cases increasing poverty) (see, e.g., Bonal 2002; Verger, Novelli, and
Altinyelken 2012).18 In other cases politicians accept the advice because they have an interest
in making their education systems competitive (Cerny 1997; Brown and Lauder 1996; Carnoy
and Rhoten 2002) and the recommendations provided by this group are seen as a way to
accomplish this goal.
Availability and (occasional) financial support are not the only reasons that experts are
able to exert influence on policy. Politicians may also opt to delegate policymaking respon-
sibility to technocratic experts as a political strategy to avoid responsibility or to reduce
18There exist other explanations for why politicians have accepted the advice of international experts.
One strand of literature on the “globalization” of education policy makes the argument that the diffusion
of education has been, essentially, a byproduct of a larger diffusion of the Western nation-state model
(Anderson-Levitt 2003). Others argue that the spread of a global education system is the result of a
dissemination of educational policy and ideology (Schriewer and Martinez 2004; Carney 2008). In either
case, the result is that international policy experts are contributing to convergence between left and right.
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their work load (O’Donell 1994; Williams 2006). Additionally, the international social, ed-
ucational, and professional networks in which these experts move means that many times
there are close, often personal, connections between those making and those taking recom-
mendations (Centeno and Silva 2016). International organizations support the spread of
information through these networks partially by hosting conferences on ideas in education
policy reform (Osorio Gonnet 2018). Having struggled with attempts to improve educa-
tion for so long, politicians and bureaucrats are open to recommendations from experts
who present examples of successful policy to a broad audience.19 Further, many politicians
themselves come from a technocratic background and are, therefore, more open to accepting
advice from these actors (Huneeus 1998).
Expert advice, both domestic and international, contributes to education policy con-
vergence for two reasons. First, because of the technocratic nature of these actors, their
recommendations are driven by research and evidence, not political ideology. As a result,
they will recommend the same policies to governments on both sides of the aisle. These
recommendations are disseminated widely and thus freely available to policymakers looking
for ideas on how to improve education (Hunter 2020). Any government that is willing to
accept these recommendations will naturally move toward a convergent position with any
other party also employing experts to design policy.
Second, in many cases, the recommendations for policies to address equity, the chief
concern of the left, and economy, the chief concern of the right, will be identical. In the
broadest terms, there will be overlap when there is a match between the skills that would
be gained by raising the academic performance of the lowest group and the labor pool
needed for growth in the country’s major industries. Recent reports summarizing expert
recommendations continue to push for targeted interventions on the lowest performing and
poorest schools in order to make the biggest improvements (The World Bank 2018; Bassi
19The reach of these networks is considerable. Consider the case of Salta, Argentina, a remote interior
province which received a delegation of Finnish education researchers in 2016 to present a study on discipline
in Finnish classrooms to the teachers of Salta (Berruezo 2017).
116
et al. 2012). In particular, the recent work in this area stresses the importance of skills in
improving education systems (Busso et al. 2017). By focusing on the tangible capabilities
that students graduate with, these recommendations recognize two realities: that the lowest
performing students are not leaving school with remunerative abilities and that fixing this
deficit will allow economies to continue to grow in a competitive global economy that places
increasing cognitive demands on even low-skilled labor.
4.2 Divergent Forces
There are two primary divergent forces that work to drive left and right apart on educa-
tion policy: priorities and macroeconomics. Party platforms convey not just policy positions
but also the relative importance of different policy areas. That is, they express partisan pol-
icy priorities. Underlying ideological preferences shape priorities within education generally,
and the priority of education in relation to other policy areas. Where divergence in education
exists, it is largely the result of divergent priorities between left and right. Macroeconomic
factors provide a second divergent force, albeit one outside the control of parties and one
likely to dominate regardless of the presence of convergent forces.
Beyond priorities, preferences and underlying ideology can create divergence as well in
the absence of policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert advice. Under democracy
it is unlikely that all of these forces will disappear, but they can weaken in ways that create
openings for ideological parties to make decisive changes to education systems.
4.2.1 Policy Priorities
Underlying ideological factors can motivate education policy priorities and the priority
of education vis-à-vis other policy areas. The left’s focus on equity leads to a predictable
focus on policies aimed at equitable distribution of education. The left prefers these policies
over those aimed purely at boosting absolute performance on education and quality metrics.
Given the purported connection between education and equity enhancement, education is
more likely to be a higher priority than other policy areas.
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The right’s ideological preferences push it toward policies more directly aimed at boosting
overall economic performance. This tends to align more closely with concerns over absolute
levels of access and, to a greater extent, quality. This logic also means that education is
likely to be a lower priority policy than other areas because education is such a long-term
(and in many ways indirect) way to boost economic performance.
4.2.2 Macroeconomics
Some policy divergence between left and right can be explained by forces outside the
government’s direct control: macroeconomics.20 This power is also likely to take precedence
over any divergent forces. For example, even if left and right have reached a common level of
funding for education, an economic recession that severely limits government revenue may
force those in power to break from the status quo. In the Latin American context, many
economies continue to rely on commodity exports with volatile prices determined by a global
market (Wibbels 2006; Campello and Zucco 2016).
Macroeconomic factors play an important role in determining education policy. They
do so indirectly through their effect on government revenue. They can also dictate policy
priorities, particularly in times of economic downturns. Even in the most dire situations
education is not a “crisis” in the way that high unemployment is an economic crisis or an
epidemic is a public health crisis. This increases the propensity of education to be pushed
down the priority list in favor of these other areas when economic conditions worsen. During
times of economic crisis Latin American countries also find that they are unable to borrow
to support social spending and instead must reduce provision of these services in order to
support the sectors of the economy that remain productive (Wibbels 2006).
Macroeconomic conditions bear some relationship to party ideology through the eco-
nomic policy preferences of each side of the political spectrum. However, the effect is both
slow-moving and imprecise. For this reason, macroeconomic conditions can be considered
20The ruling party does have some control over the economy, obviously, but even in planned economies,
external shocks and international economic conditions are entirely external.
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exogenous to party type and a non-systematic factor affecting education policy.
4.3 The Dominance of Convergent Forces in Education
Policy
The goal of this chapter is to provide an explanation of the forces that produce the
empirical finding of convergence in education between left and right governments. The
nature of parties offers a compelling reason to believe this should be the case ex ante.
If parties exist to help elect their members to office, then they must adapt to changing
political situations if they are to survive. At times this may mean true evolution — conversion
to a new policy position. At other times it may mean a pivot — a convergence — on a policy
area. The convergent forces described above will necessarily dominate divergent preferences
in any case where parties seek survival. Further, if a party goes extinct as a result of
maintaining its ideological position, a replacement party could only compete in the electoral
space using a different strategy that includes policy convergence in that area.
Not all policies are equally likely to converge. Access policies are most likely to converge
because they leave the strongest legacies, face high levels of support from all stakeholders
(since nobody loses), and are consistently recommended by experts. Guaranteeing access
to schooling is universally accepted as positive and supported by the general public, teach-
ers, business elites, and education experts. Increasing enrollment or completion rates (and
correspondingly reducing dropout or repetition rates) involves policies that have no losers
— building or staffing schools to increase availability, providing funds to purchase uniforms
to reduce barriers, or implement a CCT to encourage attendance are all viewed as win-win
policies. Some actors may object to the cost of these programs, but many, especially CCTs,
are relatively low-cost (Hunter and Sugiyama 2012). Further, many of the education policies
that diffuse are financially sponsored by international organizations like the World Bank.
Increasing access often involves the construction of schools, expansion of the bureaucracy,
and other structures that quickly become entrenched. At the same time reducing access to
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education is a politically untenable position because education is viewed as a fundamental
human right (UN General Assembly 1948; World Health Organization et al. 2008; UN 2015).
Quality policies, on the other hand, are less likely to converge. Experts remain divided
about the best policies for improving quality of education both generally and which policies
are best matched to which circumstances in particular (Busso et al. 2017). As a result,
advice is less consistent and more likely to recommend dramatic changes. In terms of both
policy legacies and electoral calculations related to stakeholders, the connection with quality
policies is also less consistent. Some policies are likely to create entrenched legacies and
stakeholders take strong positions, but others are not. For example, a policy that shifts
instruction hours to planning hours for teachers may receive a high degree of support from the
teachers’ unions and may only have to overcome minor legacies to be implemented (including
increasing funding to cover the additional hours). In contrast, a policy mandating that
teachers undergo periodic review will likely encounter strong opposition from the teachers’
unions and significant legacies.
4.4 Conclusion
Political left and right have fundamentally different underlying ideologies; they frequently
express different views on education; and they draw on different segments of the voting public
to form their electoral coalitions. Yet as Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate, there exists very
little difference in metrics on spending or performance between left and right governments.
This chapter argues that the convergence between the two ends of the political spectrum can
be accounted for by three primary forces: policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert
advice.
Policy legacies create barriers to changes through bureaucratic inertia, creation of politi-
cal costs, and limitation of the potential policy space. Organized political actors, particularly
the teachers’ unions and business elites create political pressures for parties on both left and
right, although each typically aligns with only one of these groups. Both left and right
120
also experience pressures from general public opinion on education and a situation in which
changes to policy are likely to extract (significant) short-term costs while returning only
long-term benefits. Finally, both domestic and international experts recommend identical
policies regardless of the ideological identify of the party in power and both left and right
are increasingly relying on these experts to craft their education policy.
In the following chapter I illustrate these convergent forces in the case of Chile. There, as
my theory predicts, the combination of these three convergent forces dominate the divergent
tendency from competing policy priorities of ideologically opposed left and right parties.
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Chapter 5
Chile: Convergence in a “Least Likely” Case
Chapters 2 and 3 showed that partisan ideology plays very little role in determining either
education outputs or outcomes and Chapter 4 proposed an explanation for this unexpected
convergence. This chapter considers the statistical findings and the alternative explanation
in light of evidence from Chile. Political left and right in Chile maintain distinct motivations
and goals for the education system — the left is driven more by interests in equity and
the right more by interests in the growth. These core principles are tied intimately with
their respective electoral blocs and underlying political ideologies. However, both sides are
constrained by political forces — policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert advice —
that I argue drive policy toward convergence. The policy priorities of each administration
help to explain remaining differences between the two parties.
I process trace the role that electoral politics and policy legacies play in Chile through
time. Evidence in this chapter comes from a mix of primary sources and interviews collected
through six months of field research as well as the secondary literature. The Chilean case
demonstrates that even in a polarized context where left and right favor different education
systems, political ideology does not drive observed outputs (spending by level or area), or
outcomes (enrollment rates, repetition rates, dropout rates, or test scores).
The left’s greater focus on equity and the right’s on growth helps to explain several
observed trends in education policy in Chile. In addition, this framework contributes to
an explanation of some unexpected behavior by both sides of the political spectrum. The
left’s embrace of teacher evaluations, for example, cuts against the interests of the teachers’
unions, one of its primary supporters, but was pursued because of the continued reports that
low teacher quality was a serious impediment to improving the lowest-performing schools.
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The chapter first justifies the selection of Chile as an appropriate case for this test,
providing a brief overview of the Chilean party system in doing so. It then reviews the
performance of Chilean education on metrics of access and quality, showing that outputs and
outcomes have converged since the return to democracy in 1990. The heart of the chapter
comes in section 5.3, which process traces education policy and reforms in the modern era,
focusing primarily on the period after the return to democracy in 1990.
5.1 Chile: An Extreme Case
Chile can be viewed as an “extreme” case and thus an excellent opportunity to explore a
causal explanation, to use the language of Seawright and Gerring (2008). It is extreme in two
key ways. First, it is extreme in the degree to which left and right have staked out ideological
positions on education. Chile has a long history of a highly institutionalized party system in
which ideological parties are differentiated on a clear left–right spectrum (Mainwaring and
Scully 1995). These parties have dramatically different visions for the education system. The
left has long promoted a system of greater equity and has sided with the teachers’ unions in
calling for more “democratic” schools.
Parties on the right, by contrast, embrace the neoliberal education system first imple-
mented under the military regime (Gauri 1998, p. 5). This decentralized education system
is based on individual choice and the market principles of competition and efficiency. The
system operates a nationwide voucher program in which privately run schools are funded
with state money and enroll nearly two-thirds of all Chilean students (Centro de Estudios
2017).
Second, Chile is extreme in how salient education is to the voting public. Education
is a higher priority issue in Chile than in any other Latin American country. Indeed, in
years in which the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) asked Chilean survey
respondents about national challenges, a higher percentage responded that education was
the “most serious problem” facing the country than any other Latin American country in
123
those years (LAPOP n.d.). Others suggest that in Chilean national polls, education rose
from the fifth to the second biggest worry between 2009 and 2013 (Waissbluth 2013, p. 20).
Politicians have, correspondingly, paid attention to and participated in the civic discourse
on education.
If partisan ideology does not matter in the extreme Chilean context as we would expect,
then it is unlikely to matter anywhere. A failure of the prediction in this extreme case
suggests that ideology is unlikely to matter in cases where the parties are less divided on
education (a constant variable cannot explain a difference in another) or where education
is not a salient issue to voters (and we would not expect parties to take or act on extreme
policy positions).
5.1.1 Extreme Party Differences on Education
The Chilean Left and Education
The Chilean left is comprised of the Socialist Party (PS) and the Communist Party (PCCh)
and other smaller parties such as the Party for Democracy (PPD). At various points the
Christian Democrats (DC) have also been part of the left’s coalition (as have the PS and
PCCh been absent) (Siavelis 2014). The PS and PCCh pull the bloc further to the left than
it would be if the coalition were grounded only in the center-left DC. This bloc has gone by
the names “Concertación” and “Nueva Mayoría.”
Left and right in Chile differ on education in two principal areas: motivating principles
and structural vision.1 The left’s motivating principle in education is equity enhancement.
It expresses concern about inequality of both education outputs and outcomes. In its view,
greater resources should be devoted to creating equality of educational opportunities for all
Chilean students. Equally, the left expresses dismay that education outcomes remain highly
unequal, linking these results to inequality of both access (opportunity) and quality.
In terms of structure, the left prefers an education system in which the state maintains
1The left and right also differ on educational content (curriculum), which is outside the scope of this
project.
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a greater role (in both school administration and labor conditions) in opposition to the
market-based education system put in place under the military regime. Its platform focuses
on bolstering public education instead of devoting greater resources to the voucher program
and subsidized schools (Bachelet 2007).
The left also prefers a centralized system of education administration. As detailed below,
the Chilean education system was decentralized under the military regime, with many ad-
ministrative powers related to schools transferred to municipal governments. The left voices
an opposition to this arrangement, preferring instead to return to a structure in which the
Ministry of Education in Santiago has a high degree of control over schools across the coun-
try.
Finally, the left also envisions an education system in which all education providers
are run as non-profit entities. The Chilean system implemented under the military regime
allowed private providers to operate on a profit basis, under the logic that competition and
efficiency would improve quality (Chubb and Moe 1990). The left argues, instead, that these
schools have contributed to educational inequality and are at philosophical odds with the
participatory and democratic education system it prefers.
The Chilean Right and Education
The Chilean right is composed of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National
Renewal Party (RN). It has gone by many names, including “Alianza” from 2000–2009 and
“Coalición por el Cambio” since 2009.2
The right’s motivating principle in education is a fundamental concern with growth. This
vision is intimately tied with its corresponding beliefs about the relationship between the
state and economic growth. Specifically, the right favors a limited role for the state and as
few restrictions as possible for economic actors (Siavelis 2014). The right also prefers to im-
2A full listing of the right pact’s names are provided by Siavelis (2014): “Democracia y Progreso, 1989–92;
Participación y Progreso, 1992–93; Unión por el Progreso, 1993–96; Unión por Chile, 1996–2000; Alianza
por Chile, 2000–2009; Coalición por el Cambio, 2009–present.”
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plement market principles on the labor side of education, with teacher pay (and employment
status) tied to individual level performance.
The RN’s policy position is aptly described by then Senator Sebastián Piñera in the
debate over the 1992 Teaching Law:
I want to make known the basic principles which illuminate our participation
in this long debate…They are: first, to protect and safeguard educational liberty;
second, to be consistent with the principle of subsidiarity of the State on edu-
cational matters, which means in this field the State has more obligations than
rights; third, to recognize with total clarity the existence of two sectors that
participate actively in the area of instruction: the municipal and the private
subsidized, planting the fundamental idea that the treatment of both should be
equal, in a form that the equality of opportunity is applied not only to the stu-
dent level, but also to that of the institutions that provide education; fourth, to
safeguard and protect basic guarantees for the dignified practice of the teaching
career (Historia de Ley 19.070 1991, p. 897).
The military regime (1973–1990) implemented the right’s preferred educational structures
and created a system based on a market economy (Espínola 1992). Schools compete for
students and the resources that accompany them and parents are given choice to enroll their
students in any school willing to take them. This system creates incentives for educational
entrepreneurs to start new schools (Chubb and Moe 1990). The privately run, publicly
subsidized schools (particular subvencionado) operate under a voucher system and will be
referred to here simply as “subsidized.”3 Parents have been drawn to the new schools because
they earned a reputation for providing higher quality education.4
3Under this system, students are allowed to choose any school they wish to attend and a fixed rate
“subvention” will follow them to that school, public or subsidized. Despite the apparent freedom, students
are limited by practical considerations. Until the passage of the Ley de Inclusión in 2018, schools had the
ability to limit enrollment through several mechanisms. The elimination of these barriers is discussed in
greater detail below in section 5.3.6. In addition, as one teacher explained it, the variation in school quality
happens between municipalities, not within them, so for most students the distance to the nearest quality
school district is so great that there is no real choice (Anonymous Interview 2 2017).
4Although early studies suggested that the subsidized schools outperformed their public counterparts,
later analyses dispute this claim (see, e.g., Bellei 2007; Hsieh and Urquiola 2006). Selective admission
practices at subsidized schools created false comparisons and an illusion of higher performance and resulted
in stratification across schools within each type of school (Mizala and Torche 2012).
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The degree to which this system is privatized is the defining element of the Chilean
education system. Today, over 62% of all primary and secondary students attend either a
fully private or a publicly subsidized private school (subvencionado) (Centro de Estudios
















Figure 5.1: Growth of subsidized schools over time. Percentages calculated based on data
from Cox et al. (1997) and Centro de Estudios (2017).
Although the subsidized school system was established under the military regime and
the upward trajectory of subsidized schools began before the return to democracy, it was
only under the democratic administrations of the Concertación did those schools capture
a majority of the education market. Section 5.3 provides detail about why this expansion
happened.
5.1.2 Extreme Salience of Education to the Public
For education to matter in Chilean politics, voters need to care about the issue regardless
of party positions on education policy. Does education then matter to voters in Chile? In
a word, yes. As noted above, the Chilean public is much more likely to list education as
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the most important problem facing the country than their peers in other countries across
the region (LAPOP n.d.). Across all available LAPOP data, 4.0 percent of respondents rate
education as the most important problem facing the country.5 Further, polls showed that by
2013 education had become the second biggest worry for Chileans (Waissbluth 2013, p. 20).
Beyond polls, Chileans have demonstrated the salience of education through other chan-
nels. Chilean students participated in mass demonstrations and protests in 2006 and again
in 2011–2013 to a degree seen in few other cases. The demands of the students varied be-
tween the two instances of unrest and both involved a large number of students too young
to vote.6 Yet in both cases, public opinion followed the student demands closely. At least
one survey conducted at the height of the 2006 protests suggested that 69% of those sur-
veyed supported the student movement generally and the same percentage were in favor of
the methods (strikes, occupations) used, while only 25% were opposed (Gálvez 2006). This
series of events suggests that the Chilean public demonstrates its interest in education in
ways beyond the ballot-box, making the issues salient for politicians even in non-election
years, and that politicians feel obligated to respond.
Chilean parties actively discuss education in public discourse and presidential candidates
continue to make education a highlight of their campaign platforms. Thus, if parties respond
to electoral pressures, there is every reason to expect that political ideology matters for
education policies in Chile, which should have some effect on outputs and outcomes. If it
does not matter, in a case where education is politically salient and the two ends of the
political spectrum have such divergent beliefs about education, then it stands to reason that
ideology will not matter anywhere. This is the case — there is no evidence that partisan
ideology is the driving force behind either spending levels or upward trending progress on
most education outcome metrics. On the other hand, there is an abundance of evidence that
5Although this value may seem small, consider other responses to the same question — the economy:
3.5%, inequality: 5.1%, and security: 0.2% (LAPOP n.d.).
6The 2006 protests involved primarily high school students (most of whom are under 18, the voting age
in Chile), while the second round of 2011–2013 were focused more on university students.
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policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert opinions play an important role shaping
the policies that determine education outputs and outcomes.
5.2 Education Performance in Chile
Chile tends to outperform its Latin American peers on a wide range of outcome metrics
but under-perform compared with countries at similar levels of development in other regions.
Of the 70 countries that took the 2015 PISA test, no Latin American country was in the top
half (Bos et al. 2016). The highest ranked country, Chile, scored 44th overall, just behind
Slovakia and Greece (ibid.).7 On metrics of outputs and outcomes, Chile follows the patterns
described in Chapters 2 and 3: the left and right spend on education at similar levels and
distribute education resources in similar ways. Metrics of access (enrollment, completion,
dropout, and repetition) and quality (test scores) also show a convergence between left and
right.
5.2.1 Education Outputs in Chile
How has the Chilean government spent its education budget? Figure 5.2 shows overall
spending and spending by level for the period 1997–2015, when data is available as well as
spending by area over the same period. The overall spending level has remained moderately
flat, with a slight upward trend. The moderate increases that do occur, happen during the
1997–2004 and 2012–2015 periods. The former corresponds to a period of left executive
control and the latter to an executive on the right.
7The absolute highest Latin American scores come from Argentina (38th overall), but are based solely
on schools in Buenos Aires and are thus not a fair comparison with the other countries where the test is
administered across a complete sample of schools. Also note that the Dominican Republic takes the lowest







































Education Spending by Area
Figure 5.2: Chilean Education Spending. Left plot shows spending by level, right plot shows
spending by area.
As a percentage of the overall education budget, spending by level changed dramatically
over the observed period. The changes mostly occur under the watch of the left, suggesting
that partisan ideology cannot explain differences here.
During the early part of this period (1997–1998) secondary education spending jumped
significantly and primary spending fell. By 2006 secondary spending surpassed primary
and the two levels are funded at nearly equal, but decreasing rates thereafter. Changes
in enrollment are insufficient to explain these shifts. The changes occur concurrently with
an important change in education policy: the move from a half-day to a full-day in 1997.
However, because this change occurred at both the primary and secondary level it cannot
explain the change in distribution of resources.
The left hand plot also shows the school-aged population as a percentage of the entire pop-
ulation. The Chilean population is aging over this period, with primary and secondary-aged
students representing smaller percentages of the population and a corresponding increase
in the percentage of tertiary-aged students. However, these changes are fairly gradual and
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cannot explain the magnitude of the changes in spending.
The trends in education spending — increasing proportions being spent on tertiary educa-
tion and decreasing proportions on primary and secondary — continue under right-of-center
administrations beginning in 2010 and by 2015 all three levels were funded at nearly equal
levels.
The available data in the right panel of figure 5.2 is more limited for areas than for
levels, but an important trend emerges nonetheless. During the period 1998–2009, staff
expenditures grew dramatically, while current and capital expenses fell. By the end of the
observed period capital expenses represented just a tiny fraction of the overall government
education budget, while staff expenditure topped 75%. The increased length of the school
day would predict a rise in these costs, but the timing does not align as expected — we
would anticipate those expenses to rise immediately but we observe a lag of several years.
This points again to a political process as responsible for changes to education outputs.
5.2.2 Education Outcomes in Chile
Access
Figure 5.3 shows the adjusted net enrollment rate (ANER), completion and transition, rep-
etition, and dropout rates over the past decade, respectively in each subplot.8 ANER at
both the primary and secondary levels has fallen slightly at both levels. All completion and
transition rates have remained high, although there is year-to-year variation. Repetition
rates show low numbers that are trending slightly downward.
Note that in the upper left subplot the data source changes for secondary education in
2011. The Ministry of Education (Mineduc) reports numbers at irregular intervals from 1990
to 2011 while the World Bank has continuous annual data from 2007 to 2015. In years where
the two sources overlap, the World Bank estimates are consistently and significantly higher
8Note that I include the effective transition rate (ETR) on the sample plot as the completion rate because
the two are so closely linked.
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for secondary education than those from Mineduc, suggesting that the jump may not be as



















































































Figure 5.3: Outcomes in Chilean Education. ETR is the primary–secondary effective tran-
sition rate. Note that the scale of the y-axis varies between plots.
The top right plot shows the dropout rate at primary and lower secondary. The primary
dropout rate has declined very slightly, while the lower secondary rate has increased. It is
possible, however, that the spike in dropout may be just that — a temporary spike. The
combination of these results suggests that the Chilean education system is performing well
on many traditional outcome metrics.
9It is not entirely clear what drives the differences between the two sets of reported numbers, but a likely
explanation is a difference in the definition of the relevant population for secondary education, with the
World Bank using a wider age range, thus inflating slightly the estimates for ANER at the secondary level.
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Quality
Figure 5.4 looks at secondary level test scores, as reported by Altinok, Diebolt, and De
Meulemeester (2013). The upper left plot shows that test scores have risen across the board
after falling briefly at the start of the century. Equally, the upper right plot shows that
the percentage of students achieving the lowest level of competency has also risen across
the board after a brief dip. The lower left plot shows a slightly different trend with the





































































Figure 5.4: Chilean Secondary Test Scores. Note that the scale of the y-axis varies between
plots.
Figure 5.5 presents results in the Chilean national standardized exam, the Education
Quality Measurement System (SIMCE). This exam is administered annually to all students
at the corresponding levels. This provides a more comprehensive test instrument and one
more tailored to the instruction that Chilean students receive than international tests. Most
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of the test scores suggest an upward trend followed by a recent decline in scores. The
exception is mean secondary math scores, which declined, then climbed, and then fell again.
Math Reading






























Figure 5.5: SIMCE Test Scores. Primary and secondary scores reported are from the eighth
and second years of each cycle, respectively. This corresponds to the final year of primary
education and the second of four years of secondary education.
Equity
Assessing equity in Chilean education is more challenging. Observers frequently complain
that the system is inequitable and reinforces existing inequalities (see, e.g., El Mercurio
2012b). The data presented here confirms that equity remains a problem but also identifies
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some signs that Chilean education has become slightly more equitable over the past decade.
I measure equity in education along three axes in Chile: gender, geography, and income.
The additional analysis of geographic and socioeconomic equity is possible looking at Chile
because of greater data availability than at the regional level. In Chile and across Latin
America generally a major divide exists between urban and rural areas in terms of both
access and quality of schools. Education is much more costly in rural areas, where there
are fewer economies of scale and students must travel greater distances to attend school
(White and Tweeten 1973; Fox 1981; DeYoung and Howley 1990; Bard, Gardener, and
Wieland 2006). Gender differences are exaggerated in rural areas, where traditional values
still emphasize male education over female and girls are more likely to be kept at home to help
with domestic labor than boys (Alderman et al. 1996). Further, it is a challenge to attract
high quality teachers to rural areas (Monk 2007) and to provide them with professional
development (Murry and Herrera 1998). Even in the more developed Chilean context it is
worth considering equity between urban and rural schools.
Equity in schools based on economic factors continues to be a perennial problem not
only in Chile, but across Latin America in general. Schools that serve poor students tend
to struggle for a variety of reasons: students enter school with a social and academic capital
deficit (Lee and Burkam 2002; Aikens and Barbarin 2008) that continues to build throughout
their education (Ready 2010);10 parents in these schools are less able to provide academic
support for their children (Jencks and Mayer 1990); students are more likely to be absent
(Ready 2010); and school budgets are lower and social capital accumulates more slowly
(Bénabou 1996). Further, it is difficult to recruit high quality teachers to teach in struggling
schools. Economic inequity correlates with the geographic divide. Indeed, persistent poverty
is one of the challenges that rural schools face (Howley, Rhodes, and Beall 2009).
In terms of gender differences, Figure 5.6 shows that the primary level enrollment and
10Note that research shows that early childhood education gives students an early advantage and likely

















































Figure 5.6: Gender Parity Index for Enrollment and Completion. ETR is the effective
transition rate from the primary to lower secondary levels.
completion rates are at near parity for boys and girls. A meaningful inequality in both still
exists at the secondary level, where girls outperform boys (as indicated by the ratio > 1).
In fact, the GPI for secondary ANER had been near parity, but grew dramatically starting
around 2009.
Looking further at gender differences, refer again to figure 5.4. The gender gap increased
and then decreased for average test scores, percentage of students achieving at least the
lowest level of competency, and percentage of student achieving the highest competency.
The improvements here are the result of increased performance by girls and not decreased
performance by boys. In the first two measures, boys and girls have both grown, with girls
making greater gains. The exception is at the highest level of competency, where performance
by boys has stagnated or even declined slightly over the past decade.
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Figure 5.7: Variation in mean SIMCE reading scores
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Figure 5.8: Variation in mean SIMCE math scores
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In terms of geographic inequality, Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show changes in SIMCE reading
and math scores, respectively, over time throughout Chile. They provide evidence that the
rural areas performing the lowest in 1994 did, in fact, improve in both the 2006 and 2015
assessments. In a more systematic comparison, Figure 5.4 also shows that rural students
still lag behind their urban peers. The gap in average test scores and percentage of students
achieving the minimum level of competency has been shrinking after a brief period of ex-
pansion. However, in the measure of percentage of students attaining the highest level of
competency, urban students improved performance significantly before stagnating and even
declining. Rural students fared worse, with performance sinking and staying at near 0 levels.
In terms of socioeconomic equity, I use data from the Chilean National Performance
Evaluation System (SNED) as a proxy for school quality. Using SIMCE data here is not
possible because it does not contain any variables that can be used as proxies for socioeco-
nomic status. Figure 5.9 shows overall performance over time by level, urban/rural divide,
and homogeneous group.11
These figures collectively illustrate that equity remains a problem, as critics have noted,
although there are some signs that equity has increased slightly along gender and geographic
dimensions. The most persistent inequalities in education outcomes remain along socioeco-
nomic lines.
5.3 Convergence in the modern era
Chile’s modern era begins with the return to democracy in 1990, when the center-left
Concertación coalition won the presidency and held it for the next two decades. Policy
legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert advice have pushed left and right toward conver-
gence. Policy priorities based on ideological positions remain a force for divergence, but each
successive administration finds that the convergent forces limit their ability to act on these
preferences.
11Chilean schools are organized into “homogenous groups” for comparison in the SNED. Schools are
compared against peer institutions categorized by: geographic zone, size, and type.
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Figure 5.9: Overall SNED Performance by Homogeneous Group
Left and right have converged on education policy in several important regards. With
respect to policy on outputs, both support similar levels of education spending by the state;
and both have accepted that state and subsidized schools will play an important role in the
provision of Chilean education. With respect to policy related to outcomes, both favor ex-
pansion of access to early education as well as higher education; both embrace teacher merit
pay; and both have voiced support for greater equity by improving the lowest performing
schools and decreasing financial barriers to entry into higher education. Although we observe
convergence overall, there is a difference in the degree of support by the parties on some of
these issues. Convergence is not equivalent to conversion, as detailed in Chapter 4 — con-
vergence is the observed condition of identical policies under different parties and conversion
is the shift of underlying policy ideal points. Convergence in Chile varies between mere
acceptance, as with the right and the elimination of a tuition co-pay in subsidized schools,
to advancing alternatives without gutting the status quo, as with the left and support for
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public versus subsidized schools.
This section process traces the political and non-political factors that drive observed con-
vergence. I first provide a short outline of the evolution of education policy from the founding
of the Chilean Republic until Salvador Allende’s overthrow in 1973 and the period of military
rule that followed from 1973–1990. These brief sections provide important background that
shaped the policies after the country returned to a democratically elected government in
1990. The first three administrations in the modern democratic era (Patricio Aylwin, 1990–
1994, Eduardo Frei, 1994-2000, and Ricardo Lagos, 2000–2006) constitute a period of status
quo without any major changes to the education system. The center-left instead pursued
a gradual shift toward greater equity through small targeted programs. Michele Bachelet’s
administration (2006–2010) represents the first significant changes to Chilean education,
brought about as a result of student protests, but with limited real changes. Her second
administration (2014–2018) was characterized by massive changes to education, rolling back
many of the fundamental aspects of the system implemented under the military regime. The
left was able to accomplish this because of weakened policy legacies due to the passage of
time, shifted stakeholder pressures, and a willingness to ignore expert advice. Sebastian
Piñera’s two center-right administrations (2010–2014 and 2018–present) are also primarily
status quo in education, limited by the legacies of the left.
Table 5.1 outlines the changes in parts of the education system from 1973 through today.
Blue indicates leftist ideal policies, red indicates rightist ideal policies, and purple indicates
policy that falls between the two extremes. The table traces the evolution of education
policy across nine dimensions related to education outcomes. In terms of access, it considers
copayments and selection practices in subsidized education — do these practices exist and
in what ways are they limited; and university tuition — who pays and how. In terms of
quality, it looks at the voucher system — how closely tied are payments to enrollment;
decentralization — to what degree is control centralized; merit pay — how are teachers
evaluated and rewarded for performance; the teacher statute — in what ways is the teaching
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profession regulated; and profit — are schools allowed to exist as for-profit entities. The
table also notes additional projects which fall outside the scope of these dimensions.
Access Quality































(2018–) Anticip. Anticip. Anticip. Anticip. Anticip. Anticip. Anticip. Anticip.
Table 5.1: Evolution of Chilean education policy. Colors represent the state of policy at
the end of the corresponding administration. Blank cells indicate areas in which no policy
existed.
The overall trend is from a “deep red” system to a “purple” one, but some exceptions
exist. For the first two decades after the return to democracy, the center-left found that it
could do little to change the structures that define Chilean education and instead pusued
smaller side projects that attempt to address issues of inequality in small, uncontroversial
ways. The system becomes more red on a few dimensions even under the Concertación.
Michelle Bachelet also managed to move the system toward truly “blue” policies on a few
dimensions and it appears that these changes are likely to persist through Piñera’s second
time in office. The table also shows the left was able to implement directly moderate or
left-leaning policies in areas where no previous policy existed compared to the more gradual
changes in other areas.
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5.3.1 Democracy Pre-1973: An Early Start in Education, then
Radical Proposals
The Chilean public education system got an early start compared with many other Latin
American nations. Free primary education was established by 1813 (along with the first set
of regulations for schools and teachers), and Chile became the first country in the region to
provide education for girls (Cox et al. 1997). The next century of Chilean education, however,
saw little further development beyond an expansion with a growing population. During the
1920s the government attempted a series of reforms aimed at modernizing and advancing
this outdated education system, although some of the proposals were too radical for Chilean
society at the time (ibid.). Early in this period the seeds of competing ideologies about the
degree of centralization in the education system emerged, with the left moving toward a more
centralized system and the right preferring one that enforced a stricter subsidiarity principle
and allowed schools and municipalities to maintain high degrees of control (ibid.). This
education system could be, “characterized by strong State power, centralization of school
administration, with teachers’ unions having an important influence and teachers having
great autonomy over teaching practices” (Bellei and Vanni 2015, p. 194). Still, it was a
system that had been developed under both left and right and was not designed to conform
to any single political ideology. The history of quality, expanding access, and a constant
eye toward reforms while simultaneously staying grounded in tradition, formed the basis for
most of the education politics prior to Allende’s proposals.
After a century of moderate reforms conducted at a slow pace, the administration of
Eduardo Frei (1964–1970) took dramatic steps to modernize the education system. These
changes addressed access: increased school capacity and reduced barriers to entry through
the provision of free school lunches and uniforms; quality: increased teacher training for those
already in the profession and more years of schooling at the primary level; and equity: a delay
of four years (from sixth to tenth grade) in the decision between technical and university-
track programs (Farrell 1986). Despite the scope of change, the reforms had general public
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support since they were drafted in consultation with stakeholders, stayed well within the
bounds of normal politics, and were sold as a foundation for education for the foreseeable
future. These reforms generated a number of successes, particularly for the urban poor, but
were criticized by some on the left who felt they did not go far enough in changing societal
structures they viewed as contributing to persistent inequality and poverty (Farrell 1986).
In 1970, Salvador Allende was elected to the presidency. As a socialist who won only 36%
of the popular vote, he faced a high degree of opposition from the moment he was elected.
Despite lacking a clear mandate, the newly elected government moved quickly to implement
a radical agenda that included, among other things, education reforms more extreme than
those passed under Frei.12 The extreme nature of the education proposals and the lack of
time since the previous round of reforms were only two of several mistakes that doomed the
agenda to failure.
The proposed reforms, titled the “National Unified School” (ENU), included socialist
language that alienated both the conservative and moderate sectors of society. Early in the
document, for example, the proposal states, “the strategic perspective which illuminates the
new educational policy assumes the construction of a humanistic socialist society” (Ministerio
de Educación 1973, p. 70). Much of the document focuses on sweeping statements about
“humanistic socialism,” but among the substantive policy proposals, the document called
for the complete abolition of the traditional divide between technical and academic tracks
in schools (Farrell 1986, p. 162). Yet even this was a compromise with the radical factions
of the coalition, who were emboldened by the surprise election of Allende, and believed that
the proposed reforms did not go far enough in changing the system. Thus, no actors were
pleased with the proposals. Moderates viewed it as too extreme; radicals viewed it as too
centrist; parents and teachers viewed it as rash, too soon, and proposed in a disorganized
fashion (ibid.). These proposals were never enacted because of the military coup.
12The most radical proposals under Allende included significant land reform that generated fears among
the wealthy and triggered a swift response from the elites and their American allies.
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5.3.2 Military Regime 1973–1990: A Neoliberal Education System
and Focus on Efficiency
• Copayment: Basic system of copayment with low caps (1988)
• Selection: Schools allowed to engage in selection practices (1979)
• University tuition: Public loans available to students (1981)
• Vouchers: Established payment based on strict connection to student enrollment
levels (1979)
• Decentralization: Significant decentralization (1979)
• Merit Pay: None
• Teacher statute: Eliminated separate teaching statute and moved teachers under
general labor law
• Profit: Private and subsidized schools allowed to exist as for-profit entities (1979)
• Additional Projects: Comprehensive education law codified the system — LOCE
(1990)
The Chilean military staged a coup on September 11, 1973 and held power for the next
17 years.13 During this time, Chile became a national experiment in neoliberal policies
only previously hypothesized by Milton Friedman and his Chilean students, the “Chicago
Boys.” This theory, as applied to education policy, included recommendations to privatize
and decentralize education and rested on a fundamental belief about efficiency in schools
and the market’s ability to increase that efficiency (Chubb and Moe 1990).
The neoliberal changes came to education in 1979 when the military moved to imple-
ment the market-based education system.14 This system would be decentralized, privatized,
and operate on the market principles of competition and choice. The economists argued
that competition by publicly subsidized schools would naturally lead to higher quality and
13The military originally ruled with a junta government, headed by four chiefs (one from each branch of
the military) who were supposed to rotate control as chair of the junta, but Augusto Pinochet quickly moved
to become the sole leader of the country.
14The military government made changes to education within a month of seizing power. These early
reforms, however, were mostly confined to curriculum and changes in specific school leadership.
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increased efficiency of education since parents would be able to choose schools for their
children, thus creating an incentive for schools to find ways to increase quality (to attract
students) and efficiency (to increase profit margins) (Chubb and Moe 1990). Chilean edu-
cation in the 1980s can, as a result, be described as an era focused on efficiency (Cox and
Lemaitre 1999). Further, funding for public schools was set at equal levels (based on en-
rollment) to the new private subsidized schools so as not to give them an advantage in this
nascent competition. In announcing the changes, Pinochet made clear that the state’s role
in education was concentrated at the primary level and that “where the role of the state
ends, the market’s begins” (Corvalán and García-Huidobro 2015, p. 1).
The process of decentralization began in earnest in 1979 in conjunction with the es-
tablishment of a state subsidy that would be paid per student, regardless of whether the
institution was public or private.15 Some inside of the ministry of education today argue
that these changes were completely ideological and political — no thought was given to how
these changes would affect the provision or quality of education but were pursued in order to
fragment the teachers and reduce their organizing capacity (Anonymous Interview 5 2017).
The decrease in the total number of teachers suggests increased efficiency as expected by the
underlying theory. However, the political impetus behind the changes also resulted in an
organization system that was neither optimal nor always logical, creating new inefficiencies
that persist today (Anonymous Interview 7 2017).
The process of decentralization was incomplete even after seven years of transferring
authority to the municipalities to the point that, “Chilean policymakers, society, and even
the courts continue to believe that it is the [national] ministry that is effectively running the
municipal schools” (Gauri 1998, p. 28). There are at least three reasons for this incomplete
transfer of power. First, education plays a central role in citizenship formation and the
15The first schools were transferred from centralized control in Santiago to the municipalities in 1980, but
the process was halted temporarily in 1982 and not completed until 1987. An economic downturn created a
budgetary crisis that limited that limited the government’s ability to pay the teacher severance that would
result from the transfer, causing the delay (Gauri 1998).
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military government did not want to cede all power in this regard. Second, the theory of
decentralization suggests that local levels of government are better suited to dealing with
many problems because they can capture more fine-grained variation and match solutions to
specific problems. However, the history of military rule meant that local governments had
only limited capacity and did not necessarily have access to better data or the ability to act on
it when available. Finally, under Pinochet, municipal mayors were military leaders appointed
to the positions. As members of the military, they were used to following commands from
above and expressed no desire or ability to exercise individual initiative in education even
after they had been given the legal authority to do so (ibid.). Both limited capacity and an
unwillingness to take risks meant the central education authority was forced to retain some
powers and contributed to confusion about who was in charge.
The final round of major changes to the education system took place in the last few days
of the military regime in 1990 with the passage of the Organic Constitutional Education
Law (LOCE).16 This law cemented the market-based system and simultaneously gave the
national Ministry of Education important powers that would serve as the basis for the new
democratic regimes to improve quality and enhance equity in Chilean schools.
Finally, at the university level, higher education also underwent neoliberal reforms un-
der the military regime. Free universal tuition was eliminated and replaced with a system
of government-backed loans and universities gained new autonomy in their administration
(Disi 2018). These 1981 reforms also reorganized many of the post-secondary non-tertiary
(technical) education options in the country (Muga 1990).17
To summarize, the roots of partisan divides over education can be traced back over
a century. Not until the Allende government, however, did education policy move into
an overtly ideological space. Although Allende’s proposals failed to be enacted, let alone
implemented, the military regime’s reaction was a strong move in the opposite ideological
16The proposal became law on the final day of the military rule.
17Although these changes had important impacts on the education system, this type of education is beyond
the scope of this project.
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direction, not a mere return to pre-Allende policies. Thus with the return to democracy in
1990, the newly elected left of center government found it had a semi-decentralized system,
fractured between public and subsidized institutions, in which teachers were held in very low
regard and paid accordingly. Although the military had surrendered power peacefully after
losing the plebiscite, the specter of another coup loomed large in the mind of all politicians.
5.3.3 Aylwin, Frei, and Lagos, 1990–2006: Status Quo with Tar-
geted Equity Programs
• Copayment: Slight rightward shift, followed by slight leftward shift. Allowed public
secondary schools to charge a copayment and increased cap on copayments (1993);
introduced system of scholarships to cover copayment for poorest students (1997);
restricted mandatory copayments from being applied to low-income students (2004)
• Selection: No change
• University tuition: Slight rightward shift. Increased loans to students
• Vouchers: No change
• Decentralization: No change
• Merit Pay: New moderate program. Implemented a school-level merit pay system
(1995)
• Teacher statute: New slightly left-of-center program. Enacted for first time since
military coup (1991)
• Profit: No change
• Additional Projects: Quality programs focused on lowest-performing schools — P-
900 (1990), MECE (Básico, Rural, and Medio) (1990), move to a full school day (1997),
Enlaces rural school technology program (1992), extended mandatory schooling to 12
years (2003)
The center-left Concertación coalition won the presidency in the first democratic election
and continued to hold it for the next two decades. The first three administrations during
this time — those of Patricio Aylwin, 1990–1994, Eduardo Frei, 1994–2000, and Ricardo
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Lagos, 2000–2006 — can be characterized largely as status quo administrations that held
ambiguous positions toward education policy and used small targeted programs to address
concerns about equity. I present these three administrations together because of the high
degree of similarity in the approach to education under the three presidents, even though
Aylwin and Frei, both Christian Democrats, were more centrist than Lagos, a socialist.
Three competing drives characterize the ambiguity of the center-left’s position on educa-
tion during this period: one in which the three administrations maintained the status quo,
another in which they moved rightward on policy, and a third in which they made modest
leftward shifts. Maintenance of the status quo is, by far, the dominant trend of the three.
No changes were made to policies related to school selection, decentralization, or profit in
education. There was slight movement toward more conservative policies in university tu-
ition and the copay system under Aylwin. These reforms reflect the center-left’s movement
toward convergence with the right’s commitment to education choice (Gauri 1998). The
center-left also implemented for the first time a merit pay system for teachers. Merit pay is
more in line with the right’s vision for education than the center-left’s, but the Concertación
(in consultation with the teacher’s unions) designed a moderate system. The Frei and Lagos
administrations shifted left slightly on the voucher system and reversed course to moderate
slightly the copay reforms implemented under Aylwin. The center-left also re-implemented
a separate teacher statute that was slightly left of center and over the course of the three
administrations pursued a series of small targeted programs that shifted focus gradually from
efficiency toward equity (Cox and Lemaitre 1999; García-Huidobro 2000).
Policy Priorities
All three presidents campaigned on promises of prioritizing education. Aylwin promised to
address educational deficiencies (Gauri 1998), Frei to continue the policies of Aylwin, and
Lagos to focus on equity (Weinstein 2017). Once in office, however, the priorities of the three
governments were more ambiguous.
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Aylwin began his tenure by appointing Ricardo Lagos as Minister of Education. The
appointment signaled the importance of education to the new administration because Lagos
was, apart from Aylwin, the most prominent politician on the left at the time and conse-
quently brought with him a great number of resources that otherwise would not have been
available to education reformers (Weinstein 2017).18 As important as education was to the
new administration, however, it was not the top priority, economic concerns took precedence.
The policies of Minister of Education Lagos became the policies of the Aylwin government.
The appointment of Lagos, a socialist, as the Minister of Education pulled the education
policy of the center-left Aylwin (a member of the DC) further to the left than it would have
been otherwise. Lagos pushed for a new teaching statute, higher teacher pay, and a general
increase to education funding.19 The Teacher Statute was a top priority and would treat
teaching as separate from other labor, enhance job security, and guarantee a minimum pay
for teachers. The new law effectively made it impossible to either fire a teacher or move staff
from one school to another, regardless of changing enrollment needs and raised guaranteed
minimum salaries (Cox et al. 1997). These changes were largely welcomed by the unions,
which had long desired such a law, even if many teachers still felt that it had not gone far
enough (Gauri 1998). The guarantee of minimum salaries cut into the neoliberal logic that
strictly tied school budgets to student enrollment but also strengthened the decentralized
nature of the system by bolstering the power of municipalities in administering schools
(ibid.). Yet a year after implementing the Teacher Statute, the Aylwin government floated
a proposal to retract some of the job security protections of the Teacher Statute they had
just passed (ibid.).
Funding for subsidized schools is another area in which the Aylwin administration exhib-
ited ambiguous policy priorities. The military regime established a system of copayments
18Previous research has shown that devoting human capital to education is both one way to show that it
is a priority and an effective way to produce results (Apfeld and Liu 2019).
19Lagos was both a true supporter of high quality education and a savvy politician. The policies he pushed
served his own political ends by appealing to future constituents and setting the stage for his later bid for
the presidency (Gauri 1998; Mizala and Romaguera 2004).
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in 1988 (financiamiento compartido). This system allowed subsidized schools to charge stu-
dents fees to supplement the state subsidy, but the fees were capped at a relatively low
level and only allowed at subsidized schools. Aylwin enacted the RN’s proposal to expand
these copayments to public secondary schools (provided that they were “voluntary”), in-
crease dramatically the cap on the fees,20 and establish a system for discounting the subsidy
based on the level of the fees in such a way that copayments were encouraged (BCN 2014).
This change is a clear entrenchment of the neoliberal system and was accepted by the left in
exchange for support by the right on a renewal of value added taxes (Gauri 1998).
The Frei administration continued the focus on quality and equity of education started
under its predecessor, reflecting the move away from the neoliberal focus of the 1980s on
efficiency (Cox et al. 1997; Carnoy 2007). These priorities also contained a high degree of
ambiguity. On the one hand, Frei continued several targeted equity programs started under
Aylwin and moved the Chilean education system from half-day classes to a full-day sched-
ule. On the other hand, Frei moved forward with proposed changes to the teacher statute
immediately after taking office. These reforms had been abandoned (ostensibly postponed
until after the 1993 election) by Aylwin’s government because of intense opposition to them
by the left’s electoral base. Among the changes was a provision to allow municipalities to
move teachers between schools to match shifting student demand (Gauri 1998). Frei also
moved quickly on a major change to the teaching profession: the introduction of teacher
evaluations and performance-based pay through the 1995 National Teacher Evaluation Sys-
tem (SNED) (Cox and Lemaitre 1999). Its adoption was made possible by a simultaneous
increase in teacher salaries and other improvements to teaching conditions (Mizala and Ro-
maguera 2000). These evaluations would occur at the collective level — schools were awarded
a distinction for their performance, not individual teachers — and were based on a range of
metrics, not only test scores (Mizala and Romaguera 2004).
20New limits were increased to multiple times the value of the subsidy, although the subsidy was decreased
discounted based on value of the copayment.
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After being elected in 1999, Lagos released a document outlining his government’s pri-
orities. The document was subtitled “Growth with Equity” and its first two priorities were
economic growth and education (Lagos 1999). In the section on growth, the focus was placed
on the need for better workers — providing greater training and education to boost human
capital and allow Chile to (continue to) compete at the global level. It also outlined a plan
to increase technical education and move more students into those positions. Neverthe-
less, the Lagos administration began its education agenda with uncontroversial policies, like
those of its predecessors, continuing targeted programs and extending the number of years
of mandatory schooling (Weinstein 2017).
Despite this rhetoric and despite being more left than his predecessors, the biggest change
under Lagos was a slight shift to the right on merit pay, which introduced individual level
evaluations in 2002. The reforms passed because the new system was implemented on a
voluntary basis and because previous salary raises that demonstrated to the unions a good
faith interest by the government (Mizala and Schneider 2014). Still, these reforms capture
the ambiguity of the era. On the one hand, the left enacted policies clearly more in line with
a neoliberal agenda. On the other hand, they were in keeping with technocratic recommen-
dations (the Brunner report, discussed below, explicitly endorsed merit pay) and held the
promise of equitable enhancements to school quality.
Policy Legacies
The three Concertación administrations of Aylwin, Frei, and Lagos faced three common
policy legacies that limited their ability to adopt the left’s ideal education policies: the
perceived threat of another coup, the electoral system, and bureaucrats at the Ministry of
Education appointed under Pinochet.
Fear of another coup Fear of upsetting the right and provoking another military reaction
created guardrails within which the newly elected government had to stay. The Aylwin
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government faced the crucial task of convincing business elites and the military that the
center-left would continue to support the neoliberal economic policies they credited with the
sustained economic growth of the country (Giraldo 1997). In order to avoid direct compar-
isons with the high tension created during the Allende government, the first Concertación
government never referred to education changes as “reforms” (Bellei and Vanni 2015). They
also attempted to make any changes inclusive of all major stakeholders in education, non-
ideological, and flexible in the freedom they gave to local implementation (ibid.). Many of
the policies they pursued were focused on trying to recover what had been lost more than
advancing a new agenda (Weinstein 2017).
Anti-democratic electoral elements Changes to electoral rules put in place in the waning
days of the military regime created two obstacles to policy reform: the binomial electoral
system and “designated” senators.21 Under the binomial rules, electoral districts received
two seats, assigned based on plurality rules and going to the top two vote-winners. However,
a party or bloc could only win both seats in a district if it managed to win twice as many
votes as any other party (Nohlen 2005). The system heavily favored conservative parties
that had supported the military government (Carey 1999). Further, the addition of the
designated senators stacked the upper chamber of the legislature with right wing politicians.
The combination of these two electoral elements made winning a majority in both chambers
impossible for the left and limited its ability to pursue structural changes to the education
system that would have required bicameral legislative support.
Pinochet’s bureaucrats Finally, the government had to deal with the bureaucratic legacy
within the Ministry of Education. After 17 years of military rule, the Ministry of Education
was staffed with many who were interested in maintaining the status quo (Anonymous In-
terview 2 2017). Leadership positions in the ministry were appointed, but these lower-level
21The system also created “lifetime” senators, but only Pinochet and Frei ever received that title.
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bureaucrats had power to resist changes and delay implementation.
Stakeholder pressures
In the elections immediately following the return to democracy the Concertación formed a
diverse electoral coalition, contributing to its ambiguous position regarding education policy.
In order to appeal to a wide range of actors, the Concertación attempted to maintain a lack
of clarity of the government’s position on many of the crucial aspects of the system (Gauri
1998). Partly as a result, teachers (who played an important role in this coalition) and
students (who played a secondary role) were disappointed in the half-measures they were
given by the new democratic governments.
Above and beyond the historical connection between the left and the unions, the Con-
certación strengthened its bond with the teachers’ unions during their 1989 pro-democracy
“no” campaign. Communist teachers openly opposed the military regime during the 1980s
(Matamoros Fernández 2017) and the plebiscitary campaign was supported generally by the
labor unions (Drake and Valenzuela 1989). Gaining the support of the unions ensured vic-
tory against the military regime. In order to secure this support, the left promised to reverse
the fall in prestige and real pay that the teaching profession suffered under military rule.22
The center-left increased teacher salaries almost immediately after coming to power, but
was unable to match previous levels, adjusting for inflation, because of competing budgetary
demands. Further, many reforms that the unions sought relating to the teaching profession
were moved down the political agenda. The teachers began to demand the center-left and
left fulfill their end of the bargain and pay the “historical debt” owed them. The idea that
the teachers are owed a debt for the professional (and financial) degradation they suffered
under the military regime and the role they played in ending its tenure continues to be a
refrain in union and leftist politics (Bellei 2001).23
22There was little doubt that if Pinochet lost the plebiscite and respected the outcome, the left would have
an easy victory in the ensuing elections. This helps to explain the electoral changes and education policy
put in place by the departing military regime.
23This refrain continues to the present day. During the 2015 debate over a proposed teaching law, the
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The passage of the Teaching Statute under Aylwin was favored by the teachers’ unions,
but the Concertación governments strained this relationship in several ways in the coming
years. First, the Frei government walked back some of the labor protections afforded by the
new law only a year after it was passed (Gauri 1998). This triggered a strike in 1994 that
took months of negotiation to resolve. Eventually, the unions agreed to a modified version
of the proposal to allow municipalities to move teachers to match student enrollment.24
Students were also disappointed in the response they received from the new governments.
In 1992 university students called for tuition reforms, specifically for flexible tuition adjusted
to meet students’ ability to pay. The Concertación governments responded with legislation
to increase loans to low-income students and allowing the sales of this debt to private banks
(Palacios-Valladares and Ondetti 2018). Far from satisfying students, this move both en-
gendered student protests and entrenched the neoliberal system at the tertiary level further
(Palacios-Valladares 2017). In response to the increased dissatisfaction, the Aylwin admin-
istration increased scholarships for low-income students (Palacios-Valladares and Ondetti
2018). The protests decreased, but students remained dissatisfied with the response from a
government they had expected to be an ally.
Expert Advice
All three of the first Concertación governments relied heavily on technocratic advice in de-
signing their policies. Indeed, “the intensification of governmental actions in the education
field obeys the double proposal [of CEPAL and UNESCO] to raise levels of general pro-
ductivity…and fight against inequality and poverty, privileging education as the principal
mechanism of social integration” (Cox et al. 1995, p. 13). Aylwin’s government participated
in an important series of meetings with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
main teachers’ union called for an indefinite strike. They cited a call for “reparations to the affected for the
historical debt” as the second of five justifications for the strike (Moya, Vargas, and Machuca 2015).
24In the compromise municipalities could dismiss teachers if enrollment dropped sufficiently, but only
according to annual plans that included strict limits.
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America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (Cox et al. 1995). During Frei’s government, the
internal “Brunner commission” produced a crucial (and sharply critical) report on Chilean
education that shaped policy for years to come (Brunner et al. 1995). Equally, policy design
under Lagos was influenced by outside factors, including international technocratic input.
François Delannoy at the World Bank, in particular, played a crucial role in shaping policy
during the Lagos administration (interview with Weinstein 2017). As Delannoy (2000, p. 23)
writes, “the implementation of the government’s education change process over this period
benefited from a strong political commitment and a stable technical team.”
Of these influences, perhaps the most important was the “Brunner commission,” so named
for its chair. Frei called for “a National Commission for Educational Modernization, with
representatives of different sectors including, among others, the Teachers Union, business-
people, the Church and public and private school administrators” during the first year of the
his administration (Bellei and Vanni 2015, p. 184). Frei’s decision to include such a wide
range of actors, particularly the teachers, but also academics and actors of many “colores
políticos,” increased the likelihood that reforms based on their proposals would pass and be
implemented effectively (Weinstein 2017). The resulting commission produced a report that
acted as a guidebook for education proposals.
The Brunner report produced a range of recommendations. Some focused on non-partisan
and uncontroversial ideas — an extended school day, for example. Others, more closely
aligned with the right’s vision for education in Chile — further decentralization (staffing de-
cisions should be made at the school and not municipal level and subsidies should be paid to
schools directly to encourage increased performance) and teacher merit pay (Bellei and Vanni
2015; Gauri 1998). This latter point became the most controversial — and most surprising
— policy change during this period. Introducing teacher merit pay is a surprising policy
position for the left to take for two reasons. First, it is opposed by the teachers’ unions, a
key supporter of the left. Second, tying salaries to measurable performance more closely fits
with the ideas of competition and efficiency central to the neoliberal vision for education.
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The administration promoted the proposed legislation under the slogan “participation, qual-
ity, and equity” (Weinstein 2017), pointing to a strategy of framing the reforms in terms
acceptable to the left’s base. Nonetheless, the left pursued this policy because of the Brun-
ner commission’s report that more rapid advances in the quality of Chilean education were
limited by the quality of instruction (Comité Técnico n.d.; Bonifaz 2011; Weinstein 2006).
Addressing teacher quality seemed a pressing issue and linking teacher pay to performance
was a policy idea gaining traction in international circles at the time.
The policy calls by experts in the 1990s focused on quality and equity of education (Cox
et al. 1995). Chile had reached near universal enrollment at the primary and secondary lev-
els during the 1980s, but it was evident that the quality of this education was substandard
in many schools. In light of these recommendations and as a way to avoid conflicts with
the right, the Aylwin administration pursued less controversial policies focused on improv-
ing school quality, particularly in rural schools. Some of the targeted solutions included
the Primary Education Quality Improvement Program (MECE-Básico) and the 900 schools
program (P-900), both of which were designed and recommended by technocrats as a way
to enhance equity (García-Huidobro 2000).
MECE included a range of provisions to help improve the quality of schools, including
greater funding for textbooks and school libraries and an expansion of pre-primary educa-
tion. The program was funded partially through loans from the World Bank and lasted from
1992–1997. MECE was originally aimed at primary schools (MECE-Básico) and was accom-
panied by a sister program focused on rural schools (MECE-Rural) (Cox and Lemaitre 1999).
Later, a similar program for secondary schools (MECE-Media) was added under Frei (Cox
et al. 1995). Finally, the P-900 program identified the worst performing 10% of all Chilean
schools and provided a high degree of support to these institutions. Schools in the program
were offered pedagogical materials and technical assistance for implementing changes. The
program was largely considered to be a wild success (Delannoy 2000; Redondo, Descouvières,
and Rojas 2004; Waissbluth 2013). These programs are indicative of the center-left’s strategy
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during this period. Structural changes were not politically feasible, so instead they pursued
smaller programs aimed at addressing equity in ways unlikely to generate controversy.
5.3.4 Bachelet, 2006–2010: Student Protests Drive the Agenda
but Accomplish Little because of Political Constraints
• Copayment: Slight leftward shift. Allowed special education programs to participate
in copayments (2007); planned gradual replacement of the scholarship program with a
new subsidy to cover copayments for low income students (2008)
• Selection: Moderate leftward shift. LGE places some restrictions on using student
backgrounds for selection into primary schools (2009)
• University tuition: No change
• Vouchers: Slight leftward shift. SEP provides additional subsidy payment to schools
that education high percentages of low-income students (2008)
• Decentralization: No change
• Merit Pay: No change
• Teacher statute: No change
• Profit: No change
• Additional Projects: LGE replace LOCE as main education law (2009)
The most significant piece of policy to result from Bachelet’s first administration was
a replacement for the primary law governing the education system (the LOCE) passed on
the final day of the military regime. The decision to pursue education reforms at all was
driven by massive student protests in 2006. The new General Education Law of 2009 (LGE)
represented the first real attempt to weaken the market-based education system, although
it left the principle components in tact, including allowing subsidized schools to select stu-
dents, charge a tuition co-pay, and be incorporated as for-profit entities. Despite leaving
these structures in place, the agreement between left and right on the LGE represented a
fundamental shift in thinking about education. It was a tacit admission that the market
alone had not fulfilled its promises to create high quality, equitable education for all and
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opened the door to further, significant, changes in the future (Corvalán and García-Huidobro
2015).
Bachelet’s administration also passed legislation aimed at reducing social inequality with-
out changing the underlying market-based structure of the education system. The 2008
Preferential School Subvention Law (SEP) changed the calculations used for the voucher
payment to take into account the socioeconomic status of each student (Valenzuela and
Montecinos 2017). Schools that enrolled students from the bottom half of the economic
spectrum would receive an increased subsidy of up to 70% with an additional bonus for
enrolling large numbers of these students (ibid.).
Policy Priorities
Education was not a central plank in Bachelet’s platform during the 2005 presidential cam-
paign (Palacios-Valladares and Ondetti 2018). Debates on education were confined largely
to questions about pre-primary education. All candidates were in agreement over the im-
portance of this level and the need to support it, but differed in their motivations. Bachelet
voiced support for free pre-primary education in Chile as a way to combat inequality (Zúñiga
2005b). This stood in contrast to her opponents who, during a debate in July 2005, were
in agreement that pre-primary education should be accessible at no cost (at least for the
poorest 60% of Chileans) but explicitly expressed their interest in improving access to this
level of education as a strategy to boost economic growth (Zúñiga 2005a).
Just before Bachelet was sworn into office, Martín Zilic, the incoming Minister of Edu-
cation, reiterated the government’s position that education was crucial for continued devel-
opment in Chile while simultaneously signaling the left’s focus on equity by discussing the
importance of boosting education metrics in the lowest performing schools (Gómez 2006).
Still, there was little indication in these statements that education would be a policy priority.
Massive protests by secondary level students in 2006, known as the Revolución Pingüina,25
25The “Revolución Pingüina” (Penguin Revolution) takes its name from the typical Chilean student uni-
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forced education to the forefront of the government’s agenda. The protests began with the
relatively modest demands that students be given free passes for public transportation and
the fee eliminated for taking the national University Selection Examination (PSU). The stu-
dents escalated to a call for a complete rewrite of the LOCE after meetings with Michelle
Bachelet (Jaramillo 2006). These demands helped to move public debate toward a larger
discussion on equity in the education system and shortcomings with the neoliberal economic
model on which it was based (Amorós 2006). The focus on inequality was apparent to all
and fed into the feeling on the left that the time had come for larger changes in education
(interview with Zilic 2017). As one of the student leaders put it, “The Concertación’s great
debt, and they know it, is education. What they’re doing now is important, but it is [still]
lacking” (César Valenzuela as quoted in Pavez 2006).
As protests continued, the situation began to spiral out of control. Bachelet moved to
make changes in the Ministry of Education, replacing Martín Zilic with Yasna Provoste
as the Minister of Education, a nod to the stakeholders. Both had ties to the DC, but
whereas Zilic was a surgeon by training, Provoste was a teacher. Bachelet’s decision to
appoint a former teacher illustrates the shift in education priorities. Provoste’s background
in education signaled to both the unions and students that they would be given a greater seat
at the education policy table. The new minister adopted a new approach to the negotiations,
including making other changes on the negotiation team. One addition was Pilar Romaguera,
a technocrat with no illusions about the task at hand: “My job is to advance the dialogue
and return the conversations with the students to arrive at a positive result” (as quoted in
Zúñiga 2006). This contrasts Zilic, who argued that he had been chosen for the post to
address claims about the mismanagement of Mineduc (interview with Zilic 2017).
The student protests in 2006 ultimately led to the passage of the Ley General de Edu-
cación (LGE) in 2009 (Waissbluth 2013). The LGE laid the groundwork for future reforms
although it made few immediate changes to the system. In introducing the law to the
forms, which bear some resemblance to a penguin’s coloring.
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Congress, Bachelet noted that the education challenges facing the country were quality and
equity, but did not draw a direct connection between the market-based nature of the ed-
ucation system and inequalities that underlay the student demands (Bachelet 2007). The
resulting law reaffirmed the role of the state in education, expanded educational objectives
and made them more flexible, and incorporated pre-primary education (which had existed
previously, but was not defined by the LOCE) (Santos 2018).
Policy Legacies
By the time Bachelet was sworn into office, the policy legacies of the military regime had
weakened but they had not disappeared entirely. The passage of the LGE to replace the
LOCE is evidence of this shift. During the debate over the proposed law, Bachelet made
the first public references to an agenda to make fundamental changes to the system (El
Mercurio 2007f). Although the discussion was tepid at first, it marks an important point in
the story of Chilean education policy. These proposals (which included, among other things,
a call to end profit in education) would not become law during Bachelet’s first term, but
even broaching the topic led to strong civic debate and opposition by conservative sectors
of Chilean society. Some accused the administration of opening up an ideological battle and
ignoring the role that private education played in the development of Chilean education (El
Mercurio 2007c). That such a debate was possible indicates a shift in the strength of the
military’s policy legacies; that the suggestions were met with a forceful response indicates
that the neoliberal education system was still a legacy with which the left had to contend.
During the debate over the proposed education law, the Alianza voiced opposition to the
proposals because of a perceived lack of focus on quality (El Mercurio 2007a; El Mercurio
2007b). The coalition put forward its own proposal, titled, “Quality, equity, and liberty”
(Campusano and Dalgalarrando 2007). “Democracy” later replaced equity in the right’s
description of their priorities (El Mercurio 2007e). Both formulations display a high degree
of similarity to the education initiatives under the Lagos administration, providing further
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evidence that despite the Alianza’s opposition to the proposed law, there existed a significant
degree of convergence with the left.
Debate continued throughout the legislative session and an initial compromise between
left and right failed. Ultimately the legislation was salvaged after language was changed to
avoid objections raised by the private and subsidized school teachers (Ebner and Campusano
2007; El Mercurio 2008c). This final agreement between left and right that led to the LGE
represented a fundamental shift in thinking about education in Chile. Among other things,
it was an admission that competition alone had produced neither quality nor equity in
education (Bellei and Vanni 2015), one of the foundational claims of the logic behind this
system (Chubb and Moe 1990). This new law also marked a shift away from minimum
standards that schools must move toward more general standards describing educational
goals (Montt 2017). Thus, during Bachelet’s term the consensus between left and right
continued, but only after being shifted in the direction of the left’s preferred policies.
Stakeholder pressures
The greatest stakeholder pressures on the Bachelet administration came as a result of the
student protests. Despite the subsequent political careers of some of the movement’s leaders
and historical ties between students and the left, the Concertación did not have deep ties
with the student movement (Niedzwiecki and Pribble 2017). The weak relationship partially
explains the tepid initial response to the student protests and hesitation in including them in
negotiations over proposed education policy.26 However, the movement received widespread
public support, with surveys reporting support for the students near 70% (Gálvez 2006) and
Bachelet’s popularity falling from 65% to 44% (Adimark 2006b). This forced the government
to act. Yet a divided public also contributed to a limited degree of change in the resulting
26This weak relationship manifested itself again during the subsequent Piñera administration. The left
had a better relationship with students relative to the right, but as the opposition party in 2011, the left’s
coalition chose to exert only minimal pressure on the Piñera administration to make changes (Niedzwiecki
and Pribble 2017).
162
LGE. While a large majority (87% according to one survey) opposed the left’s proposal
entirely, similar numbers also supported the idea of ending profit in education and preferred
guaranteed education over “educational freedom” (75% and 88%, respectively), central points
in the right’s education vision (El Mercurio 2008a).
Students drove the issue of education to the top of the political agenda and have received
the most attention in the analysis of this event, but they were not the only participants in
the demonstrations. Parents and teachers also participated, further elevating the urgency of
the issue. In conjunction with student protests and meetings with Bachelet, the teachers’
union went on strike and members of the parents’ association threatened a hunger strike (La
Tercera 2006).
Teachers placed other pressures on the administration, ultimately forcing it to abandon
plans to revise the merit pay system. Some of the most vocal opposition came from teachers
at subsidized schools, who were concerned that new reforms may bring them under regula-
tions previously reserved for public school teachers. In particular, the Corporation of Private
Schools (Conacep)27 voiced opposition to the suggestion that teachers at subsidized schools
should be subject to a standard evaluation (El Mercurio 2006). Even though a majority of
teachers (as well as a majority of the general public) favored individual teacher evaluation
(El Mercurio 2008e; El Mercurio 2008b), the administration ultimately shelved these plans.
Business elites represented an interest that could not be ignored by the left during this
period, even if they were not part of its electoral strategy. The election promises to focus on
pre-primary education were partially aimed at pleasing this group, who had been increasingly
focusing on pre-primary education as a target for improving economic output in the future (El
Mercurio 2005b; El Mercurio 2005c). Student demands pushed this issue down the political
agenda, but the LGE included provisions to increase access to early childhood education in
keeping with these campaign promises.
27Conacep members include both fully private and subsidized schools.
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Expert advice
Bachelet signaled an interest in relying on experts at the start of her administration. The
appointment of Zilic as Minister of Education, for example, showed a focus on technocratic
administration. The continuation of expert advice was important for Chilean education
because Bachelet came into office in the wake of several reports evaluating education under
the Lagos administration that identified areas in need of improvement. Some argued that
the outcomes in education (and health) were lower than should be expected given the level
of investment (Vergara 2005). Others, including the Minister of Education Sergio Bitar,
claimed education quality had suffered after the period of expansionary access (El Mercurio
2005a). These positions drove the dialogue during the presidential elections and helped to
set what Bachelet had hoped would be her top education priorities.
Experts continued to push the importance of education for long-term reduction of poverty
during this time period as well, contributing further to the role that education would play
in Bachelet’s administration (Büchi 2005). Economists, business leaders, union officials, and
politicians on both left and right agreed that investment in education was absolutely critical
for the continued growth and development of the country (El Mercurio 2007d; El Mercurio
2008d; El Mercurio 2008f; Castañeda 2009). Bachelet followed the advice of these experts in
crafting the LGE, ultimately producing a moderate document that maintained the essential
structure of the neoliberal system.
5.3.5 Piñera, 2010–2014: Status Quo under the Right
• Copayment: Slight rightward shift. Schools must report number of students exempt
from the copayment and the resources dedicated to cover this gap (2011)
• Selection: No change
• University tuition: No change
• Vouchers: No change
• Decentralization: No change
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• Merit Pay: No change
• Teacher statute: Slight rightward shift. Added greater flexibility to teacher statute
(2011)
• Profit: No change
• Additional Projects: Program of professional development for school principals; new
scholarships for students studying to become teachers; ACE (2011); Superintendent of
Education (2011); Extension of compulsory schooling (2013)
Just as Bachelet was constrained in her first term, Piñera was also limited by the legacies
of the left. During the first Piñera administration there was neither fluctuation in policy nor
efforts to undo the Bachelet reforms. The center-right government found itself substantially
constrained by public opinion and reversing the newly enacted policies would require political
capital that the administration preferred to spend in other areas. In fact, the continuation
of policy was so striking that Alianza politicians were quoted as saying they expected that
the left should have no difficulties in voting with the right on any education legislation under
Piñera (El Mercurio 2010d). The administration came to office with a wide range of goals
for education. Partially as a result of this lack of focus, the administration accomplished
very few of its education goals.
The only major education legislation to come out of this administration resulted from
ideas originally proposed under Bachelet — a new bureaucracy in charge of education qual-
ity. The result, the Education Quality Assurance System (ACE) and Superintendent of
Education were created within the Ministry of Education and given real power for dealing
with failing schools. These additions enjoyed bipartisan support and are representative of
the consensus between left and right on equitable improvements to education quality.
Policy Priorities
Before taking office, Piñera laid out his administration’s priorities in a document focused on
the right’s vision for Chile: a society of opportunity, security, institutions, and values (Piñera
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2010, p. 8). The document portrayed a clear ideological commitment to market economics
and a (very) limited role for the government in reducing economic inequality. Yet it also
called for changes to education that were more in line with the left’s vision: enhanced access
and quality, particularly at the pre-primary and tertiary levels couched in the language of
equality. Nowhere in the document was there a proposal to roll back the reforms introduced
under the previous Concertación governments. Rather, it criticized these administrations for
spending the education budget poorly and proposed creating a new agency to ensure quality
education. The policy document demonstrated the right’s focus on growth, both generally
and in relation to education policy specifically, and the degree to which the left and right
had already converged in this area.
A little more than a year later, Piñera released a second document outlining in more detail
his administration’s plan for education. In it, he proposed an increase in spending on higher
education through more student loans, not through state expenditures, thus responding to an
OECD report (OECD 2010) that the Chilean government was spending too little on higher
education while maintaining a position acceptable to the right (El Mercurio 2011e). Piñera’s
education plan suggested that there were four challenges facing Chilean education: quality,
coverage, finance, and regulation (El Mercurio 2011g). It recommended strengthening the
teaching profession, increasing the subsidy for subsidized schools, ensuring quality of higher
education, ensuring “instructional freedom,” and removing low-performing municipal schools
from municipal control (ibid.). The document explicitly claimed that, “education is not
only a medium for achieving higher levels of knowledge, abilities, and productivity. But
it is also an end in an of itself, one that can facilitate individual achievement and talent
development” (El Mercurio 2011h). Nevertheless, the language overall follows the rhetoric
of student protests at the time so closely as to leave no doubt that it was written in response
to that movement, demonstrating the power of stakeholders to constrain the government.
In line with these documents, Piñera chose to focus on pre-primary education. The right
seized the opportunity to act because of the connection between education at this level and
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citizenship outcomes (such as reduced crime rates and fewer future encounters with police)
even though the national discussion about the importance of pre-primary education was
ongoing (interview with Zilic 2017).
The Piñera administration passed two laws aimed at increasing the quality of schooling
— a new Education Quality Assurance System (ACE) and a Superintendent of Education
(Elacqua 2015). These agencies were long-standing proposals and had undergone much of
their formation already under the previous Bachelet administration (Anonymous Interview 6
2017).28 ACE was introduced into the legislature with great controversy but was ultimately
passed, however, with bipartisan support (interview with Walker 2018).
The administration also proposed changes to the teacher evaluation system early in its
tenure (El Mercurio 2010a). However, the proposals were quickly withdrawn after strong op-
position from the teacher’s unions and focus was shifted toward improving teacher formation
(El Mercurio 2010b).
Partly as a result of having so many diverse goals for education policy, the Piñera ad-
ministration struggled to implement many of them and faced legislative challenges along
the way (El Mercurio 2011c). At the same time, the administration’s desire to link tax
reform (specifically an increased business tax levy) with education funding created signifi-
cant hurdles for passing either (El Mercurio 2012a). The combined effect of this strategy
was that even proposals that had generated a high degree of agreement in the past made
little progress. Creating a superintendent of education, for example, was introduced to the
legislature in November 2011 but did not advance beyond the first stage of the legislative
process for over a year (El Mercurio 2012c).
28An educational quality agency had existed under Allende, but its structure was vastly different than
what was proposed (and would be passed) in the 21st century. The modern proposal was first put forth by
Martín Zilic shortly before his exit from office. This proposal also differed from what was passed in that
it called for an agency that would evaluate, limit profit in schools, and be entirely isolated from politics
(interview with Zilic 2017).
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Policy Legacies
The right found that it was constrained by the new LGE passed in 2009 and attempted
to find ways to make this new policy work to its advantage. One aspect of the LGE was
the introduction of a guaranteed pre-school program, Chile crece contigo (Chile Grows With
You). The program grew very quickly at the start and while its pace slackened during the
Piñera administration, the right took no active steps to halt or eliminate the program entirely
(Niedzwiecki and Pribble 2017). Instead, it increased the compulsory years of schooling from
12 to 13, extending it with a year of kindergarten. The new law guaranteed a public option
for the additional year of schooling, but it did so at no additional financial cost because Chile
crece contigo already accomplished the same goal (ibid.). Extending mandatory schooling
thus acted for the right as an easy political victory at no cost. Long-term, however, this
change entrenched a new norm and further drove convergence with the left.
The left’s reforms related to teachers also limited the right’s policy scope. After the
nearly two decades of military control in which prestige and real pay fell for teachers, the
low quality of existing teachers and of those entering the profession was a well-documented
problem (Ávalos 1998). The new democratic governments sought to address this problem
through the SNED and subsequent teacher evaluations including efforts under Bachelet to
recruit high-quality teachers. The Piñera administration continued these efforts and even
added new initiatives including a scholarship program for highly qualified teaching candidates
(Ávalos 2015). The right pursued these policies for at least two reasons: the Ministry of
Education had already invested significant resources in this problem and inertia drove an
interest in continuing them and there existed evidence of the effectiveness of the programs
(Flotts 2011).
Stakeholder pressures
Pressure from general public opinion and members of the right’s constituency push it toward
convergence with the left in education policies. During the 2009 election, Piñera found he
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had to commit to maintaining existing public programs. Once in office, he had to negotiate
a deal with the left on pre-school education (El Mercurio 2011b). This compromise and
continuity approach played well with voters, who overwhelmingly (75%) approved of a grand
national agreement for education (Herrera 2011). During these negotiations and in selling
the proposals to the public, right of center politicians focused on the claim that the best
way to equalize opportunity was through education, particularly at the pre-primary level
(El Mercurio 2011f). This also appealed to the business elites who supported UDI (Roberts
2011) and had called for improved quality of education in order to provide a skilled workforce
(El Mercurio 2008f).
The right also found that stakeholder pressures pushed it toward including equity as
an explicit goal, at least in its rhetoric. Leading into the debate about the 2012 national
budget, two rogue RN senators proposed adding equity as a goal to be achieved through
education, among other policies (El Mercurio 2011i). This break from the party line pointed
to emerging battle lines for the 2014 presidential elections and a prescient reading of the
direction of public opinion and national debate.
Chilean political parties have long been criticized for being elitist. After repeatedly losing
elections after the return to democracy, the Chilean right pursued a new and unique electoral
strategy that involved sustained, direct contact with youth. They created opportunities for
students to become involved in the party in a pipeline system that would place them on
ballots as candidates at a young age (Luna 2010). The result of this strategy, pursued
largely by UDI, was a massive growth in party membership and greater electoral success.
In spite of this strategy, the Piñera administration did not offer a strong response to a
new wave of student protests that broke out in 2011. Students focused on a single (if large)
demand: free, high-quality public education for all. The movement included students not
only at public schools, but also high numbers from subsidized and fully private secondary
schools (UNICEF 2014). Unlike the previous student protests, this round was less centralized
and split between several coordinating organizations (ibid.). The movement first started with
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the modest goals of rebuilding schools damaged in a massive earthquake the previous year
and allowing students to ride public transportation free of cost year-round (as opposed to
only during the school year, a concession they won previously). It transformed its purpose
as university students joined (and then dominated) the movement (Palacios-Valladares and
Ondetti 2018).
In the face of these protests and plummeting public approval of the way the adminis-
tration was handling education, the government opened up a dialogue with the students.
These negotiations broke down, after months of frustration and a government crackdown on
an unapproved protest (UNICEF 2014). Public support for both the student demands and
the protest methods grew (the latter gaining majority support after the crackdown): “the
2011 education movement possessed, from the public’s opinion…a profound moral legitimacy”
(ibid., p. 17). At one point the movement registered 79% support in public opinion polls
(Adimark 2006a). As the conflict wore on, however, opinion shifted dramatically as to who
was “winning” the conflict away from the students and toward the government (UNICEF
2014). By the end of the administration the students had accomplished much less than they
had under Bachelet.
Expert advice
Piñera campaigned with the charge that the Concertación was “exhausted” and had come up
short in fulfilling its promises. He staked out a claim to technocratic solutions to problems
and worked to appeal to the center of the political spectrum (Siavelis 2014). After the
election he followed through on this promise by selecting technocrats to head his ministries
and followed recommendations from international assessments of Chilean education. Outside
experts pushed the Piñera administration toward both pre-primary and tertiary education.
Piñera’s second minister of education, Harald Bayer, was an economist who had served
on the Presidential Education Council in 2006 that had been created in response to the
student protests at the time. This combination of experiences gave him a level of expertise
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in education uncommon (at the time) for ministers of education in Chile. At times, it also
led him to diverge from the official party line on priorities, as in his 2012 claim that the
top educational priority was increasing equity so that family income would not determine
educational development through life (El Mercurio 2012b).29 Although these comments may
not reflect the overall position of the right, they are yet another example of how the decision
to employ experts in the educational policy area helps to drive convergence between left and
right.
Outside experts also encouraged a focus on the importance of pre-primary education (El
Mercurio 2010e). The press also pushed the administration toward this area. An El Mercurio
editorial writes, for example, “To create a society of opportunities — the current government
arrived at La Moneda with that promise — it must act in many areas, but education is the
fundamental one” (El Mercurio 2011d).
At the same time, the OECD released a report early in the Piñera administration that
lauded Chile’s growth in education, but noted that it still trailed behind its OECD peers,
particularly in spending on higher education (El Mercurio 2010c). More than the student
protests, this report pushed the Piñera administration toward a focus on higher education
funding. As noted above, Piñera proposed to address the problem not by increasing state
support for higher education, but by encouraging student loans, a position supported in the
conservative news media (e.g. El Mercurio 2011a).30
5.3.6 Bachelet, 2014–2018: Forcing Dramatic Change
• Copayment: Dramatic leftward shift. Complete elimination of copayments (2015)
• Selection: Dramatic leftward shift. Near complete elimination of student selection
practices (2015)
• University tuition: Dramatic leftward shift. Free tuition provided for lowest 50% of
29Bayer was eventually impeached for failing to address illegal profit practices at universities.
30Note that while he pushed for an increase in these loans, Piñera did not make any changes to their
administration or the rules surrounding them.
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income earners (2016)
• Vouchers: No change
• Decentralization: Dramatic leftward shift. Legislation to re-centralize the education
system (2015)
• Merit Pay: Slight rightward shift. Updated system moves toward more individual
assessment (2017)
• Teacher statute: Slight leftward shift. Replaced teacher statute with new law defin-
ing the teaching career (2017)
• Profit: Dramatic leftward shift. Elimination of for-profit subsidized schools (2015)
• Additional Projects:
In the wake of the 2011–2013 student protests and continued frustration by students,
Michelle Bachelet ran for president a second time, including in her platform the promise
of ending profit in education (Elacqua 2015). This marked the end of modest and incre-
mental education changes and the start off more aggressive and ideologically-based reforms.
Bureaucrats in Mineduc noted that the changes during Bachelet’s second administration
were characterized by ideological content and not technical analysis (Anonymous Interview
5 2017). The two biggest pieces of education legislation to be passed during this period were
the Social Inclusion Law (Ley de Inclusión) that ended copayments, selection, and profit
in subsidized schools and the re-centralization of the school system (desmunicipalización).
These laws were not only ideological, they were major breaks with the past and highly con-
tentious policies (interview with Weinstein 2017). Passage of the Social Inclusion Law was
not at all bipartisan, with the entire center-right and right bloc voting against it (interview
with Walker 2018).
Bachelet also oversaw the passage of a third significant but less ideological piece of legis-
lation: a law defining the teaching career and replacing most of the teaching statute. Parts
of the new teaching career legislation move in a direction more in line with the right’s policy
position, however. The law includes additional evaluation requirements, extending them
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to teachers at all schools that receive state funds (Carrera Docente (Chile) 2016). For the
first time since the return to democracy, the law defined a full teaching career (Ruffinelli
Vargas 2016). It set minimum requirements to study education at the university level, re-
quired all teachers to be accredited, and defined five “cycles” of the career (Eyzaguirre 2016).
Advancement within these cycles was based on individual level evaluations and came with
considerable pay increases (Veas Sánchez 2016). This law represented the result of years
of negotiations with the unions, who agreed to individual evaluations only in exchange for
real pay raises for all teachers and the connection between evaluations and career advance-
ment (Ruffinelli Vargas 2016). The law was intended to be implemented gradually to lessen
impacts on teachers nearing retirement (ibid.).
Policy Priorities
The 2014 presidential election cycle introduced equity enhancement as an early educational
priority (Franco, Contreras, and Saldivia 2012). During the campaigns, Bachelet proposed
re-centralizing control over primary and secondary education, removing much of the munic-
ipal authority in this area (El Mercurio 2013). In the wake of the 2011 student protests,
Bachelet also campaigned on the promise of free university education for the poorest 70% of
students by 2018 and free university for all by 2020 (Delisle and Bernasconi 2018).
Driven partly by the underlying political agenda of the more left-leaning parties in the
coalition and partly by increasing public frustration with unfulfilled promises, the left began
to make fundamental, divergent changes to the system. Centralizing the system, stripping
subsidized schools of their selective admissions practices, nominally ending profit in edu-
cation, and finding ways to guarantee fully free education for a larger percentage of the
population fundamentally undermine the market logic of the system. This new course was
the result of weakened policy legacies (with the passage of time the left finally felt that the
risk of a new military coup had subsided), stakeholder pressures (the promise of free univer-
sity education was partially responsible for Bachelet’s victory), and an intentional decision
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to ignore expert advice. Additionally, the left controlled the executive branch and held a
sizable majority in both legislative houses (partly due to constitutional changes).
Further, many of the student leaders from the protests assumed active political roles
with the left after graduation. Several of them (namely Giorgio Jackson, Camila Vallejo,
and Jaime Bellolio) were elected to political office as representatives (diputados) in the lower
chamber. Their place in the party helped to push the demands of students to the forefront
of the left’s political agenda. The election of these former student leaders to political office
did not spell the end of student protests, however. Instead, a new generation of students
made even greater demands of the incoming Bachelet administration. The newly elected
government insisted their goals in education were in line with the building consensus that
education was a tool to end both poverty and inequality, but the students shifted the debate,
arguing that education was only one piece of a larger puzzle (El Mercurio 2014d). They
insisted that the underlying market logic of the system was incompatible with the goals
of reducing inequality and demanded sweeping structural changes to address this problem
(El Mercurio 2014c). These demands pushed the administration to accelerate access to free
higher education (Said, Herrera, and Toro 2015).
The government’s first piece of education legislation took a fairly moderate position,
proposing the creation of a new minister to handle university closings in order to ensure that
students affected by the closings would be able to enroll in another institution (El Mercurio
2014g). After the initial modest proposal, however, the government introduced a series of
sweeping proposals that ignited strong debate from many sectors. These proposals, which
would become the “Social Inclusion Law,” included an end to many of the practices that
subsidized schools relied upon: profit, charging co-pays, and selection of students.31 The
proposals also called for changes to the teaching profession. Additional opposition came
from private schools, which felt excluded from a reform process that would affect them
31Schools had been allowed to set admissions criteria based on academic achievement, interviews with
parents, and religion (Carrasco et al. 2014).
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and demanded a seat at the table (El Mercurio 2014b). Equally, the right objected in
the legislature to both the nature and the specifics of the proposals (El Mercurio 2014a;
Valenzuela and Fernández 2014). Fears rose that the process had become political and that
the proposals, if enacted, would end up being decided in the courts instead of the legislative
arena (El Mercurio 2014f).
The government’s focus on higher education was criticized for taking away resources from
more pressing areas such as pre-primary education (El Mercurio 2016b; Margherita 2016)
and the focus on “systemic” issues as a distraction from other ways that the government
could help the neediest in the immediate term (El Mercurio 2016a). Even though Chilean
education had developed significantly by this point, it was still not at a level at which
funding for tertiary education had become progressive. Many Chilean students had to take
out significant loans to finance their higher education. But because of the low quality of
secondary education, they were only able to attend low-quality (often for-profit) universities
that produced graduates whose earnings potential did not justify the investment. Ultimately,
fiscal constraints forced Bachelet to scale down campaign promises and only provide free
tuition for the bottom half of students (Delisle and Bernasconi 2018). While this new policy
was mandatory for public universities, it was optional for private ones. Universities that
enroll students whose families meet the income requirements must waive tuition and be
reimbursed by the state at a fixed rate per student (similar to the subsidy system at lower
levels of Chilean education) (ibid.). This led universities to complain that the funding does
not reflect actual costs of education (Kershaw 2019) and some observers to speculate that
the result will be that low-income students are crowded out of the most selective institutions
(Bucarey 2018).
Policy Legacies
Even after the left won and held the presidency four consecutive times after the return to
democracy, the right’s education policy legacy was still firmly entrenched when the second
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Bachelet administration took office in 2012 with a left majority in both chambers of the
legislature.32 The left confronted three major policy legacies: inequality in the education
system, sustained partially by the rules allowing subsidized schools to select their students
and charge a co-pay, the overall market-based structure of the school system, and steadily
declining enrollment at public schools.33 The Bachelet government opted to address the first
two, even knowing that the likely result of the specific proposal would be a further exodus
of students from public into private schools (Toro 2014).
Bachelet’s intention to re-centralize the education system was in keeping with a long-
standing goal of the left. This goal was deferred until the second Bachelet administration
for political reasons. As with other policy choices, recentralizing the system would require a
legislative agreement between both left and right — one that the right was unlikely to accept.
At the same time, the left enjoyed some of the benefits of not having to administer directly all
of the country’s approximately 10,000 public schools (Gauri 1998). This freed up attention
and resources to pursue other goals. Only once the left had both a legislative majority and
had accomplished much of its education agenda did it move to recentralize the system. Even
then, the approach to centralization took a more limited form. Local and regional boards
were left in place (albeit in a modified role) and given some limited autonomy (Historia
de la Ley 21.040 2017). A return to the centralized system in place before the military
regime would have required the elimination of many jobs in the intermediate levels of the
bureaucracy (Anonymous Interview 6 2017). The political costs of eliminating all of these
positions was too high for the left (Anonymous Interview 4 2017). Thus the decentralized
policy legacy of the right placed another limit on the range of possible policy for the left.
32The left controlled the lower chamber immediately after the transition to democracy. They also won
a majority of seats in the senate, but with a slimmer margin, failed to win a majority due to non-elected
members (senadores asignados y senadores vitalicios) (Carey 1999).
33Note that not all observers blame these features of subsidized schools for persistent inequality in ed-
ucation, this is the claim of the left. Those on the right tend to place blame on either the government’s
continued support of poor-performing public schools or students (or families) themselves. Others on the
right accept that these factors may contribute to the problem, but claim that eliminating a profit motive
from education will not solve the problem.
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Two additional crucial legacies had changed since the first time Bachelet was elected.
First, the threat of a new military coup had subsided. Two decades of rule by the left had
demonstrated sufficiently a commitment to the neoliberal economic structures the right most
wanted to protect. From the perspective of the mass public, the memory of the military dic-
tatorship was fading (Palacios-Valladares and Ondetti 2018, p. 11) and from the perspective
of politicians on the left, the fear of Pinochet’s return had been replaced by a determination
that there would be no return to military rule (Ominami et al. 2010, p. 28). Second, the
passage of the LGE had generated at least a tacit agreement between right and left that
the market-based education system had failed some students and needed reforms (Bellei and
Vanni 2015). These changes opened the door for Bachelet to make more aggressive changes
to the education system.
Stakeholder pressures
Under Bachelet, the newly formed Nueva Mayoría coalition continued the Concertación’s
practice of including the teachers’ unions in debates over education proposals. Including the
unions in negotiations about the new law on the teaching career was essential for its passage.
Nevertheless, the dynamics of the relationship changed. Union strength had weakened, even
since the return to democracy, and fewer teachers were joining or participating (Anonymous
Interview 2 2017). At the same time, union members became disillusioned with the lead-
ership, which they felt was not taking a sufficiently aggressive stand against a government
with whom the union leaders were ideologically aligned (ibid.).
Changes to stakeholder pressures help to explain why the left pursued free university
education. Palacios-Valladares and Ondetti (2018) argue that the left’s embrace of this
policy was a result of changes within party elites due to the 2011 student protests — a more
leftist element felt empowered. This group had long existed with the left’s coalition, but
was forced to take a more limited role in the years after the return to democracy out of fear
of triggering another coup. By 2016 the political context had changed, however, and these
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more extreme actors could take an increasingly active role in the coalition. The changes to
the education law did not receive universal support within the majority coalition. As the
agenda became more ideologically motivated, the party divisions within the coalition became
more apparent — at the start of Bachelet’s second term, for example, not a single member
of the DC was appointed to a Mineduc position (interview with Walker 2018).
Although electoral shifts allowed this faction to rise to power within the left’s coalition,
they pushed forward reforms only by ignoring other stakeholders. During the debate over
the Social Inclusion Law, many voiced disapproval of the proposals. According to one poll
of teachers, principals, and school leaders, 78% expressed the opinion that ending selection
would not improve the quality of education (Herrera 2014).
In addition, new actors mobilized in mass political demonstrations. Specifically, orga-
nized groups of parents whose children attended subsidized schools marched against the
proposals. The parents were driven by fear that the elimination of the copay would force
subsidized schools to convert to entirely private institutions and thus the then-affordable
copay would become an unaffordable full tuition (El Mercurio 2014e). These protests did
not reach the level of others (the student protests, for example) and many other parents were
in favor of the proposed reforms. The protesters were joined by legislators from UDI (and
notably not the RN) (Guzmán 2014), suggesting an ideological perspective to the marches
that empowered the left to ignore these voices in large part.
Expert advice
While the previous Bachelet administration (as well as other Concertación governments)
relied heavily on expert advice in designing their education policies, the second Bachelet
government was criticized for not consulting experts. Edmundo Pérez Yoma, a Christian
Democrat who had served in cabinet positions under Frei and Bachelet claimed that, “we
[the Concertación] always achieved things that were well done, well studied, politically well
inspired and technically well implemented” but that the second Bachelet administration,
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“has been characterized by things half done or, frankly, badly done” (El Mercurio 2016c).
Equally, José Joaquin Brunner (former head of the “Brunner Commission”) claimed that
“The second...[anniversary of Bachelet’s inauguration] was marked by badly thought out,
designed, and implemented ideas, like free [university] education” (ibid.). The administra-
tion’s decision to willfully ignore expert opinion was necessary to achieve its ends because
many of the policies this group continued to recommend were much more moderate than
those sought by Bachelet.
A lack of expert opinion also contributed to the push for eliminating university tuition.
Bernasconi (2014) argues that a stable policy environment reduced the scope of academic
research within Chile to the point where the radical proposal of free tuition existed in a
vacuum of relevant studies. Those pushing the change were not completely blind to its
possible consequences, but knew much less than might be expected for such a massive change.
The Bachelet government followed expert advice (partially) in at least one respect: the
decision not to fully re-centralize. International education research points to the importance
of local inputs in addressing many education problems. The ability to tailor a solution to
a micro-level context increases the chances that it will succeed (Bellei 2018). The limited
scope of centralization thus accomplished a political goal and took into consideration expert
advice.
5.3.7 Piñera, 2018–Present: Uncertain Status Quo
Like his first term in office, Piñera is constrained by the legacies of the left and will be
unable to roll back the policies put into place under Bachelet and the left. He has been in
office for less than half of his elected term and it is still too early to draw conclusions about
the shape of education policy under his administration. However, there are signs that it will
be another period of status quo under the right. During his 2017 campaign, general electoral
pressure pushed Sebastian Piñera to commit to preserve the education policies put into place
under Bachelet, including the provision to expand free university education. According to the
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(then) head of the General Education Division, the new administration would not be able to
move backwards too much; the only real changes Piñera could make would be the enthusiasm
with which the government supports the new inclusion law (interview with García-Huidobro
2017).
This shift in policy position was entirely pragmatic, but it also reflected a deeper reality:
that the reforms undertaken by the left were viewed as legitimate (interview with Walker
2018). Not only did the general public view the reforms as legitimate, but party elites on
the right also had to concede the legitimacy of the process that produced them (ibid.).
In at least one area, however, Piñera has attempted to break the status quo and roll back
a Bachelet-era policy: a limited reintroduction of selective practices at top public schools.
He proposed that, starting in the 7th grade, schools should be allowed be allowed to use
scholastic achievement as a factor in admitting up to 30% of the student body (an increase
from the 15% allowed under Bachelet’s Social Inclusion Law) and to interview parents as
part of the admission process (Schüller Gamboa 2019). This proposal was rejected by the
lower chamber in the legislature, ending the right’s hopes to reverse the policy and forcing
convergence (Marín 2019).
Policy Priorities
After being elected but before taking office, Piñera’s education team made clear that there
would be no major backtracking on the education policies implemented under Bachelet. A
month after the election, his education coordinator publicly claimed, “From no point of
view are we proposing to take a wrecking ball to what the last administration did, but
rather to perfect a number of aspects that appear to us fundamental to improve education’s
functioning” (Cabello, Álvarez, and Valencia 2017).
In addition to campaign promises to leave central aspects of the Bachelet education legacy
in place, Piñera also made promises to improve the quality of school leadership if elected again
(interview with Weinstein 2017). School leadership was, at the time, an increasingly popular
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subject within the education discourse and one the right could support. By focusing on school
leaders (as opposed to teachers), the right avoided many of the hot-button controversies that
would be electoral losers. Yet if successful, school leadership reforms could be a venue for
introducing new market-based ideas into classrooms.
The education agenda of the Piñera administration ran into trouble quickly, with the
selection of Gerardo Varela, an outsider with no education experience as his pick for minister
of education. The Minister quickly developed a reputation for expressing impolitic opinions.
After doubling-down on a claim that school repairs should be paid for with local “bingo”
games (as opposed to state support alone), the minister was forced to resign (Reyes 2019).
Policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert advice
The aggressive student protests of 2006 and 2011 helped to generate the left’s legacy. Re-
sponding to these protests the first time brought education to the forefront of the political
agenda and forced the government to address student concerns before teacher concerns, as
originally planned. Both responses resulted in policies that the right realized it could not
touch without triggering a new round of social unrest.
The left’s promises to extend free education are not in line with the right’s ideal policy
position. Still, the popularity of these programs made them difficult to oppose. Reversing
these policies is a political non-starter for the right in the current political climate. Instead,
Piñera has indicated that he will attempt to use this legacy as an advantage by expanding
free access to technical education (Herrera 2018). This approach serves a dual purpose: by
not opposing free education, he avoids confrontation with the left; by focusing on technical
education, he can appeal to the economic focus of the right, since this kind of education has
direct and immediate impacts on the economy (Busso et al. 2017).
The process of re-centralization is another area with an uncertain future. The changes
created several unexpected challenges for the government. There remains uncertainty about
the consequences this will have for regional and provincial bureaucracies already in place.
181
Some speculate that the changes will actually result in new hiring and an increase in the size
of the bureaucracy because the changes will create redundant responsibilities (Anonymous
Interview 3 2017). Others argue that after such an extended period under the old system,
Mineduc’s greatest challenge will be to convince the public that they “are not a threat”
(Anonymous Interview 7 2017).
Electoral pressure in the 2017 elections pushed Piñera to vow support for the education
policies of the left. After the public became accustomed to the expanded pre-primary edu-
cation implemented by the left, a change of course became politically infeasible for the right,
despite the high likelihood of victory at the polls.
5.4 Conclusion
The Chilean case illustrates the political forces that drive education policy convergence
between left and right. Each democratic administration arrived with its own priorities, but
found that policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert opinion constrained their ac-
tions. The Chilean education system was set to move to an extreme left position under
socialist president Salvador Allende during the early 1970s. The coup and military regime
that followed, however, not only ended those plans but instead imposed an extreme right ed-
ucation system built on neoliberal economic principles of competition and efficiency. These
policies created legacies so strong that it took nearly 30 years of center-left and left admin-
istrations to overcome them. And even then, the resulting policies are, mostly, moderate
positions. Table 5.1 illustrates this visually: the Chilean system moves from a deep “red” to
a more “purple” outlook overall.
Under the first three Concertación governments from 1990–2006, the center-left exercised
restraint and largely maintained the status-quo. While structural changes related to access
and quality were not possible, policymakers pursued side projects that attempted to advance
equity through small targeted programs. This period exemplified ambiguity in their desired
education policy, with some minor changes appearing to undermine the market-based edu-
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cation system and others entrenching it further. The consequence was that by 2006, a high
degree of convergence had occurred, driven largely by the left moving toward the right.
Michelle Bachelet’s first administration represented the first major changes away from
this ambiguity and the status quo. However, the shift was largely externally driven, with
pressure from grassroots student protests contributing to a new education agenda more than
any other political factor. These protests shifted debate in Chile over education from a
discussion on incremental changes to improve quality to a deeper dialogue about economic
inequality and its connection to educational equity. The resulting policy, the LGE, did not
overturn the Pinochet-era system. But it did represent a consensus between left and right
on the failures of this system and it laid the groundwork for future changes.
Sebastian Piñera’s first administration was the first time the right had controlled the
presidency since the return to democracy, but his administration chose not to spend their
political capital on overturning the recently passed education policy. Throughout his cam-
paign and into the first years of his administration, Piñera’s rhetoric on education included
discussions of equity, reflecting a new political reality. At the same time, he implemented
policies on pre-primary education that were recommended by experts and embraced by both
left and right. His administration thus demonstrates a convergence in which the right moved
toward the left’s ideal policy point.
When Bachelet returned to office in 2016, the left moved quickly to make major changes
to the education system. With control of both the executive and legislative branches, a
decreased fear about inciting another coup due to the passage of time, and an empowered
extreme wing of the coalition, the left finally eliminated many of the structures of the market-
based system most often criticized for exacerbating social and economic inequality. This
moves some aspects of the education system into “blue” territory. Despite this, the current
Piñera administration is expected to maintain these policies. An early attempt to roll back
one of the reforms (by re-implementing selection in subsidized schools) was rebuffed in the
legislature, forcing convergence and sending a clear political signal.
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It is these most recent changes where the consensus between left and right begins to break
down in Chile. It is an illustration of the difference between convergence (the observed state
of identical policies under left and right) and conversion (a true shift in the underlying ideal
policy points). Although it supported old and at times even implemented new policies that
were much more in line with the right’s vision of education than its own, the left never fully
abandoned its underlying ideological beliefs about education. Once the political climate had
shifted sufficiently in its favor, the left moved to implement reforms that would move the




6.1 Left, Right, and Education
This project asked the question what effect does the partisan ideology of the executive
have on education outputs (total spending and distribution of spending) and outcomes (ac-
cess, quality, and equity) in Latin American democracies. Are there systematic differences
between left and right on how much is spend on education? On where that money is di-
rected? Or on whether it produces better outcomes under one end of the political spectrum
or another? I find that despite theoretical reasons to expect left and right to diverge and
previous findings of differences in the OECD, partisan ideology does very little to explain
differences in patterns of outputs or outcomes. I argue that this is the case because of en-
during policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert advice. I explore the case of Chile
in depth, where I show these forces at work. This chapter summarizes these findings and
explores their implications for policy and for a broader research agenda and concludes with
some thoughts on future work in this area.
Expectations of divergence There are several compelling theoretical and empirical reasons
to expect that the left and right will perform differently on metrics of education outputs and
outcomes. Political left and right are defined based on differing core beliefs about inequality
and the role of the state in addressing inequality (Bobbio 1996; Coppedge 1997; Luna and
Rovira Kaltwasser 2014). The left sees inequality as a problem that the state should intervene
to reduce, while the right is split between one camp that agrees that inequality is a problem
but does not believe the state should take an active role in reducing it and another that does
not view inequality as problematic at all (Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014; Wiesehomeier
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and Doyle 2014). Because education is so often touted as the solution for reducing both
poverty and inequality (The World Bank 2019; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004; Hanushek
and Wößmann 2007; Woessmann 2016), it is reasonable to expect that the left and right will
have different priorities in terms of education policy and that these policies will translate
into different outputs and outcomes.
To be precise, we should expect that the left, which is driven by concerns over equity
should spend more on education. Within the education budget, we should also expect
the left to devote a greater share to primary and secondary education because they are
more progressive in nature than is tertiary and to staff expenditures because of the left’s
deep historical ties with teachers’ unions (Murillo 2001), after controlling for the stage of
development of the education system. Previous studies in OECD countries have, in fact,
found that the left outspends the right on education (Iversen and Stephens 2008; Ansell
2010; Ansell 2008b; Rauh, Kirchner, and Kappe 2011). Other work notes the connection
between democracy and education spending (Brown and Hunter 2004; Brown and Hunter
1999; Stasavage 2005; Rudra 2005; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Wibbels 2006). The
combination of these findings with the power resource theory of Rueschemeyer, Huber, and
Stephens (1992) and Huber and Stephens (2001) in which left electoral presence generates
greater social spending reinforces this expectation. In terms of education quality, the left’s
concern for equality of outcome produces the expectation that it will outperform the right
on measures of education quality.
At the same time, there exist some reasons to expect the opposite: that the right may
perform on par with the left. Education is connected not only with equity enhancement, but
also macroeconomic growth (OECD/ECLAC/CAF 2016; Hanushek and Wößmann 2007)
and upward mobility at the individual level (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004), both of
which are in line with the right’s concern for growth. The right sometimes expresses support
for equality of opportunity, which leads to the expectation that it should perform better on
measures of educational access. In addition, some authors have questioned the relationship
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between the left and greater spending, finding instead that the right actually spends more
on tertiary education (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004; Ansell 2008b; Ansell and Samuels
2010; Rauh, Kirchner, and Kappe 2011) and a few authors find that there is no difference
between left and right in Latin America (Huber and Stephens 2012; Huber, Mustillo, and
Stephens 2008). Still, the bulk of the literature points to an expectation of divergence
between left and right on education outputs and outcomes.
Convergence on outputs and outcomes Despite expectations to the contrary, there exists
little difference between left and right on metrics of access or quality. The left slightly
outperforms the right on gender equity in dropout rates, but the substantive effect is very
small and there are no differences on other access or quality outcome metrics.
Chapter 2 presented findings on the convergence of education outputs between political
left and right. There are three primary takeaways from this chapter. First, party ideology
does not predict overall levels of education spending in Latin America. There is no evidence
that either the left or the right on the whole devotes greater shares of the government budget
to education policy. Where variation in spending occurs, partisan ideology cannot explain
it. Second, the left tends to spend more on secondary education than do other parts of the
political spectrum. The differences, however, are small in substantive terms — an average
regime change produces a shift of only 0.56% and average shifts to left and right produce,
respectively, 1.76% and -1.78% changes. Finally, looking at spending by area, I hypothesized
that the left would devote greater shares of the education budget to staff salaries because of
the connection between the left and teachers’ unions. I find that while the left does not spend
more on staff salaries, the right spends slightly more on capital expenses. Again, however,
the effect size is substantively small — an average rightward change in administration would
produce only a 2.04% increase in capital expenditures as a share of the entire education
budget.
Similarly, Chapter 3 presented findings on the convergence of education outcomes between
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political left and right. On measures of completion rates, repetition rates, dropout rates,
and transition rates, there is no meaningful difference between left and right governments.
Equally, on test scores, the best of poor alternatives for measuring true education quality,
the political left and right perform at approximately the same levels. There is some evidence
that students perform slightly better under right governments, as measured by PISA test
scores. However, the substantive effect is very small — in order to produce a single standard
deviation change, partisan ideology would have to swing from one extreme of the political
spectrum to the other and that change would have to persist for 15 years. Swings that
extreme are never observed empirically.
Explaining unexpected convergence Given these unexpected patterns, what can explain this
convergence? Chapter 4 provides an alternative theory of the political forces that push left
and right to similar policy positions and thus to similar outputs and outcomes. I argue that
while policy preferences remain distinct between left and right (the left is focused on equity
and the right on growth), three political factors are dominant and result in convergence: pol-
icy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert advice. My argument resembles that of Heclo
(1978), who finds that bureaucratic and technocratic factors drive policy in the American
context. Note that convergence — the observed condition of identical policies under left
and right — is not the same as conversion — a shift in the underlying ideal policy positions
for a party. Although the two conditions are observationally equivalent, the distinction is
important because it can help to explain when parties will break from these patterns.
Policy legacies create barriers to changes through bureaucratic inertia, creation of polit-
ical costs, and limitation of the potential policy space. Legacies affect both left and right
parties and push them toward convergence on education policy. Some bureaucracies are
designed to resist changes in policy (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Moe 1991; De
Figueiredo 2002); all are subject to the logic of path dependence (Pierson 2000) where change
occurs only at critical junctures (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Collier and Collier 2002; Levi 1997;
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North 1990). Policies become more entrenched over time as procedures and routinization
contribute to positive feedback mechanisms (Arthur 1994). The longer a policy has been in
place, the more difficult it becomes to change it (ibid.).
Overcoming policy legacies can incur political costs. Politicians tend to be most eager
to pursue “flashy” education policies that do not work (Tarschys 2003) or successful policies
that are less cost-effective (Busso et al. 2017). Foregoing these types of policies incurs
an opportunity cost in terms of the political recognition that can be gained from them.
Similarly, there is a political cost associated with many structural reforms in Latin America,
where patronage jobs in the civil service (Grindle 1977; Gordin 2002; Dargent 2015) and
non-programmatic distribution of education funds (Ames 2001; Brunner et al. 1995; Luna
and Mardones 2016) continue to be a problem.
Policy legacies also generate practical constraints. Changes in policy may require massive
investments of time or capital. Investing in either of these incurs an opportunity cost to
politicians who may prefer to allocate their resources to other policy areas. Limitations on
state capacity can also create a barrier to education policy reforms by restricting the policies
that can be implemented successfully (Besley and Persson 2014). Finally, natural cognitive
processes may limit the scope of alternatives considered by policymakers and generate a
preference for the status quo (Prahalad 2004; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).
Both left and right also experience electoral pressures from a situation in which changes
to policy are likely to extract (significant) short-term costs while returning only long-term
benefits and general public opinion on education. Education policy incurs short-term costs
in terms of capital. Education funding must compete with every other aspect of the gov-
ernment budget (Wildavsky 1986), including non-discretionary elements that reduce total
funds available for social programs. Latin American states also continue to struggle with
raising revenue through taxation (Gavin and Perotti 1997; Goñi, López, and Servén 2011;
Shome 1999; Tanzi 2000), further limiting possible funding.
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Education policy can also incur short-term political costs exacted by education stake-
holders opposed to reforms. Organized political actors, particularly the teachers’ unions and
business elites create political pressures for parties on both left and right, although each
typically aligns with only one of these groups. Teachers’ unions exist to support the labor
conditions of their members (Moe and Wiborg 2017a) and can use disruptive tactics to op-
pose policies they view as opposed to their interests. Although the unions tend to be aligned
with the left, they hold enough political power that neither side of the political spectrum can
ignore them. Business elites also have a vested interested in education, as they rely on the
education system to produce skilled labor and allow continued growth (Moe 2017a). As an
actor, business elites are diverse and do not always coordinate on policy related to education
(Schneider 2004; Moe 2017b). When they do, however, they are also sufficiently powerful
that neither left nor right (the traditional partner of the business community) can afford to
ignore them.
Finally, expert opinion contributes to convergence between left and right. Technocratic
experts, both domestic and international, recommend identical policies regardless of the
ideological identify of the party in power (Domínguez 1997). The neoliberal right had a
monopoly on reliance on technocratic experts (Dargent 2012; Luna and Kaltwasser 2014),
but over the past thirty years, both left and right have increasingly relied on these experts to
craft their education policy (Dargent 2015), resulting in similar policies being enacted under
all administrations.
Expert advice on access-related policies tends to be very consistent — creating education
opportunities and reducing barriers to entry (Wolff, Schiefelbein, and Valenzuela 1994) and
improving quality so that students view the benefits of education to outweigh its costs
(The World Bank 1995; Busso et al. 2017). Advice on quality-related policies, however,
varies to a greater degree. During the 1990s and early 2000s, international organizations
pushed for increased accountability (through standardized testing and merit pay for teachers)
(PREAL Advisory Board 2005) along with greater decentralization to allow local officials and
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schools flexibility in designing solutions (Board 2001). In recent years, however, experts have
admitted that there remains great uncertainty as to which policies are most effective in which
situations due to a lack of systematic, high-quality evidence (Busso et al. 2017). Nevertheless,
expert-recommended policies fluctuate less than politically-motivated ones and the increasing
reliance on these actors for policy recommendations contributes to convergence.
Process tracing Chile, a case of least likely convergence I test this explanation with a case
study of Chile. Chile is an extreme case in that an ideologically distinct left and right have
long held very different positions on education. It is also extreme in the extent to which
education is salient to the voting public. If ideology does not matter for education outputs
and outcomes here, then it is unlikely to matter anywhere. First, I find that, both outputs
and outcomes have converged under left and right in Chilean democracy. Chile performs
well on many metrics of education outputs. Enrollment, transition, and completion rates are
high and dropout and repetition rates are fairly low. In terms of quality, Chile scores high
in comparison to other Latin American countries, but low compared to the OECD. Further,
there exists persistent inequalities in education outcomes, particularly along rural/urban
and socioeconomic lines. Second, I find supporting evidence for the alternative theory that a
combination of policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert opinion are responsible for
driving this convergence. The Chilean left experienced great limitations in policymaking due
to the legacies left by the military government that ruled from 1973–1990. Both left and right
in democracy also found that stakeholder pressures drove the education policy discussion
while technocrats produced policy recommendations that resisted ideological changes. The
collective result of these pressures is that the Chilean education gradually transformed from
a far-right neoliberal system to a moderate compromise system. Some exceptions to this
trend exist. For example, the left implemented a system of merit pay for teachers more in
line with neoliberal preferences than its own. During its most recent time in power the left
also made a concerted push to roll back military-era policies related to subsidized schools.
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Under the first three Concertación governments of Patricio Aylwin (1990–1994), Eduardo
Frei (1994–2000), and Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006), the left exercised restraint and largely
maintained the status-quo. This period exemplified ambiguity in the left’s desired education
policy, with some minor changes appearing to undermine the market-based education sys-
tem and others entrenching it further. Michelle Bachelet’s first administration (2006–2010)
represented the first major changes away from this ambiguity and the status quo. However,
the shift was largely externally driven by pressure from grassroots student protests, which
were strong enough to disrupt the status quo and push change forward. Sebastian Piñera’s
(2010–2014) first administration was the first time the right had controlled the presidency
since the return to democracy, but his administration chose not to spend their political
capital on overturning the recently passed education policy. Throughout his campaign and
into the first years of his administration, Piñera’s rhetoric on education included discussions
of equity, reflecting a new political reality. At the same time, he implemented policies on
pre-primary education that were recommended by experts and embraced by both left and
right. When Bachelet returned to office (2014–2018), the left moved quickly to make major
changes to the education system, attempting to have policy priorities overpower convergent
forces. This was made possible by weakened policy legacies, a shift in stakeholder pressures,
and an intentional decision to ignore expert advice.
It is these most recent changes where the consensus between left and right begins to break
down in Chile. It is an illustration of the difference between convergence and conversion.
Although they supported old and at times even implemented new policies that were much
more in line with the right’s vision of education than their own, the left never fully abandoned
its underlying ideological beliefs about education. Once the political climate had shifted
sufficiently in its favor, the left acted to implement reforms that would move the system
in that direction. Sebastian Piñera was elected for a second term in 2018 and has thus far
accepted the status quo in most cases. He introduced legislation to roll back the limitations
on selection in subsidized schools, but was rebuffed in the legislature.
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6.2 Policy Recommendations
In a bleak assessment of education politics in Latin America Puryear (1997) writes,
One of the problems with the debate on education policy in Latin America is that
it emphasizes technical problems and ignores politics. The plain fact is that the
political problems are much more difficult to resolve…At least three problems de-
serve mention. First, traditional education systems have created vested interests
that are difficult to confront. Large and centralized ministries are jealous of their
power and jobs. Teachers’ unions, powerful and well-organized…often overpower
ministers of education, who may hold office for a year or less. Politicians have
opposed reform because they might lose control over decisions on education jobs
and investment (often an important source of patronage)…Second, governments
traditionally have not given education the necessary political priority…[F]ew have
been willing to invest their political capital in education reform…Third, civil so-
ciety — the consumer of education — has not played a serious role in education
policy. Middle and upper class families generally send their children to private
schools, and do not experience directly the deficiencies of public education. When
they use the public system — for higher education — they tend only to defend
public subsidies for that sector.
This project largely confirms these same factors drive convergence between left and right
on education policy. But my findings also point to some reasons for optimism on each of
Puryear’s three criticisms.
Vested interests are difficult to confront This project confirms entirely Puryear’s claim that
entrenched vested interests are an obstacle to education reforms. Teachers’ unions, business
elites, and bureaucrats themselves all can contribute to policy stasis. That both left and
right are subject to these forces points to the need for bipartisan efforts to overcome them.
Thus the first policy lesson to come from this project is that bipartisan (and nonpartisan)
reforms present the best option for continuing to improve education in Latin America.
The likelihood of policy convergence should serve as an impetus for politicians to bridge
ideological divides and work with their opponents on education agendas. As described above,
the short-term costs and long-term benefits of education policy are a major obstacle to
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any kind of serious reform. Bipartisan efforts can overcome this problem by reducing the
immediate costs as well as the risk that later benefits may accrue to one’s political opponent.
Second, to improve the quality of education, improve the quality of governance. Specifi-
cally, any efforts to reduce patronage jobs and clientelist use of education funds will create
opportunities to use those resources in more productive ways. The move toward greater
reliance on technocrats by both left and right is an important step in this process, but it
is by no means sufficient. Further efforts to enhance democracy and move away from non-
programmatic politics may yield dividends in policy areas (like education) that are not the
direct targets of such efforts.
Third, including vested stakeholders in policy design can diminish the likelihood they
will oppose changes. The Chilean case illustrates this benefit through the iterated and
incremental negotiations with the teachers’ unions. The left’s long-term strategy of providing
the teachers’ unions with much of what they wanted (salary increases and a labor law with
increased protections) eventually allowed it to implement a system of teacher evaluations
and merit pay. This project thus echoes the policy recommendations from Grindle (2004)
that the unions be included in the policymaking process from an early stage.
Including teachers in the policymaking process can have an additional benefit. Successful
policy requires more than good ideas — it needs a pathway to successful implementation.
Bureaucrats and teachers can be potential obstacles to this implementation. Both groups
may oppose reforms that they view as confusing, counter-productive, or opposed to their
interests (see Golden (2000) on bureaucrats and Payne (2008) and Hess (1999) on teachers).
Where I differ from Puryear is in the solution to this problem. He argues that increased
accountability and a strengthened teaching profession are the correct response (Puryear
1997). My project does not speak to whether these are good recommendations. Instead, it
suggests that enthusiastic supporters of a new policy within bureaucracies as well as “on the
ground” in schools can facilitate the adoption of new policy. Understanding the legacies in
place that might push bureaucrats or teachers toward resistance is crucial for moving instead
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toward support. If policymakers can secure the support of these actors, then they can also
establish new paths whose positive feedback will generate increasing returns to education.
Including teachers in the policymaking process can increase the probability they will be
receptive to implementing the policy at the classroom level.
In weighing the significance of policy legacies in the creation of new policies, this project
speaks to the importance of institutions. Given the power of legacies in shaping the course
of future policy, legislators should be cognizant of the fact that their policies, if successfully
implemented, are likely to be enduring. “Critical junctures” are not misnamed. “Getting it
right” at these points is crucial for the development of the education system. In this way,
policy legacies can be made to work in favor of stronger education policy. Thus a fourth
recommendation is to invest in research that produces institutional plans that will generate
desirable positive feedback. Chile acts here as a potential cautionary tale — the left moved
ahead with its plans to provide free university education even in the absence of solid research
into its effects (Bernasconi 2014). Although it is too early to be certain, there are already
indications that the policy may have a variety of negative unintended consequences including
crowding out low-income students at the most selective institutions (Kershaw 2019; Bucarey
2018).
Education is not a high political priority To Puryear’s claim that education needs to be
made an even higher political priority, this project offers the additional concern that there
are significant hurdles to education reforms even if politicians make it a priority. While
prioritization is important, it is not sufficient. The case of Chile speaks to this issue in
several ways. The center-left Concertación governments that came to power after the return
to democracy made education an explicit priority. Yet they were still constrained significantly
in the type and scope of reforms that were possible. They opted for small programs aimed at
enhancing equity by targeting the lowest performing schools. This strategy produced positive
results. In this sense, Chile can offer both hope and a potential policy recommendation.
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Faced with seemingly insurmountable constraints imposed by policy legacies, politicians can
nonetheless pursue targeted projects whose smaller budgets and limited scope make them
unlikely to face resistance.
The positive feedback loops that policy generates makes these smaller programs even
more important. Increasing quality education provision will generate demand for ever greater
levels and constrain politicians who cannot reduce this provision. Successful targeted pro-
grams can lead to increased expectations and public demands that force convergence on
greater education provision. In this sense, the effect of policy legacies can be a positive
force for improving education systems. Policy legacies can tie the hands of politicians. If
the legacies in place provide positive outcomes for students, then these limitations can be a
positive for society. Again, the Chilean case provides just such an example. The increased
provision of pre-primary education (which is essential for long-term equity enhancement)
under Bachelet created in only a couple of years a legacy that Piñera was bound to respect
after taking office.
Civil society has not played a significant role in policy Puryear’s third claim is that civil
society has not contributed to education policy in positive ways. Again, this project offers
some insight into the obstacles that exist for greater contributions from actors in civil society.
Collective action problems by parents and students, along with a frequent disinterest from
business elites combines to make education a lower political priority. Here again, though,
Chile offers some hope. The student protests in 2006 drove the education debate in significant
ways. Without these events, it is unlikely that the Concertación would have pursued the
LGE, which opened the door to further changes to the system. Equally, the 2011 student
protests eventually resulted in the provision of free university tuition to over half of all
Chilean students. The consequences of this change remain to be seen, but the policy lesson
is clear: in democracy, demands from citizens can produce meaningful policy change.
Education advocates — both citizens and politicians — can take from this study the
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lesson of the importance of stakeholders on education policy reforms. Given the pressures
stakeholders can place on legislators and the role that these pressures play in driving policy
convergence, organizers and advocates can leverage this power to drive a reform agenda.
This does not provide a clear roadmap for how these groups could overcome their collective
action problems, but the Chilean students may provide at least a couple of clues for applying
pressure once organized: specific, focused demands are more likely to yield specific, focused
policy and maintaining support in public opinion is essential for convincing politicians they
must make education a priority.
Equally, from the perspective of reform-minded politicians, leveraging public opinion
in support of desired policies can create pressures for one’s own party and the opposition.
Strategies to drive the dialog and encourage public support can help to overcome pressures
from either teachers’ unions or business elites and legislative inertia. The Chilean case is one
of organic protests — they originated from the bottom-up — but savvy politicians can drive
the dialogue themselves in a top-down approach. Shifting opinion to focus on education
generally or in favor of a specific policy can shift dramatically the dialogue on education
policy and help to advance a policy agenda.
6.3 Broader Implications
Beyond policy, this project contributes to a number of existing bodies of work related to
Latin America, politics, and education. It speaks most directly to the growing literature on
the politics of education, but it also speaks to work on parties in Latin America, education
policy and development, and Chilean politics. Finally, although this project focused on Latin
America, its lessons may extend to the context of the United States.
The politics of education This study heeds the call of Clark (1986), Busemeyer and Tram-
pusch (2011), and Gift and Wibbels (2014) and attempts to add to our understanding of the
politics of education. There exists some research on the political determinants of education
spending. Iversen and Stephens (2008), Ansell (2010), Garrett (1998), and Iversen and Wren
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(1998) find that the left spends more than the right on certain areas in the OECD. Many
others (Brown and Hunter 2004; Brown and Hunter 1999; Stasavage 2005; Rudra 2005; Kauf-
man and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Wibbels 2006; Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Hecock
2006) find that democratic governments tend to spend more on education than authoritarian
governments. This study contributes to this literature. While it does not contradict any of
the findings of these studies directly, it does suggest that in the high-inequality and less de-
veloped setting of Latin America, the relationships between partisan ideology and education
outputs operates in different ways from in the OECD. My counter-intuitive findings that
there is little relationship between partisan ideology and education outputs contrasts work
in the OECD, but confirms findings by Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008), Huber and
Stephens (2012), and Garritzmann and Seng (2016).
This project also extends the literature in an important new direction: studying the
connection between partisan ideology and education outcomes. There exist many studies
that look at the relationship between partisan ideology and what is taught in schools (Kelly-
Woessner and Woessner 2008; Niemi and Niemi 2007), how it is taught (Runhare and Mu-
virimi 2017; Journell 2010), and the overall structure of the education system (DeBray 2006;
Busemeyer 2014). Yet, to the best of my knowledge, there exists no other study that asks
whether partisan ideology affects the degree to which students enroll in and complete school-
ing and whether they learn anything while they are there. Connecting partisan ideology with
education outcomes is a novel contribution. Given that left and right pursue different poli-
cies in so many other areas, the penumbra in the literature is surprising. Whether public
policy produces meaningful results for citizens is an important question for the quality of
governance. The finding that left and right are performing equally well (or equally poorly,
as the case is for education quality in Latin America) deserves greater attention in future
research.
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Parties in Latin America Previous work on Latin America has established a connection
between partisan ideology and a variety of policy outcomes: market reforms (Gibson 1997;
Murillo 2009); tax revenue (Hart 2010); regulatory regimes (Murillo 2009); privatization
(Doyle 2012); social policy (Madrid, Hunter, and Weyland 2010); and education system
decentralization (Murillo 1999). Murillo’s findings in particular contribute to the expectation
that left and right should diverge on education policy and makes it all the more surprising
that I find convergence in this area. This study does not negate any of these previous
findings, but rather extends our knowledge of the conditions under which partisan ideology
will and will not matter for policy creation. A null finding here seems to confirm the claim
by Wilensky (1975, p. 3) that “education is special” and should be incorporated into our
understanding of partisan politics in the region.
This study also contributes to a broad literature on the left and right in Latin America.
Ameringer (1992), Ames (1995), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Coppedge (1997), Luna
and Zechmeister (2005), Mainwaring and Torcal (2006), and Mainwaring (2016) all offer
important insight into the party systems across the region. Equally, volumes on the left
(Levitsky and Roberts 2011b; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010) and right (Luna and
Kaltwasser 2014) in Latin America provide a valuable assessment of the evolution and status
of left and right as well as sketching out an outline for future research on this topic. This
study contributes greater nuance to our understanding on a policy area in which the two
sides of the political spectrum have converged. This happens despite strong expectations
that they should not, given that views on inequality are the foundational difference between
left and right (Bobbio 1996; Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014) and education is viewed as
crucial for enhancing equity (The World Bank 1995).
Education policy and development The project does not focus on the specifics of education
policy. It does not ask which policies are most effective or the conditions under which
certain policies are most likely to succeed. A rich literature on education policy already
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exists for this purpose (see, e.g., The World Bank 2018; Busso et al. 2017; Bassi et al.
2012; OECD/ECLAC/CAF 2016). Yet this project can contribute to the education policy
and development literature. The finding of convergence and exploration of the factors that
produce it are important to understand for those seeking to promote any specific education
policies. This project also contributes to an understanding of the barriers (and potential
catalysts) to successful implementation of education policy.
The Chilean case also speaks very directly to international education policy debates. The
neoliberal system put in place under the military regime implemented many of the policies
that were included in both the finance-driven and competitiveness-driven recommendations
from international experts. Despite having left these structures in place for decades, Chilean
education continues to lag behind its OECD peers and has yet to resolve entrenched inequal-
ities. Chile is a cautionary tale in that whatever merits these recommendations may have,
they are not sufficient to lift students across the region to competitive world levels.
At the same time, Chile also speaks to implementation strategies for these same policies.
Whereas decentralization and privatization were implemented unilaterally under the mili-
tary regime, merit pay was introduced gradually not only under democracy, but under left
administrations. Further, this policy was accepted by the teachers’ unions and ultimately
embraced by many rank-and-file teachers, due to the gradual, negotiated approach by the
government. This is not a novel finding, but this study does reinforce the arguments by
Grindle (2004) and others that such a strategy can create space for surprising reforms.
Chilean education and politics Education in Chile has received significant attention from
researchers. Looking at primary and secondary education, García-Huidobro (2000), Cox and
Lemaitre (1999), Bellei (2001), Niedzwiecki and Pribble (2017), Redondo, Descouvières, and
Rojas (2004), Gauri (1998), and Torche (2005) all provide valuable contributions assessing
the content and effects of Chilean education policies. Similarly, Farrell (1986) looks at the
role that education played in the military coup and Matamoros Fernández (2017) considers
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the role of education during the military regime. Other researchers have examined in great
detail the student protests (primarily) of 2006 and 2011 (Palacios-Valladares 2017; Palacios-
Valladares and Ondetti 2018; Disi 2018; UNICEF 2014). The Chilean political system has
also received significant attention. Studies on Chilean parties and party politics (Siavelis
2014; Carey 1999; Nohlen 2005; Luna 2018) built a substantial base of knowledge in this
area. This project extends the knowledge from these two large bodies of work combining
the political and education aspects. It also takes advantage of the longer historical view
provided by an additional two decades of democratic rule to build on the excellent studies
of the 1990s.
Where previous studies had only leftist governments to study, the alternation in power
since 2010 opened the possibility of exploring these questions in a fuller context. Specifically,
I am able to look at the effect of legacies of the left on right governments. Where previous
studies could see only the left working within a framework created by the right, a study
published in 2019 can generate a more complete picture of convergence between the two
ends of the political spectrum.
Beyond Latin America This study has focused on Latin America generally and Chile in
particular. Its findings may be relevant for the study of the politics of education in the
United States as well, however. Recent publications have noted that similarities between
the higher education systems of the United States and Chile make it a better point of
comparison for questions about higher education funding than European countries (Delisle
and Bernasconi 2018). Both systems rely heavily on private provision of education that is
financed by student debt, rather than the state. Other similarities contribute to the belief
that Chile could serve as an instructive lesson for the United States. First, the United
States also underperforms in education relative to its levels of development and investment
in education (OECD 2017). Second, there is an increasing partisan divide on all policy areas,
including education (the Common Core curriculum (Henderson and West 2015) or higher
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education (Doherty and Kiley 2019), for example). Third, the debate in the United States
over education, particularly higher education, has become intimately tied with concerns over
increasing and persistent inequalities (Fain 2019). With these commonalities, the lessons
contained within this project on the political forces that limit policymakers’ ability to reform
education may also be relevant in the context of the United States.
6.4 Future Research and Concluding Remarks
This project has contributed to questions about the relationship between partisan ideol-
ogy of the executive and education outputs and outcomes. It focused narrowly on spending,
enrollment, completion, transition, repetition, and dropout rates as measures of access and
test scores as a measure of quality while ignoring larger questions about other education
outcomes. Specifically, it does not address citizenship outcomes — does the ideology of the
government affect what kind of national values, state history, or how students are learning
these things? I argued that states are loathe to surrender any of their real power in ed-
ucation precisely because of the connection between education and citizenship formation.
There exists a deep literature in the sociology of education about the role that education
plays in perpetuating socio-economic and political power (e.g. Althusser 1971; Freire 1996;
Bowles and Gintis 2011; Marginson 1999; Wolff 2005). But do left and right produce dif-
ferent types of citizens or do the convergent forces act in this area as well? Future research
should investigate this question.
Similarly, previous work (see, e.g. Farnen and Meloen 2000) has examined the relationship
between education and individual-level behavior that supports democracy. Others have
argued that the political right (even in democracy) tends to correlate with authoritarian
attitudes (Altemeyer 1996; Duckitt et al. 2010). What, then, is the relationship between
education under left or right and pro-democratic behaviors and attitudes? These are some
of the long-term goals and outcomes of education. In terms of short-term outcomes, more
work needs to be done to explore their relationship between partisan ideology. I found that
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there is very little relationship between partisan ideology and measures of access (enrollment,
completion, transition, dropout, or repetition rates), or quality (test scores). Does this
finding hold in other regions, particularly in the OECD where partisan ideology is related
to spending?
Equally, this project does not investigate the connection between partisan ideology and
curriculum generally. There exists a wealth of studies that look at this question in the context
of individual countries (e.g. Runhare and Muvirimi 2017; Journell 2010; Stinson 2007; Kelly-
Woessner and Woessner 2008; Niemi and Niemi 2007). Yet no comprehensive theory exists
connecting partisan ideology and curriculum design. Efforts to rewrite curriculum are costly
and time-consuming endeavors and often politically charged (Pring 1986). Those subjects
most connected with citizenship formation often fall into this area, but the United States has
demonstrated that even subjects like science can become the targets for partisan fights. As
an additional impetus to study this question separately, curriculum development can behave
differently vis-à-vis bureaucracies and legacies. The drafting process is often lengthy, but
an incomplete curriculum design could be overturned effortlessly by a new administration.
Curriculum is also a policy that can be very low cost to change, but also an area where
on the ground implementation can be derailed by dissatisfied teachers (Payne 2008; Hess
1999). Future work should consider what role partisan ideology plays in the design and
implementation of school curriculum.
This project focused on the question of partisan ideology and education outputs and
outcomes in the context of Latin America and specifically the case of Chile. Future research
might productively explore whether these findings hold in other developing regions or at the
subnational level in federal countries. As noted, Chile is an extreme case and if partisan
ideology cannot explain any variation in education outputs or outcomes there, then it is
unlikely to be able to do so anywhere. However, the factors that make Latin America unique
as a region, notably its high and persistent levels of inequality, may mean that the dynamics
of education are distinct in other regions (Huber et al. 2006). Additional cases, particularly
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in other regions, could contribute to a confirmation of my theory.
Exploring these questions in additional cases would also open the possibility of testing the
convergent forces for necessity and sufficiency (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000). I have argued
that all three forces — policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert advice — matter in
the Latin American context. Are all three necessary? Are policy legacies alone sufficient to
produce convergence? Approaching this question in other policy areas could also contribute
to answering these questions and to defining the scope conditions of this theory. I argued that
education policy is unique in several key ways — there are no educational “emergencies,”
education is a human right, and education is sequential and cumulative. Do these unique
features limit the theory of convergence to education policy or is it more broadly applicable?
The forces themselves are not unique to education policy, leading me to hypothesize that
they act in similar ways on other policy areas. This hypothesis should be tested in future
work.
A related future research question focuses on education systems in the wake of transitions
between democratic and non-democratic governments. The Chilean case hints at the some of
the changes that took place both in the wake of the military coup and, in greater detail, those
that occurred after the return to democracy. How do legacies from one system constrain the
actions of another? Are legacies left by authoritarian governments more enduring than those
left by democracies? By its nature an authoritarian government should be less bound by
policy legacies and stakeholder pressures than a democratic one. Yet these governments are
not completely free of the forces of path dependence, bureaucratic inertia, or public opinion.
Equally, education tends to generate individual-level behaviors and attitudes believed to
be positive for democracy (Farnen and Meloen 2000). How enduring, then, are education
policies after a transition away from democracy?
Finally, future research may also explore the question of what factors can help politicians
extend their time horizons. One of the central obstacles to education reform discussed
is that policy in this area is likely to inflict short term costs but return only long term
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benefits. Convergence may provide some ground for politicians to overcome this problem
(as suggested above), but what other elements can contribute to this solution? Under what
conditions can politicians overcome their naturally short time horizons? We generally assume
that because of the election cycle, politicians will avoid tackling problems that present long
term benefits and short term costs. Yet we also observe exceptions to this. In 2018 the city
of Austin, Texas, for example, approved a 100-year plan for dealing with water resources.
There are parallels between this case and the education policies considered here — the plan
was adopted when water was considered a salient issue, though not an “emergency” (the
historic drought in Central Texas that lasted 2008–2016 had passed and water reserves had
returned to normal levels); water policy involves a network of laws at different levels of
government; crucial aspects are beyond the control of legislators (e.g. rain or existing water
tables); and solutions involved significant short-term costs with the promise of only long-
term benefits. Future work linking episodes in which lawmakers appear to extend their time
horizons significantly with policy that seems to have converged could generate lessons for
policymakers.
Education has far reaching effects on individual lives and society as a whole. Research
demonstrates that at the individual level, increased education can provide upward mobility
and is crucial for integral human development. Equally, organized education is a fundamental
component of citizenship formation — states build their futures in classrooms. For these
reasons, there exists an intimate connection between education and politics. Yet political
science is only now starting to consider seriously education as a research topic. This study
contributes to our understanding of this relationship by demonstrating that there is only a
weak relationship between partisan ideology and education outputs and outcomes. Instead,
a combination of political forces — policy legacies, stakeholder pressures, and expert advice
— drive parties toward policy convergence. As states look forward for new ways to improve
their education systems and continue their development, an understanding that partisan








ACE: Sistema de Aseguramiento de la Calidad de la Educación — Education Quality As-
surance System [Chile]
ANER: Adjusted net enrollment rate
ARENA: Alianza Republicana Nacionalista — Nationalist Republican Alliance [El Sal-
vador]
CCT: Conditional Cash Transfer program
CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe — United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
ENU: Escuela Nacional Unificada — National Unified School [Chile]
ETR: Effective transition rate
FA: Frente Amplio — Broad Front Party [Uruguay]
DC: Demócrata Cristiana — Christian Democrat [Party] [Chile]
IDB: Inter-American Development Bank
ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education
LAPOP: Latin American Public Opinion Project
LGE: Ley General de Educación — General Education Law [Chile]
LOCE: Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Educación — Organic Constitutional Education
Law [Chile]
MAR: Missing at Random
MAS: Movimiento al Socialismo — Movement toward Socialism [Bolivia]
MCAR: Missing Completely at Random
MDGs: Millenium Development Goals
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MECE: Programa de Mejoramiento de la Calidad de la Educación (Básica/Rural/Media)
— (Primary/Rural/Secondary) Education Quality Improvement Program [Chile]
Mineduc: Ministerio de Educación — Ministry of Education [Chile]
OECD: Organization for Economic Development
PAN: Partido de Acción Nacional — National Action Party [Mexico]
PCCh: Partido Comunista de Chile — Communist Party of Chile [Chile]
PCV: Partido Comunista de Venezuela — Venezuelan Communist Party [Venezuela]
PISA: Program for International Student Assessment
PPD: Partido por la Democracia — Party for Democracy [Chile]
PRI: Partido Revolucionario Institucional — Institutional Revolution Party [Mexico]
PS: Partido Socialista — Socialist Party [Chile]
PSDB: Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira — Brazilian Social Democracy Party [Brazil]
PSU: Prueba de Selección Universitaria — University Selection Exam [Chile]
PT: Partido dos Trabalhadores — Worker’s Party [Brazil]
RN: Renovación Nacional — National Renovation [Party] [Chile]
SEP: Ley de Subvención Escolar Preferencial — Preferential School Subvention Law [Chile]
SIMCE: Sistema de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación — Education Quality Mea-
surement System [Chile]
SNED: Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Desempeño — National Performance Evaluation
System [Chile]
UDI: Union Democrática Independiente — Independent Democratic Union [Party] [Chile]
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
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Appendix B
Comparison with the OECD
Given previous findings that partisan ideology is a predictor of education spending in
OECD countries, it is worth exploring how these results compare directly with those in
Latin America. This appendix shows results on models of both outputs and outcomes. The
models in this appendix are as close as possible to those presented in the main text. Where
differences exist they are described below and are driven by both theory and data.
I show that in the OECD, as in Latin America, the left spends slightly more on secondary
education than the right, but this difference is substantively small. Similarly, the right spends
slightly more on capital expenditures than the left. Unlike in Latin America, I find that
parties on the right spend more on tertiary education than the left. There are no meaningful
differences between left and right on any education outcomes.
B.1 Data
In the OECD sample I use the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) left-right compos-
ite index (RILE) (Lehmann et al. 2015). This index puts all parties onto a one-dimensional
scale that runs from −100 on the left to +100 on the right.
It is not possible to use RILE in the Latin American sample for a direct comparison
of results because coverage in the region is still highly limited. Similarly, it is not possible
to use the Baker and Greene party measure on the OECD sample as they only classify
Latin American parties. While there are left/right party coding schemes that exist for a
wider range of countries, using them would require the assumption that parties in the same
family share preferences about education spending. This assumption holds in the regional
context, but is much more tenuous at the world level (Mair and Mudde 1998). Additionally,
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other coding schemes do not map onto Baker and Greene’s directly. These authors calculate
ideology based on an expert survey from Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009). Experts in
this survey coded parties and politicians based on positions on specific policy areas. This
approach provides a number of benefits, but makes the resulting codings extremely difficult
























Figure B.1: Party-Year Observations. Subplot (a) shows observations in the Latin American
sample. Subplot (b) shows the density of observations by RILE in the OECD sample.
Figure B.1 shows the relative prevalence of different party types in this dataset. The
distribution of parties in Latin America is very different from those in the OECD. Center-
right parties are the most common, though the center-left also has high representation —
the distribution is clearly bimodal. The left tail is also fatter than the right. In the OECD,
the distribution is fairly centered around the ideological center, although the center-left is
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slightly more common than the center-right.1 The extremes are uncommon in the OECD,
where the extreme right is much further from the center than the extreme left. Differences
between the distribution of political parties in each sample contributes to the claim that
Latin America should be treated in a separate analysis, as is done in this project.
I do not include a control for external debt service in the OECD sample for two reasons.
First, there is no theoretical reason for doing so. The control is important in Latin America
because of the spending model pushed by the IMF and other lending agencies alongside their
structural adjustment loans during the 1990s. Second, this data is simply unavailable because
countries in the OECD do not, with few exceptions, take out these kinds of international
loans.
Unlike Latin American countries, most OECD countries have parliamentary systems. To
account for this, the right left index value is used for the party with the highest vote share
in parliamentary systems. Similarly, the OECD models control for the percentage of seats
in the parliament won by the party with the most seats.
B.2 Outputs
B.2.1 Results in the OECD
Table B.1 presents results from the OECD sample models. The negative coefficient at
the secondary level suggests that the left spends more of its education budget on secondary
education than the right. Conversely, the right appears to spend more of its education
budget on tertiary education. These findings are largely in line with previous research on
the OECD. The right also appears to devote greater resources to capital expenses.
Several statistically significant results bear brief examination. First, democracy is asso-
ciated with higher levels of overall spending. This is in line with previous research. Second,
school-aged population is positively correlated with staff expenditures, but negatively with
capital and current expenses. These findings are intuitive — additional students require
1About 46% of the sample falls between -25 and 0, while about 39% falls between 0 and +25.
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more teachers, but there are many efficiencies to achieve in terms of facilities and other
consumable costs. Third, the significant and positive coefficients on primary and secondary
aged populations in models 2 and 3, respectively, are also intuitively satisfying. The negative
coefficient on tertiary aged population is surprising, however. Larger numbers of university-
aged students, as a percentage of the population, would suggest greater demand for tertiary
education and thus a greater share of education resources. There is no clear reason why we
should see the opposite.
Overall Primary Secondary Tertiary Staff Capital Current
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ideology −3.03e−3 −5.86e−3 −0.02∗ 0.02∗∗ −0.02 0.02∗ 2.70e−3
(−1.06) (−0.77) (−2.16) (3.25) (−0.97) (1.97) (0.19)
Polyarchy 14.81∗∗∗ 5.76 −0.65 −13.83∗ 10.03 −0.01 −15.50
(5.17) (0.76) (−0.07) (−2.03) (0.63) (−1.0e−3) (−1.15)
GDP per capita 1.20 1.36 10.71∗∗∗ 2.74 −2.48 −3.04 −1.24
(1.30) (0.64) (4.03) (1.51) (−0.51) (−1.21) (−0.30)
Urbanization 3.75 −85.88∗∗∗ 37.74 −37.74∗ 32.74 −42.68∗∗ 18.04
(0.67) (−5.42) (1.83) (−2.52) (1.06) (−2.65) (0.70)
Previous Education −1.51∗∗∗ −1.38 0.50 −0.02 3.12 −3.03∗ −0.80
(−4.21) (−1.23) (0.34) (−0.02) (1.10) (−2.05) (−0.34)
Growth 0.12 −7.44∗∗ −4.04 6.03∗∗ 0.54 1.32 0.28
(0.13) (−3.11) (−1.26) (2.85) (0.11) (0.53) (0.07)
School-aged Population 0.04 22.67∗∗∗ −7.84∗∗ −22.58∗∗∗









Parliamentary share −0.28 −1.56 −7.01∗ 3.33∗ 0.23 −3.53 5.36
(−0.42) (−0.76) (−2.56) (2.11) (0.07) (−1.93) (1.81)
Total education spending 0.80 −3.12 0.08 −2.49 4.98∗∗ −2.57
(0.60) (−1.77) (0.63) (−0.86) (3.32) (−1.06)
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Time controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 413 365 378 398 351 348 351
R2 0.9457 0.9461 0.8675 0.9116 0.8328 0.8121 0.8608
F Statistic 153.3∗∗∗ 142.2∗∗∗ 53.64∗∗∗ 84.85∗∗∗ 36.53∗∗∗ 31.38∗∗∗ 45.36∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table B.1: Spending models in OECD countries
Looking at the significant models, Figures B.2 plots the predicted secondary spending
along the RILE spectrum. The magnitude of the effect across the full ideological spectrum
is even smaller than for Latin America. This is unsurprising given the total variation in
budgetary allotments (as shown in Figure 1.2).
The positive and significant coefficient on capital expenses suggests that the right is
devoting greater education resources to this area. This finding has not been reported in the
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Figure B.2: Predicted spending levels for secondary and tertiary education. All covariates
are held at their mean.
spending and capital expenses. In both cases the coefficient is negative, suggesting that more
highly educated general populations result in lower education spending (and lower capital
investment). One possible explanation for this is that in advanced industrial societies, more
highly educated populations provide their children with greater cultural capital and other
home-based resources that have been shown to improve school performance, thus relieving
some of the burden from the state.
B.3 Outcomes
B.3.1 Access
The findings presented here are largely in keeping with those for Latin America: partisan
ideology holds little, if any, explanatory power for differences in education outcomes. Models
here are presented in three specifications, to allow comparison to both the Baker and Greene
models of the primary analysis and the Rosas models in Appendix D. The only place where it
is significant in the following models is in the maximum spec model for secondary completion
rates. The substantive effect in this size is small, as in other models, but the overall model is
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a poor fit and explains only a little over a third of the total variation. This, and the lack of
other similar findings, supports the conclusion that there is no relationship between partisan
ideology and education access outcomes.
Primary Secondary
Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology −0.008 −0.006 −0.014 −0.007 −0.004 0.003
(−0.511) (−0.356) (−0.763) (−0.240) (−0.132) (0.106)
Polyarchy 2.019 14.901
(0.125) (0.571)
GDP per capita −0.501 −0.683 8.099 6.641
(−0.195) (−0.237) (1.629) (1.420)
Urbanization −6.730 −12.796
(−0.501) (−0.522)




Lower house share 0.011 −0.002
(0.607) (−0.056)
Term length 0.062 0.036 0.091 0.239
(0.245) (0.134) (0.175) (0.529)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 222 220 192 182 180 153
R2 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.19
F Statistic 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.56 0.64 0.75
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table B.2: Adjusted Net Enrollment Rates.
Primary Secondary
Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology −0.005 −0.004 −0.010 −0.093 −0.079 −0.164∗
(−0.129) (−0.101) (−0.223) (−1.934) (−1.496) (−2.412)
Polyarchy −42.228 −55.594
(−0.962) (−1.163)
GDP per capita −10.044 −13.614 6.797 9.640
(−1.873) (−1.796) (0.846) (0.925)
Urbanization 121.576∗ −19.890
(2.172) (−0.244)




Lower house share 0.028 0.068
(0.563) (1.041)
Term length −0.003 0.014 0.294 0.042
(−0.005) (0.023) (0.449) (0.056)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 158 156 141 113 111 97
R2 0.11 0.14 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.38
F Statistic 0.56 0.65 0.86 1.17 1.11 1.11
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table B.3: Completion Rates.
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Min Base Max












Lower house share −0.006
(−0.513)
Term length 0.080 0.065
(0.568) (0.423)
Primary-aged population −0.000 −0.000
(−1.617) (−0.690)
Secondary-aged population
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 105 105 93
R2 0.26 0.32 0.40
F Statistic 1.05 1.22 1.20
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table B.4: Transition Rates.
Primary Secondary
Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology −0.014 −0.011 −0.002 0.046 0.057 0.091
(−0.841) (−0.625) (−0.096) (1.312) (1.480) (1.959)
Polyarchy −1.792 48.294
(−0.097) (1.531)
GDP per capita 3.215 0.306 3.268 8.330
(1.453) (0.091) (0.544) (1.184)
Urbanization −1.298 86.307
(−0.052) (1.235)




Lower house share −0.010 −0.079
(−0.453) (−1.785)
Term length 0.044 0.084 0.220 0.235
(0.174) (0.315) (0.439) (0.460)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 129 129 118 113 113 102
R2 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.35 0.36 0.46
F Statistic 0.62 0.67 0.60 1.64∗ 1.53 1.70∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table B.5: Dropout Rates.
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Primary Secondary
Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology −0.007 −0.010 −0.012 −0.016 −0.020 −0.016
(−0.756) (−1.071) (−1.072) (−1.113) (−1.260) (−0.820)
Polyarchy −9.071 5.582
(−1.189) (0.411)
GDP per capita 1.149 2.156 0.546 −1.123
(1.032) (1.143) (0.228) (−0.357)
Urbanization 34.148∗ −4.216
(2.651) (−0.176)




Lower house share −0.001 −0.021
(−0.196) (−1.284)
Term length −0.198 −0.220 −0.157 −0.143
(−1.455) (−1.638) (−0.712) (−0.597)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 94 94 83 113 113 101
R2 0.40 0.43 0.58 0.32 0.32 0.40
F Statistic 2.06∗ 1.91∗ 2.43∗∗ 1.52 1.41 1.39
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table B.6: Repetition Rates.
B.3.2 Quality
The results for quality are also in keeping with the findings from the Latin American
sample: right parties perform at slightly higher levels than those on the left. Again, inter-
preting the meaning of the substantive size of the effect is difficult. Because the unit of
analysis is a 15-year moving mean, a one unit change corresponds to a shift in ideology that
persists for 15 years. Further, even though the rile variable runs from −100 to +100, when
the 15 year moving mean is calculated, the range shrinks to approximately 12 to 20. This
means that a one standard deviation change in PISA score would require a mean change in
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Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.340) (0.102) (0.936) (0.552) (0.389) (0.737)
Polyarchy 0.048 −0.216
(0.836) (−1.264)
GDP per capita −0.023∗ −0.018 −0.057∗ −0.035
(−2.012) (−1.377) (−2.087) (−1.237)
Urbanization 0.091 −0.051
(1.950) (−0.321)




Lower house share 0.000 0.000
(0.467) (0.780)
Term length −0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001
(−0.008) (0.261) (0.836) (0.448)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 190 188 160 172 170 143
R2 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.23
F Statistic 0.44 0.62 0.77 0.57 0.79 0.87
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table B.7: GPI: Adjusted Net Enrollment Rates.
Primary Secondary
Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.001
(−0.921) (−0.953) (−1.012) (0.312) (−0.435) (1.028)
Polyarchy 0.089 0.559
(0.679) (1.645)
GDP per capita 0.015 0.034 −0.057 −0.133
(0.977) (1.429) (−0.896) (−1.655)
Urbanization 0.096 −0.205
(0.581) (−0.289)




Lower house share −0.000 −0.000
(−0.574) (−0.472)
Term length −0.001 −0.001 −0.008 −0.006
(−0.555) (−0.489) (−1.489) (−1.056)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 145 143 129 102 100 87
R2 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.40
F Statistic 0.44 0.48 0.59 0.67 0.76 1.07
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table B.8: GPI: Completion Rates.
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Lower house share 0.000
(1.426)
Term length −0.000 0.001
(−0.000) (0.181)
Primary-aged population −0.000 0.000
(−0.261) (0.120)
Secondary-aged population
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 103 103 93
R2 0.44 0.44 0.49
F Statistic 2.41∗∗ 2.09∗∗ 1.82∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table B.9: GPI: Transition Rates.
Primary Secondary
Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology −0.006 −0.009 −0.000 −0.015 0.010 −0.020
(−0.532) (−0.793) (−0.037) (−0.518) (0.346) (−0.453)
Polyarchy −3.041 −12.846
(−0.270) (−0.486)
GDP per capita −0.151 −0.283 11.062∗ 14.144∗
(−0.103) (−0.124) (2.047) (2.084)
Urbanization 4.368 0.672
(0.248) (0.010)




Lower house share 0.002 0.009
(0.118) (0.198)
Term length −0.156 −0.031 0.401 0.245
(−0.926) (−0.175) (0.944) (0.515)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 115 115 104 84 84 74
R2 0.06 0.08 0.21 0.29 0.36 0.44
F Statistic 0.23 0.25 0.60 0.96 1.19 1.07
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table B.10: GPI: Dropout Rates.
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Primary Secondary
Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.010
(0.354) (0.495) (1.085) (1.341) (1.507) (0.964)
Polyarchy 3.627 −12.465
(0.563) (−1.663)
GDP per capita −0.884 −0.107 0.087 0.047
(−1.118) (−0.069) (0.061) (0.027)
Urbanization 13.986 5.103
(1.401) (0.416)




Lower house share −0.004 0.011
(−0.528) (1.206)
Term length 0.153 0.135 0.089 0.043
(1.491) (1.194) (0.743) (0.319)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 81 81 71 100 100 89
R2 0.12 0.18 0.29 0.43 0.43 0.50
F Statistic 0.38 0.51 0.61 2.23∗∗ 2.05∗∗ 1.86∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table B.11: GPI: Repetition Rates.
Equity of Quality
In contrast to the findings in Latin America, the OECD sample suggests that the left out-
performs the right on the gender parity index for test scores! However, this is only true for
math, while the other subject areas have 95% CIs that cross the 0 threshold. This finding
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Figure B.4: Effect of party ideology on GPI for PISA scores — 15 year moving mean.
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Appendix C
UNESCO Definitions of Education Levels and Areas
All definitions provided herein are taken verbatim from UNESCO Institute for Statistics
(2012).
C.1 Levels
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) pro-
vides internationally comparable definitions of education levels called the International Stan-
dard Classification of Education (ISCED) (ibid.). These standards were first defined in 1997
and then updated in 2011 with a more comprehensive and granular scheme. The descriptions
in this appendix all correspond to the 2011 definitions.
ISCED breaks education into nine levels, labeled ISCED level 0–8. These levels cor-
respond to the following categories: early childhood, primary, lower secondary, upper sec-
ondary, post-secondary non-tertiary, short-cycle tertiary, bachelor’s or equivalent, master’s
or equivalent, and doctoral or equivalent.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ISCED Level 1: Programmes at ISCED level 1, or primary education, are typically designed
to provide students with fundamental skills in reading, writing and mathematics (i.e. literacy
and numeracy) and establish a solid foundation for learning and understanding core areas of
knowledge, personal and social development, in preparation for lower secondary education.
It focuses on learning at a basic level of complexity with little, if any, specialisation.
Educational activities at ISCED level 1 (particularly in the early grades) are often or-
ganized around units, projects or broad learning areas, often with an integrated approach
rather than providing instruction in specific subjects. Typically, there is one main teacher
responsible for a group of pupils who organizes the learning process, although a class may
have more than one teacher, especially for certain subjects or units.
Age is typically the only entry requirement at this level. The customary or legal age of
entry is usually not below 5 years old nor above 7 years old. This level typically lasts six years,
although its duration can range between four and seven years. Primary education typically
lasts until age 10 to 12…Upon completion of primary education programmes, children may
continue their education at ISCED level 2 (lower secondary education).
ISCED Level 2: Programmes at ISCED level 2, or lower secondary education, are typically
designed to build on the learning outcomes from ISCED level 1. Usually, the aim is to lay
the foundation for lifelong learning and human development upon which education systems
may then expand further educational opportunities. Some education systems may already
offer vocational education programmes at ISCED level 2 to provide individuals with skills
relevant to employment.
Programmes at this level are usually organized around a more subject-oriented curricu-
lum, introducing theoretical concepts across a broad range of subjects. Teachers typically
have pedagogical training in specific subjects and, more often than at ISCED level 1, a class
of students may have several teachers with specialised knowledge of the subjects they teach.
ISCED level 2 begins after four to seven years of ISCED level 1 education, with six years
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of ISCED level 1 being the most common duration. Students enter ISCED level 2 typically
between ages 10 and 13 (age 12 being the most common).
ISCED Level 3: Programmes at ISCED level 3, or upper secondary education, are typically
designed to complete secondary education in preparation for tertiary education or provide
skills relevant to employment, or both.
Programmes at this level offer students more varied, specialised and in-depth instruction
than programmes at ISCED level 2. They are more differentiated, with an increased range
of options and streams available. Teachers are often highly qualified in the subjects or fields
of specialisation they teach, particularly in the higher grades.
ISCED level 3 begins after 8 to 11 years of education since the beginning of ISCED level
1. Pupils enter this level typically between ages 14 and 16. ISCED level 3 programmes
usually end 12 or 13 years after the beginning of ISCED level 1 (or around age 17 or 18),
with 12 years being the most widespread cumulative duration. However, exit from upper
secondary education may range across education systems from usually 11 to 13 years of
education since the beginning of ISCED level 1.
ISCED Level 5: Programmes at ISCED level 5, or short-cycle tertiary education, are of-
ten designed to provide participants with professional knowledge, skills and competencies.
Typically, they are practically- based, occupationally-specific and prepare students to enter
the labour market. However, these programmes may also provide a pathway to other ter-
tiary education programmes. Academic tertiary education programmes below the level of a
Bachelor’s programme or equivalent are also classified as ISCED level 5.
Entry into ISCED level 5 programmes requires the successful completion of ISCED level
3 or 4 with access to tertiary education. Programmes at ISCED level 5 have more complex
content than programmes at ISCED levels 3 and 4, but they are shorter and usually less
theoretically-oriented than ISCED level 6 programmes.
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Although ISCED level 5 programmes are usually designed to prepare for employment,
they may give credit for transfer into ISCED level 6 or 7 programmes. Upon completion of
these ISCED level 5 programmes, individuals may in some education systems continue their
education at ISCED level 6 (Bachelor’s or equivalent level) or long first degree ISCED level
7 programmes (Master’s or equivalent level).
ISCED Level 6: Programmes at ISCED level 6, or Bachelor’s or equivalent level, are often
designed to provide participants with intermediate academic and/or professional knowledge,
skills and competencies, leading to a first degree or equivalent qualification. Programmes
at this level are typically theoretically-based but may include practical components and are
informed by state of the art research and/or best professional practice. They are traditionally
offered by universities and equivalent tertiary educational institutions.
Instruction at this level often takes the form of lectures by staff who are typically required
to have attained ISCED levels 7 or 8 or have achieved experience as a senior professional
in the field of work. Programmes at this level do not necessarily involve the completion
of a research project or thesis, but if they do, it is less advanced, less independent or is
undertaken with more guidance than those at ISCED level 7 or 8.
Entry into these programmes normally requires the successful completion of an ISCED
level 3 or 4 programme with access to tertiary education. Entry may depend on subject
choice and/or grades achieved at ISCED levels 3 and/or 4. Additionally, it may be required
to take and succeed in entry examinations. Entry or transfer into ISCED level 6 is also
sometimes possible after the successful completion of ISCED level 5. Upon completion of
ISCED level 6 programmes, individuals may continue their education at ISCED level 7
(Master’s or equivalent level), although not all ISCED level 6 programmes provide access to
ISCED level 7. ISCED level 6 programmes do not usually give direct access to programmes
at ISCED level 8 (doctoral or equivalent level).
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C.2 Areas
Staff Expenditures: All staff (teacher and non-teachers) compensation expressed as a per-
centage of direct expenditure in public educational institutions (instructional and non-
instructional) of the specified level of education. Financial aid to students and other transfers
are excluded from direct expenditure. Staff compensation includes salaries, contributions by
employers for staff retirement programmes, and other allowances and benefits. Divide all staff
compensation in public institutions of a given level of education (ex. primary, secondary, or
all levels combined) by total expenditure (current and capital) in public institutions of the
same level of education, and multiply by 100.
Current Expenditures: Current expenditure expressed as a percentage of direct expendi-
ture in public educational institutions (instructional and non-instructional). Financial aid
to students and other transfers are excluded from direct expenditure. Current expenditure
is consumed within the current year and would have to be renewed if needed in the fol-
lowing year. It includes staff compensation and current expenditure other than for staff
compensation (ex. on teaching materials, ancillary services and administration). Divide
all current expenditure in public institutions by total expenditure (current and capital) in
public institutions, and multiply by 100.
Capital Expenditures: Capital expenditure expressed as a percentage of direct expenditure
in public educational institutions (instructional and non-instructional). Financial aid to
students and other transfers are excluded from direct expenditure. Capital expenditure is
for education goods or assets that yield benefits for a period of more than one year. It
includes expenditure for construction, renovation and major repairs of buildings and the
purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles. Divide capital expenditure in public institutions
by total expenditure (current and capital) in public institutions, and multiply by 100.
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Appendix D
Alternative Party Codings and Model Extensions
As noted in the main text, I employ two other party coding systems in robustness checks
of these results. Because they provide the highest coverage and the most recent data the
Baker and Greene (2011) measure serves as the benchmark model. The first alternative
is provided by Rosas (2005) and uses a similar continuous measure of party ideology. This
variable is measured on a continuous scale from −2 on the left to +2 on the right. The Rosas
measure of partisan ideology has inferior coverage, forcing models in the outputs analysis to
use alternative specifications in order to reach statistical significance.
The second alternative typology and coding of political parties comes from Coppedge
(1997) as extended by Huber and Stephens (2012) (referred to herein as the CHS coding and
data). Using this coding makes the results more directly compatible with those in Huber and
Stephens (ibid.), but are harder to compare with the continuous measures. In this coding
system, parties are classified along two dimensions: a left-right dimension and a Christian
or secular dimension. The former dimension has the following categories: left, center-left,
center, center-right, right, other, and personalist. I exclude all “other” and “personalist”
parties from the analyses. These exclusions have no effect on the outcomes.1 In the analyses
I also collapse Christian and secular parties into single categories (e.g. Christian center-
left and secular center-left become, simply, center-left). Including these parties as separate
categories, however, has no effect on the results.
In their extensions, Huber and Stephens (ibid.) include an alternative coding of the
Peronist party in Argentina as secular center-left (as opposed to the “Other” category it is
assigned in previous eras) for 2010–2012 because the party became more programmatically
1See Section D.1 below for a discussion of “other” and “personalist” parties in Latin America.
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oriented. I adopt this coding as it reflects the dynamic nature of party politics and avoids
dropping additional cases. All results presented below are robust to either specification.
I further convert the CHS codings into an interval variable. This is done for both theoret-
ical and practical reasons. On the theoretical side, there is no clear category to withold in the
regression analysis. Typically, the category with the most observations would be withheld.
In this case, that would be the center-left. The consequence of this is that all coefficient
estimates are in relationship to this category. Yet there is no reason to be interested in how
the left or the center compares with the center-left and some of the categories have very few
observations. Nor is there any reason to prefer a different party category for comparison.
While it is possible to conduct a series of regressions witholding a different category each
time, the results are neither intuitive nor informative. On the practical side, any categorical
results are not comparable to the linear results from either the Baker and Greene or the
Rosas-based variable analyses.
A consequence of converting from a categorical measure to an interval one is that it
introduces an assumption that the spacing between party categories is constant. This as-
sumption is almost certainly not met in this case. For this reason, the results from the CHS
regressions should be treated with great care and are presented only to show that there is
general agreement across all three datasets.
Baker and Greene’s measure correlates with Rosas at 0.72. After converting the CHS
measure to an interval variable, we can also correlate this with the primary measures —
Baker and Greene with Coppedge: 0.20; Rosas with Coppedge: 0.25. It is unsurprising
that the CHS codings correlate at a low level with the other measures given the different
way in which party ideology is measured. It is encouraging, then, that the results from this
alternative measure are in line with those from Baker and Greene and Rosas.
230
D.1 Personalist and Other Parties
In the reanalysis using the CHS coding, I exclude personalist and other parties for theo-
retical reasons. These parties do not fit onto a left-right dimension and they do not form a
homogeneous group about which any meaningful conclusions can be drawn. Excluding them
has no substantive effects on the results presented in the main text.
Of the 374 observations in the CHS data coding, 26 (7%) are classified as either “other”
or “personalist.” However, missingness on other variables means that excluding these parties
generally decreases the model n by only 4–6 observations. Table D.1 summarizes where these
observations occur.
Argentina Ecuador Guatemala Peru Suriname Venezuela
Other 5 0 0 0 0 0
Personalist 0 4 4 9 6 2
Table D.1: Country-year observations of personalist and other parties by country. All coun-
tries not listed have no observations in these categories.
From the codebook provided by Huber and Stephens (2012), these observations corre-
spond to the following parties:
Argentina: Partido Justicialista
Ecuador: Partido Sociedad Patriótica
Guatemala: Frente Republicano Guatemalteco
Peru: Cambio 90, Peru Posible
Suriname: Nationale Democratische Partij
Venezuela: Convergencia Nacional, Movimiento Quinta República
D.2 Outputs
D.2.1 Results from Rosas
Given the high level of correlation between the Rosas measure and the benchmark from
Baker and Greene, it should be no surprise that the results are nearly identical when this
measure is used. As in the primary analysis, the only level at which ideology is significant
is the secondary level. Again, the left spends more than the right here. Unlike Baker and
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Greene, however, the Rosas measure does not suggest that there are any differences between
left and right in terms of capital expenditures (or any other area). The restricted sample size
may be responsible for this difference. Table D.2 presents a simplified view of the results.
The models all have R2 values and F-statistics that suggest they explain a high degree of




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































D.2.2 Results from CHS
The results from the analysis using the Coppedge measure, presented in table D.3 vary
only slightly from the other two sets of models. Because CHS measure ideology in such a
different way, these results should be considered encouraging confirmatory evidence in favor
of the conclusion that partisan ideology plays little role in determining education spending.
As with the models using Baker and Greene’s measure and the Rosas measure, the CHS













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These results are also consistent with the main findings presented above. The coefficient
on ideology at the secondary level is only significant at the p < 0.069 level, but it is still
suggestive that the left spends slightly more than the right, albeit in substantively small
amounts.
D.2.3 Bivariate Results
Overall Primary Secondary Tertiary Staff Capital Current
Ideology 0.088 0.475∗∗∗ −0.028 −0.374∗∗∗ 0.300 0.118 −0.317∗
(1.707) (4.551) (−0.246) (−4.124) (1.845) (1.323) (−2.348)
Observations 222 207 205 205 159 162 159
R2 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.03
F Statistic 2.91 20.71∗∗∗ 0.06 17.00∗∗∗ 3.41 1.75 5.51∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table D.4: Spending by in Latin America. Bivariate results.
As noted in the main text, these results should not be considered to carry any substantive
meaning. If a statistical model is a simplified view of the world and a data generation process,
then these models are ones in which education spending is determined absent consideration of
number of students, national economic situation, or current state of education development.




Reanalyzing the outcome models using different specifications of the ideology measure
(for access models) and time (for quality measures) produces results substantively identical to
those presented in the main text. Because Rosas has lower coverage of the ideology variable,
total observations in most full specification models are reduced to the point where they
cannot provide valid statistical inferences. In order to overcome this problem, I am forced to
reduce the number of explanatory variables. The models presented below use a “baseline”
specification in which the explanatory variables are ideology, GDP per capita, length of term,
school aged population, along with controls for time and country dummies. Additional
minimal specification models (using only ideology as a predictor) and a full specification




Min Base Max Min Base
Ideology 0.404 0.486 1.828 −0.824 0.186
(0.881) (0.980) (0.316) (−0.951) (0.230)
Polyarchy 187.057
(0.327)








Lower house share −12.687
(−0.458)
Term length 1.090 4.594 2.163
(1.548) (0.328) (1.887)
Primary-aged population 0.000 0.000
(1.204) (0.007)
Secondary-aged population
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 29 27 22 25 23
R2 0.21 0.46 0.73 0.41 0.72
F Statistic 0.42 0.73 0.28 0.82 1.81
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table D.5: Adjusted Net Enrollment Rates. Ideology is measured using Rosas classification.




Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology 0.378 0.348 −1.394 0.963 1.846 2.168
(0.286) (0.219) (−1.060) (0.651) (1.233) (0.926)
Polyarchy −169.452 −158.236
(−1.616) (−0.894)
GDP per capita −7.373 −44.806 −45.029 −2.769
(−0.205) (−1.654) (−1.134) (−0.048)
Urbanization −383.941 −1088.670
(−0.963) (−2.343)




Lower house share 45.844 25.444
(1.937) (0.688)
Term length 0.800 −2.746 4.478 7.656
(0.349) (−0.624) (2.018) (1.480)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 29 27 22 30 29 24
R2 0.19 0.29 0.95 0.24 0.41 0.85
F Statistic 0.37 0.35 2.92 0.45 0.70 1.17
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table D.6: Completion Rates. Ideology is measured using Rosas classification.
Min Base Max












Lower house share 8.215
(0.309)
Term length 0.584 2.169
(0.529) (0.436)
Primary-aged population −0.000 0.000
(−0.178) (0.946)
Secondary-aged population
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 26 26 22
R2 0.52 0.58 0.92
F Statistic 1.39 1.08 1.13
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table D.7: Transition Rates. Ideology is measured using Rosas classification.
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Primary Secondary
Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology −0.267 −0.110 −0.365 0.633 0.826 1.672
(−0.426) (−0.158) (−0.252) (0.989) (1.095) (0.924)
Polyarchy 70.027 15.921
(0.666) (0.075)
GDP per capita −15.619 −24.746 −9.269 −12.529
(−0.881) (−0.771) (−0.456) (−0.218)
Urbanization −808.615 −81.663
(−1.635) (−0.224)




Lower house share −0.576 42.647
(−0.025) (1.239)
Term length −0.129 −1.961 0.870 3.440
(−0.122) (−0.618) (0.784) (0.861)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 31 30 26 29 28 24
R2 0.42 0.50 0.78 0.46 0.51 0.81
F Statistic 1.09 0.95 0.88 1.12 0.96 0.64
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table D.8: Dropout Rates. Ideology is measured using Rosas classification.
Primary Secondary
Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology −0.283 −0.332 0.187 −0.506∗ −0.524 −0.899∗
(−1.128) (−1.237) (0.556) (−2.251) (−2.066) (−2.958)
Polyarchy 54.517 55.270
(2.232) (2.406)
GDP per capita 2.730 12.018 2.999 29.362∗
(0.399) (1.612) (0.427) (3.929)
Urbanization 53.274 −27.097
(0.464) (−0.449)




Lower house share −5.792 −10.777
(−1.100) (−2.245)
Term length −0.621 −0.276 0.030 −2.126∗
(−1.530) (−0.375) (0.074) (−3.165)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 31 30 26 30 29 25
R2 0.35 0.47 0.91 0.36 0.40 0.94
F Statistic 0.79 0.82 2.58 0.79 0.66 3.32
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table D.9: Repetition Rates. Ideology is measured using Rosas classification.
Bivariate Analysis
D.3.2 Quality
Figures D.1 and D.2 show an alternative model specification in which 10 and 5-year
moving means are used, respectively. The results are identical to the 15-year moving mean
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ANER Completion Transition Dropout Repetition
Ideology 0.010 −0.128 0.078 −0.158 −0.008
(0.144) (−0.876) (0.712) (−1.212) (−0.161)
Observations 70 60 53 63 64
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00
F Statistic 0.02 0.77 0.51 1.47 0.03
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table D.10: Bivariate results using Baker and Greene measure of ideology.
ANER Completion Dropout Repetition
Ideology −0.296 −0.247 −0.068 0.053
(−2.001) (−1.106) (−0.691) (1.121)
Observations 58 61 55 63
R2 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.02
F Statistic 4.00 1.22 0.48 1.26
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table D.11: Bivariate results using Baker and Greene measure of ideology.
presented in the main text. The right outperforms the left, but the substantive size of the
effect is extremely small.
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Figure D.1: Effect of party ideology on PISA scores — 10 year moving mean.
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Figure D.2: Effect of party ideology on PISA scores — 5 year moving mean.
Highest Achievement
Figures D.3 and D.4 use percentile scores as the dependent variable. In the former, the
outcome is the percentage of students scoring at the highest level of competency and in the
latter it is percentage of students scoring at or above the 95th percentile. All results confirm
the findings in the main analysis: the right outperforms the left in a statistically significant




















Figure D.3: Effect of party ideology on percentage of students scoring in the highest achieve-



























Min Base Max Min Base
Ideology −0.001 −0.001 0.004 −0.006 −0.008
(−0.240) (−0.203) (0.143) (−1.457) (−1.413)
Polyarchy 0.603
(0.203)








Lower house share 0.201
(1.398)
Term length 0.000 0.023 −0.005
(0.059) (0.316) (−0.597)
Primary-aged population 0.000 −0.000
(0.020) (−0.199)
Secondary-aged population
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 29 27 22 25 23
R2 0.40 0.40 0.85 0.43 0.48
F Statistic 1.02 0.58 0.60 0.88 0.65
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table D.12: GPI: Adjusted Net Enrollment Rates. Ideology is measured using Rosas classi-
fication. Secondary maximum model excluded because there are insufficient observations to
identify the model.
Primary Secondary
Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology 0.001 0.000 0.008 −0.006 −0.008 −0.003
(0.446) (0.115) (1.565) (−1.684) (−1.960) (−0.394)
Polyarchy 0.511 0.525
(1.346) (0.787)
GDP per capita 0.148 0.205 0.122 0.071
(1.843) (1.766) (1.120) (0.327)
Urbanization 2.252 2.094
(1.260) (1.195)




Lower house share 0.067 0.043
(0.815) (0.309)
Term length −0.005 0.010 −0.008 −0.003
(−1.129) (0.829) (−1.292) (−0.164)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 32 30 25 30 29 24
R2 0.35 0.48 0.85 0.40 0.47 0.82
F Statistic 0.85 0.87 1.49 0.95 0.90 0.95
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table D.13: GPI: Completion Rates. Ideology is measured using Rosas classification.
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Min Base Max












Lower house share 0.116
(1.243)
Term length −0.002 0.015
(−0.282) (1.168)
Primary-aged population 0.000 −0.000
(0.421) (−1.246)
Secondary-aged population
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 28 28 25
R2 0.28 0.30 0.79
F Statistic 0.48 0.34 0.74
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table D.14: GPI: Transition Rates. Ideology is measured using Rosas classification.
Primary Secondary
Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology 0.541 0.562 −0.236 −0.284 −0.066 −2.478
(1.565) (1.456) (−0.795) (−0.511) (−0.099) (−1.311)
Polyarchy 60.869 −149.302
(1.957) (−0.681)
GDP per capita 13.417 9.253 −8.640 −38.555
(1.397) (0.673) (−0.510) (−0.643)
Urbanization −532.150∗ 322.667
(−4.497) (0.359)




Lower house share −13.719 −44.269
(−2.737) (−0.816)
Term length −0.444 −1.821 0.700 −3.841
(−0.870) (−2.207) (0.762) (−0.961)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 27 26 23 27 26 22
R2 0.41 0.51 0.97 0.23 0.29 0.71
F Statistic 0.81 0.70 4.70 0.35 0.32 0.26
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table D.15: GPI: Dropout Rates. Ideology is measured using Rosas classification.
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Primary Secondary
Min Base Max Min Base Max
Ideology 0.157 0.173 −0.250 0.352∗ 0.359∗ 0.312
(1.409) (1.446) (−1.331) (2.587) (2.317) (0.801)
Polyarchy −26.573 −35.762
(−1.943) (−1.214)
GDP per capita −3.356 −4.515 −1.345 −10.814
(−1.099) (−1.082) (−0.314) (−1.129)
Urbanization −48.518 −24.599
(−0.754) (−0.318)




Lower house share −1.140 1.769
(−0.387) (0.288)
Term length 0.238 −0.395 −0.027 0.628
(1.314) (−0.957) (−0.111) (0.730)




Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 31 30 26 30 29 25
R2 0.19 0.35 0.81 0.45 0.48 0.78
F Statistic 0.34 0.51 1.04 1.16 0.91 0.70
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗P<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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The most common framework for statistical inference is the “frenquentist” approach,
so called because of the centrality of frequency distributions to its method. In this frame-
work, the researcher makes assumptions about the process that generated observed data
and attempts to answer question, “Given these assumptions, what is the probability of ac-
tually observing the data?” The goal of much academic statistical research is to estimate
parameters that describe the data generating process. For example, a researcher may run a
regression to estimate the effect of democracy on human capital development. In this frame-
work, however, the researcher could only make the claim that, under repeated sampling,
the true value of the estimated parameter would fall within a given range (the “confidence
interval”) some percentage of the time (often 95%). In any given sample, however, she would
have no way of knowing if the estimated parameter was in the 95% or the 5%.
The Bayesian framework provides a contrasting approach. In this framework, the re-
searcher takes a given (and known) set of data and attempts to answer the question, “Given
these data, what should I believe about the process that generated them?” This approach
has several advantages. First, the formulation of the question and the types of claims that
can be made are more straightforward. The researcher can, for example, claim that there
is a 95% chance that some range (the “credibility interval”) contains the true value of the
estimated parameter. Another advantage is that this framework allows the researcher to
achieve an arbitrarily high degree of precision regarding the results, even in the presence of
a small n.
Bayesian analysis is based on Bayes’ formula:
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P (A|B) = P (B|A) · P (A)
P (B)
(E.1)
This formula provides a systematic way of updating beliefs about the world in light of new
information. In inferential statistics, the interpretation of (P |B) is the probability of some
outcome, A, given some data, B. Unfortunately, we can never calculate the denominator of
Equation E.1 directly. We simply do not (and cannot) know the probability of the data we
have observed. To overcome this problem, we rely instead on the proportionally equivalent,
P (A|B) ∝ P (A) ·P (B|A). In Bayesian terminology, this is understood to mean the posterior
probability is proportional to the prior times the likelihood. In prose, this means that the
probability of some outcome A happening, given that we have observed some data, B, is
proportional to the probability of A ever happening times the probability that we should
observe the data B if we already known A has happened.
In this framework, all of the probabilities are distributions, describing how the researcher
believes about the likelihood of different values for the parameters before knowing the values
of the data and how he or she should believe about those values after observing the data. That
is, we can characterize our beliefs about the probability of different values for each parameter
by multiplying our prior beliefs about that parameter by the likelihood of observing the data
we observe, as specified by our model. Prior beliefs are allowed to be extremely vague, nearly
to the point of complete ignorance, although completely uninformative priors are generally
impossible to truly achieve.
Given the complexity of many models and the highly unintuitive, multi-dimensional
distributions that result, the actual implementation of a Bayesian analysis relies on the
intuition that we can learn the important characteristics of a distribution by drawing samples
from it. We allow the computer to sample repeatedly from the posterior distribution and
use that to characterize our beliefs. I implement the models using the Stan software and run
sampling for 50,000 iterations.1 I allow a 2,500 iteration burn-in period and then thin the
1Specifically, I run Stan through the package rstan in R. Section E.2 provides sample code using this
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results by 5. My effective sample size varies by test and variable, but generally falls within
a range of 35,000 to 45,000 (out of a theoretical 50,000 maximum). Standard tests confirm
that all regressions converge for all sampled variables.
E.1 Priors
A common critique of the Bayesian approach is that results obtained depend on the
priors used to model the process. This is true, but is perhaps an unfair criticism. With very
strong priors, the model will learn slowly, leaving the researcher in charge of “finding” the
results he expects. One way to overcome this problem is to use uniformative priors. This is
precisely the approach that I take. My priors on the test score models are characterized as
β ∼ N(0, 5) and σ ∼ cauchy(0, 2.5) so that the outcome variable is a draw from y ∼ N(β, σ).
Figure E.1 shows these distributions.
−20 −10 0 10 20
x
Figure E.1: Prior distributions used for β (solid line) and σ (dashed line).
framework.
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The combination of a normal distribution for β and a cauchy distribution for σ produces
vague priors. In other words, these weakly informative priors suggest a naive belief about
the distribution of the relevant parameters. The specific values for the prior distribution
parameters are chosen to match the appropriate scale for the outcome variables.
E.2 Sample Stan and R Code
Stan uses a Multi-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm called the no-U-turn sampler
(NUTS), which is an adaptive variation on the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) method to
perform sampling. This approach varies from a “standard” approach in that it draws from
a modified density, p(ρ,Θ) = p(ρ|Θ)p(Θ), where ρ is a multivariate normal distribution.
The approach attempts to calculate the momentum of the target distribution and adjust
accordingly in order to generate accurate posterior distributions.
The following code shows a typical model definition using Stan. The code is broken into
four blocks: data, parameters, model, and generated quantities. The data and parameter
blocks define mode inputs, including dimensions and restrictions on possible values. The
“model” block specifies prior distribution beliefs and the likelihood function that is used
to estimate all parameters. Finally, the “generated quantities” block specifies what values
should be stored and, in this case, how to transform some of them for output.
// Stan code to model test scores as the outcome
data {
int N; // number of observations
int K; // number of covariates
matrix[N, K] X; // covariate matrix
vector<lower = 100, upper = 650>[N] y; // outcome vector
}
parameters {
vector[K] beta; // the regression coefficients
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real<lower = 0> sigma; // the residual scale
}
model {
// Define the priors
beta ~ normal(0, 5);
sigma ~ cauchy(0, 2.5);
// The likelihood






log_lik[i] = normal_lpdf(y[i] | X[i,]*beta, sigma);
y_sim[i] = normal_rng(X[i,]*beta, sigma);
}
}
Implementing the model within R is trivial. The following code block provides an example
using PISA math scores as the dependent variable.
# some stan setup
Sys.setenv(USE_CXX14 = 1)
library(rstan)
library(shinystan) # must load to avoid multicore failure bug
rstan_options(auto_write = TRUE)
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Analysis of Comparative Manifestos Project
Quasi-Sentences on Education
The Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Krause et al. 2019) provides a wealth of
data on party manifestos in Europe since 1945 and a few Latin American countries over
the past three decades. Many of these manifestos have been broken into quasi-sentence
statements and hand-coded based on a wide range of relevant policy topics. Thus it is
possible to see where parties stand on policy issues, officially, at elections. This creates the
opportunity to study whether parties are converging or diverging in their official positions.
Still, such a study presents several significant challenges. First, the number of quasi-
sentences is large: in the European sample there are over 62,000 statements on education.
Additionally, these manifestos are provided in 38 different languages. No single researcher
is likely to be able to study these in a systematic way. Luckily, recent advances in machine
learning and natural language processing (NLP) make this a tractable problem. I use a
neural network to embed entire sentences in a representation space capable of encoding in
93 languages. I then calculate the similarity of the embedded sentences between competing
parties in each election to show that left and right are converging in their education rhetoric.
This appendix describes the methodology behind the analysis.
F.1 NLP and Sentence Embeddings
NLP has grown by leaps and bounds in recent years due to the availability of both
enhanced methods and ever greater (and cheaper) computing power. Central to all NLP
problems is the need to represent language in some kind of numerical vector format. The
simplest such methods is a “bag of words” approach. This method generates a list of all
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words and counts the number of appearances of that word in a given text.1 Bag of words
approaches are simple to implement, but lose all information about the order and context
in which words appear and generally cannot handle the introduction of new words after the
initial encoding.2
A second simple approach is to use a “dictionary” in which every unique word is mapped






the sentence could be represented as a vector [3, 2, 1, 4] for a computer to process. The
dictionary approach preserves information about word syntax and is appealing in that it
can be reversed to construct meaningful language. In the example above, it is a trivial task
to convert the numerical vector back into the sentence. However, dictionary methods have
inherent limitations, including the ability to handle only individual characters or words.3
Dictionaries can also only handle words contained in their original creation. Processing
the sentence “I am a political scientist” using a model based on the dictionary above, for
example, would have to discard the word “political.” Additionally, dictionaries can only be
used on a subset of NLP problems. They cannot, for example, be used to generate text
because machine learning and NLP models that process dictionary-based language vectors
will produce non-integer values as output, which contain no interpretable meaning.
1A “text” here could be a sentence or a longer document.
2In other words, the vocabulary used in training a bag of words model cannot be expanded when the
model is applied to new data.
3There is no theoretical restriction against creating a dictionary of sentences, but such an embedding
would contain no meaning and the number of distinct sentences would be far too large to be useful.
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To overcome these limitations, researchers have moved toward more complex language
representations. Most of these methods also rely on dictionary embeddings during their
initial stages: language must be converted to numerical values for any computer process-
ing. They move beyond these rudimentary representations, although, in learning complex
relationships between language elements. Many of these methods are “unsupervised” in
that they require no labeled training data. Instead, the computer “learns” the relationship
between words or sentences on its own.
Cutting edge research in this area focuses on the power of “neural networks” to produce
representations of arbitrary length. Perhaps the best known model in this area is Google’s
word2vec method, which encodes individual words in a vector space, usually of 100–500
dimensions. This model has been shown to have strong abilities across a range of language-
related problems (Mikolov et al. 2013). More recent researchers have attempted to move
beyond this model. One important step was provided by Kiros et al. (2015), who generated
a very similar approach that encodes entire sentences. Their model built on the strengths of
word2vec, but increased the network’s ability to “understand” human language. The LASER
model employed here (Artetxe and Schwenk 2019) is a further refinement in which entire
sentences across many languages are embedded in a common vector space.
NLP neural nets have been applied to a wide range of problems including classifying texts,
identifying language structures and parts of speech, translating between languages, generat-
ing new text sui generis, automatically captioning images, calculating semantic similarity,
and more.
F.1.1 Neural Networks
Neural networks are complex mathematics structures that are relatively easy to under-
stand. They were inspired by the human brain, but have since moved past that analogy.
Originally posited in McCulloch and Pitts (1943), neural networks did not become tractable
until an advance by Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams (1985) overcame a fundamental prob-
lem of training networks in which they would not learn. Recent advances in computing
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have made the calculations required feasible in a reasonable amount of time, leading to an
explosion in research in the area.
The fundamental unit of a neural network is the “cell.” Neural cells can have different
architectures, but the most common one is the “perceptron.” Simply put, a perceptron takes
an input and produces an output. The first crucial aspect of the neural architecture is a
probabilistic element to whether or not the perceptron “fires” (activates and produces an













Weighted sum: z = W⊤ · X
Output: hw(X) = f(X⊤ · X)
Figure F.1: A simple perceptron — the building block of a neural network.
The perceptron takes an arbitrary (but pre-defined) number of numerical inputs and
multiplies each by a given weight.5 The weighted inputs are then aggregated (with a simple
summation function) and fed into the activation function, h(·). The researcher can select an
appropriate activation function, but the logistic function and hyperbolic tangent function6
4A variety of functions exist for determining if a single neuron fires.
5Note that a fixed input of 1 is also fed into the perceptron. This value is generally referred to as the
“bias” and is equivalent to including an intercept term in linear regression.
6The hyperbolic tangent function is defined as tanh(z) = 2σ(2z)−1, where σ is a constant hyperparameter,
generally set based on the number of inputs and outputs. Early researchers used a step activation function,
but found that it trained slowly because the step function is non-differentiable, resulting in backwards passes
that did not learn.
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are common choices. The perceptron outputs a value then activates (or not) depending on
whether the calculated value of the activation function crosses the activation threshold.
A “neural network” takes at least two multiple neurons, arranges them in “layers,” and
connects the layers. The simplest neural network consists of two layers, where the input
of the second layer is the output from the first. Many neural networks rely on “dense” (or
“fully-connected”) networks in which every cell in one layer is connected to every cell in
the subsequent layer. Most neural networks also include at least one additional “hidden”
layer between the input and output layers. Networks that contain multiple hidden layers are










Figure F.2: A simple multi-layer perceptron network.
This fully-connected network consists of an input layer, a single hidden layer of four
perceptrons, and an output layer. The input layer simply passes the input values into each
perceptron. Each perceptron performs its function as described above.7 Finally, the output
layer sums the output from the hidden layer.
7Note that for simplification of visual presentation, the bias input and weights have been excluded.
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The second crucial aspect of the neural architecture is a feedback mechanism by which
the network “learns.” Training data is first passed through the network as described above.
Then, the output value is compared against the expected output value to calculate the
“error.” Working backwards through the network, the percentage that each cell played in
producing the error is calculated and the weight for that cell is adjusted to correct the
predicted output. By exposing the network to sufficient training data, weights are tuned so
that the ultimate output is an accurate representation of the input. In many circumstances,
the output is in a reduced form from the input. For example, a classification problem would
take a large number of variables as input and produce a single output — the predicted class.
Other networks sequentially reduce the number of neurons in the first half of layers, and the
increase them again in the second half — translation networks, for example, work in this
manner.
F.1.2 Neural Networks and Language Representation
Many early language models represented language as words drawn randomly from a
probability distribution of all words. The well-known Wordfish program, for example, models
language in this fashion (Slapin and Proksch 2008). More recent NLP approaches attempt
to take into account the context in which a letter or word appears in order to predict other
words or letters around it. In other words, these models view language as an ordered sequence
of inputs and allow a computer to learn to recognize patterns of words better by studying
the sequences themselves.
This approach requires a modified cell structure — cells must have some kind of “memory”
to consider both current and past input in order to model the sequential nature of language.
Perceptrons are not capable of this. Several alternative cell structures exist, but one of the
highest performing ones is the “long short-term memory” (LSTM) cell. In the most general
sense, an LSTM cell takes standard input, along with a short-term state input (that conveys
cell state from immediately preceding data) and a long-term state input (that conveys cell
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state from more distant preceding data). It then produces a standard output, and the short-
term and long-term states that will be fed into the cell along with the subsequent data.









Figure F.3: A long short-term memory cell. Blue rectangles represent logistic functions and
red rectangles represent hyperbolic tangent functions. ⊗ is the element-wise multiplication
operator and ⊕ is the element-wise addition operator.
Data, x(t), is fed into the cell and an output, y(t), is produced. h as the short-term
memory and c can be viewed as the long-term memory. Thus, h(t−1) and c(t−1) are the short-
and long-term states from the previous iteration, respectively. Tracing the path of the data,
the output is generated by considering both short- and long-term states (which have already
been modified with the new data) along with the new data itself. The new short term state
is equal to the output of the cell.
F.1.3 LASER
In order to embed the quasi-sentences from CMP, I use the Language-Agnostic Sentence
Representations (LASER) network, which was designed and recently made available to the
public by Facebook AI (Artetxe and Schwenk 2019). This network has several desirable
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properties for the problem of encoding CMP sentences. First, it creates language-agnostic
embeddings for sentences from any of 93 languages. Most other language models are built
around one or two languages. The model is trained using pairs of translated sentences, but
by exposing the model to many language pairs, it learns a language-agnostic embedding.
Second, the embeddings are high-dimensional, allowing for a very complex language model
and accurate embeddings. Figure F.4 illustrates the network architecture.
x1
BPE Embed · · · BPE Embed
</s>
BiLSTM BiLSTM· · ·
· · ·












Figure F.4: LASER Network
Light blue rectangles are the input layer where sentences are encoded using a byte-pair
encoding scheme. These encodings are then fed into a 5-layer dense bi-LSTM network.
This network differs from the LSTM described above in that it is bi-directional. In the
uni-directional model, the sequence of words is fed into the network in one direction. The
bi-directional network used in LASER looks at sentences both forwards and backwards.
The LASER network follows the general architecture of a translation network. It is
trained with an encoder — which translates sentences into computer encodings — and a
decoder — which translates those same encodings back into words. Both encoder and decoder
networks consist of five layers of LSTM cells. The decoder differs slightly in that it uses the
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uni-directional LSTM cells and is trained on the embedded sentence from the first language,
the byte-pair encoding of the sentence from the second language, and a language identifier.
The network uses a final “SoftMax” layer to aggregate output and produce a prediction. The
softmax, or normalized exponential function, takes an input vector and normalizes it into a
true probability distribution.
Note, too, that the order of the words in a sentence is reversed between the two halves
of the model. The special sentence-ending token “</s>” ends the sequence for the encoder,
but starts it for the decoder. As a result of this flip, the final output sentence is in the
correct direction.
Facebook provides a pre-trained version of this model that opens the possibility of en-
coding an arbitrary number of sentences in its network and using those embeddings in a
range of NLP problems.8 Encoding arbitrary sentences is the task required here.
F.2 Similarity of High Dimensional Sentence Repre-
sentations
High-dimensionality is a virtue of the LASER encoder, but it is also a limitation. Many
calculations that work in low-dimensional space fail when dimensions increase. This “curse
of dimensionality” (Bellman 1961) is well documented and is particularly acute for distance
metrics (Aggarwal, Hinneburg, and Keim 2001). A well-known distance metric is the Euclid-
ian distance. This is the distance between two points on a cartesian plane following a line
“as the crow flies.” The Manhattan distance (the shortest path between two points using
only orthogonal lines, named for the intuition that this is how one travels through a city
grid) is another common measure. As the number of dimensions increases, these distance
metrics become bound by unknown constants and lose their ability to describe how similar
8The public provision of the trained network, and not merely the code, is crucial. Facebook AI reports
that training was performed on 233 million sentences (all of which were translated across two languages) and
that they “train on 16 NVIDIA V100 GPUs with a total batch size of 128,000 tokens…for 17 epochs, which
takes about 5 days” (Artetxe and Schwenk 2019). By way of explanation of scale, a single NVIDIA V100
is capable of performing over 100 TFLOPS (1 TFLOP is 1 trillion floating point calculations per second).
This means the network required approximately 6.912× 1018 total calculations to train.
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(distant) two observations are (Singh Bhatti 2018).
One approach to overcome this limitation is to use the cosine similarity as a metric
for similarity between vectors. Instead of attempting to measure the distance between two
points (as in the case of Euclidian or Manhattan distance measures, for example), the cosine
similarity measure the angle between two vectors. It takes values in the range [−1, 1] where
a value of −1 corresponds to two diametrically opposed vectors and 1 to identical vectors.
This also implies that orthogonal vectors receive a value of 0.
There is an inherent problem here in that it is not clear what a “diametrically opposed”
or “orthogonal” vector for sentence embeddings might be. Nonetheless, the intuition holds
that higher cosine similarity values corresponds to greater similarity between sentences.















where Θ is the angle between the two vectors.
F.3 Validation
Does this approach produce valid estimates of the differences between sentences? The
authors of LASER demonstrate its applicability in a wide range of NLP problems (Artetxe
and Schwenk 2019). They do not, however, test it on a semantic similarity problem (as is
the case here). I provide a preliminary validation check using data from the International
Workshop on Semantic Evaluation (SemEval).9 This (approximately) bi-annual conference
provides sentence pairs with hand-coded gold standard similarity scores.
9Note that as invaluable as this data source is for validating this approach, it is limited in that all the
sentences pairs are in English. The LASER encoder performs well in the other languages used in this analysis
(see ibid.). Other options could only be considered if they can encode both the languages of interest (Spanish
and Portuguese) and English.
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I process the sentences from SemEval and embed them using the LASER encoder. The
correlation between the gold standard similarity scores and the cosine similarities of LASER
sentence embeddings is 0.67. This value suggests that while the power of the embeddings in
this task is imperfect, it performs at a sufficiently high level for drawing conclusions about
the similarity of manifesto statements.
A concern with this approach is that even using the cosine similarity as a distance metric
will result in very high values for semantically opposite sentences. This is a valid concern.
The sentences “Education is important and we should spend more on it” and “Education is
not important and we should spend less on it” have a cosine similarity of 0.91390. These
pairs of sentences obviously have opposite meanings but still appear very similar. Consider
a pair of sentences more clearly not related: “This morning I made a cup of coffee” and the
opening to A Tale of Two Cities:
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom,
it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of
incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the
spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had
nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct
the other way – in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some
of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in
the superlative degree of comparison only. (Dickens 2003, p. 5).
These sentences have a cosine similarity of 0.30590. Despite their differences, they still
have a positive similarity (recall that diametrically opposed vectors have a cosine of −1).
Still, it is an important point of comparison. The results presented in the main text and
below have cosine similarities that fall in the approximate range 0.25 to 0.5.
As another point of comparison, consider two manifesto statements from the 2005 Chilean
presidential elections. The first is from Michelle Bachelet’s Concertación: “Para lograr ese
objetivo central necesitamos invertir más en educación” (To achieve this central objective we
need to invest more in education). And from Sebastian Piñera, the candidate for the RN that
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year, “En el plano del acceso a la educación, piedra angular de la igualdad de oportunidades,
las iniquidades son abismales” (At the level of access to education, the cornerstone of equality
of opportunity, the inequalities are abysmal). The cosine similarity between these statements
is 0.55321
F.4 Results
Figure F.5 shows the results of the analysis for manifesto statements on education and
equality for both Latin American and European samples. The Latin American sample in-
cludes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The “European” sample is made up
of observations from Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Portugal,
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
Each point represents a pair of parties in an election for which data exists. The X-axis
measures the ideological difference (RILE) between the parties, as calculated by the CMP
(Krause et al. 2019). The Y-axis measures the average distance between policy statements
for the pair of parties in the election year. Solid lines show mean statement differences
regressed on ideological difference. The blue points and blue line show policy statements
related to equality and the red points and line show policy statements on education.
The results here are interesting and surprising for several reasons. First, the European
sample shows results in keeping with expectations. The downward sloping lines suggest
divergence on education and equality: as parties grow more ideologically distant, their state-
ments on these topics become more dissimilar. However, the relationship is not statistically
significant. We can interpret this as suggestive evidence that there is manifesto divergence



















































































































































































































































































































































Figure F.5: Manifesto statements and partisan ideology. Latin American sample in the left
plot, European sample in the right.
weak at best.
Second, the Latin American sample is suggestive of convergence on both education and
equality. The latter finding is particularly surprising, given the foundational nature of equity
to the left and right. There are two possible explanations for this finding. One is that
statements on “equality” are not equivalent to those on “equity.” There is no doubt that
the two concepts are distinct and they cannot be substituted for one another. The second
possibility is that in the context of very high and persistent inequality in Latin America,
right parties are simply forced to express a greater degree of support for equitable policies
than in other regions.
As with the European sample, neither relationship in Latin America is significant. In
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